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  Introduction.
     Benjamin Franklin’s Diplomacy and the 1783 Treaty of Paris 
 Benjamin Franklin’s diplomacy during the negotiations surrounding the 1783 Treaty of 
Paris has endured over two centuries of scholarly commentary and critique. Initially dispatched 
as one of a three-member delegation from the newly fangled United States to France, Franklin 
soon emerged as America’s sole commissioner before the French Court. The main assignments 
of the American delegation were to create a Franco-American alliance, to secure munitions for 
the ensuing Revolutionary War, and to wrest from Britain the diplomatic recognition of 
American independence. To accomplish these lofty goals, Franklin needed to devise a shrewd 
and farseeing diplomatic strategy. Drawing from his pre-revolutionary experiences in London, he 
clearly understood that Europe was a continent of royal empires and ancient rivalries. Franklin 
also recognized that international diplomacy occurred in settings surrounded by deceptive 
behaviors, questionable loyalties, security breaches, and sharp conflicts. Realizing that his 
advantageous experience afforded him a special understanding of imperial diplomacy, Franklin 
developed a three-part scheme to extract the greatest American entity from a behemoth British 
Empire and create a new Atlantic world order. His first endeavor involved wrestling control of 
the American delegation from the other commissioners and embellishing his existing celebrity in 
Versailles. Once in command, Franklin consciously wove America’s interests into the French 
political tapestry in a bid to make their aims interdependent. This enabled Franklin to stand with 
the strength of a French backbone, avert Britain’s repeated amity initiatives to weaken the 
crown’s tenacity, and eventually elicit the greatest concessions for peace and an independent 
United States.   
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In recent decades, the relevance of revisiting Franklin’s diplomatic activities in France 
has benefitted greatly from the enhanced availability of original source materials. In 1988, the 
Packard Humanities Institute initiated a project to create a digital database of all available 
Franklin documents. To celebrate Franklin’s 300th birthday on January 17, 2006, the Institute 
opened a new web site as a practical access point to these materials, many of which were 
previously unpublished. To date, this website contains thirty-seven volumes of published papers 
dating from the record of his birth until August 14, 1782. The collection also contains nine 
volumes of unpublished documents dating to his final letter addressed to Thomas Jefferson on 
April 8, 1790. This has created an unprecedented access to Franklin’s intimate thoughts and has 
enabled a reevaluation of his life and accomplishments. 
 Franklin’s historiography has diverged significantly over the past two centuries. This has 
not transpired in a clear and tranquil manner. In the decades following his death, despite much 
controversy about his role in the American Revolution, historians presented his story in a matter-
of-fact fashion. This approach consisted mostly of recounting events, dates, and results. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, historians realized Franklin was a much deeper personality who 
deserved a more complete analysis. Nevertheless, a thoroughgoing reevaluation of Franklin’s life 
and career did not emerge until the second half of the twentieth century as a cadre of intrepid 
editors working through the vast Franklin archival collections at the American Philosophical 
Society and Yale University began publishing a professionally crafted edition of his papers. 
Prompted by the availability of many of these papers for the first time, a new generation of 
historians embarked on a dramatic and unprecedented reevaluation of one of America’s greatest 
personalities. This resulted in a complete rebranding of Franklin’s image. As the twentieth 
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century ended, Franklin emerged as a complicated personality who experienced both triumphs 
and failures. These efforts to humanize Franklin have coincided with the application of new 
perspectives on his pivotal diplomatic career. Some of these have included recognition of 
Franklin as America’s first foreign minister who helped shape what became the vast State 
Department of the U.S. government. Other bodies of ideas including the Cold War and the 
concept of an “Atlantic World” have provoked new assessments of how Franklin’s multinational 
environment influenced him and how his contributions to literature, culture, science as well as 
diplomacy have influenced the world on a broader scale. 
 The American delegation to France evolved through three distinct phases. The earliest 
consisted of a three-person commission with instructions from Congress to engage a foreign 
court whose willingness to receive them was uncertain. Knowing the magnitude of their mission, 
Franklin assessed the abilities of his American contemporaries and concluded that he alone 
possessed the talent and experience to achieve their stated goals. To implement his homespun 
covert scheme, Franklin took advantage of a vaguely defined mission. This allowed Franklin to 
establish his personal residence in Paris as the headquarters of the America delegation and 
control the flow of information among his fellow commissioners. As Franklin consolidated his 
personal power, the delegation experienced multiple episodes of internal conflict. Franklin was 
directly and knowingly responsible for a large portion of this infighting that hurt their reputation 
and impeded the delegation’s progress. He also ignored or failed to confront multiple threats to 
the commission’s stability and success. The most startling was Franklin’s blatant and 
lackadaisical approach to protecting sensitive diplomatic information from questionable 
associates and suspected spies. Using a chaotic environment to his advantage, Franklin provoked 
divisions within the delegation to sideline the effectiveness of his colleagues. A central 
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component of this strategy rested on the persistent diplomatic failures and professional 
embarrassments of fellow commissioner Arthur Lee. These blunders enabled Franklin to align 
himself unofficially with Commissioner Silas Deane against the hapless Lee. With Lee removed 
and Deane likewise reduced to a limited sphere of influence, Franklin could embellish his 
already existing celebrity in Versailles. As Congress continually amended its instructions to the 
increasingly dysfunctional delegation, it became clear that the nomination of a sole delegate in 
Paris would quell the infighting and create a greater measure of accountability. At the urging of 
the French ministry, Congress designated Franklin as its minister plenipotentiary in France thus 
freeing him to implement the second stage of his diplomatic agenda.  
 Despite Congressional efforts, the problems plaguing the delegation continued even after 
Franklin became America’s sole delegate before the French court. This new phase exhibited a 
further breakdown of communications that resulted from what his associates described as 
Franklin’s reckless diplomacy. Despite these criticisms, Franklin increasingly imbedded himself 
within the fabric of Versailles and managed to maintain French support. Eventually, suspicions 
arose among the other commissioners and members of Congress about Franklin’s true loyalties. 
To keep an eye on Franklin’s activities Congress dispatched Col. John Laurens as a special agent 
both to assist Franklin and to evaluate the elder statesman’s pandering to the French. Franklin 
perceived the appointment and potential meddling of Laurens as a none-too-veiled condemnation 
of his performance as minister. He thus used the moment as an opportunity to request Congress 
for permission to retire because of his advancing age. Congress denied this proposition and 
requested that Franklin continue as its sole minister in Paris. By reaffirming his assignment, 
Congress in essence preserved the status quo and enabled Franklin to continue his personal style 
of diplomacy unchecked and unchanged. 
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  As time passed, it appeared that Franklin was merely performing his perfunctory 
ministerial duties without actively advancing America’s aims. While this was partially true, 
Franklin also was anticipating the diplomatic strategy of the British during the eventual process 
of concluding the war. Franklin knew from personal experience and an understanding of 
Europe’s ancient rivalries that Britain would seek to subvert the budding Franco-American 
alliance. Realizing the depths of Anglo-French animosity from the moment he arrived in France, 
Franklin consciously cajoled the Versailles elite to be on their guard against the vindictive 
British. 
 On January 2, 1782, the British diplomat David Hartley wrote Franklin proposing peace 
negotiations between Britain and America without French involvement. Franklin sternly rejected 
separate negotiations, imbedded himself within the French ministry and commenced what 
marked the third phase of Franklin’s French initiative. This stage included both the ending 
hostilities and achieving peace through the negotiation of the first treaty of the American nation. 
During a period of eleven months, Franklin brilliantly manipulated the traditional enmities 
between Britain and France, currying the favor of each when needed, and deflecting one against 
the other when required. Eventually tired of the long and costly war, the British unexpectedly 
agreed to a set of terms proposed by Franklin that London had previously rejected as 
unacceptable. Deftly guiding the process toward a favorable conclusion while remaining behind 
the scenes, Franklin manipulated the Spanish, French, and British ministers to negotiate an end 
to hostilities on January 20, 1783. Once British resolve was broken without his direct 
involvement, Franklin was able to secure the most advantageous peace for America. On 
September 3, 1783, the definitive peace craftily finagled by Franklin materialized with the 
signing of the Treaty of Paris. 
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 Following the conclusion of the treaty, Franklin remained in France for almost two years 
engaging in a multitude of interests, including a continued banter with the British over various 
incarnations of American independence. Franklin expressed an interest in a reconciliation 
between Britain and America and offered a variety of ideas on how to achieve it. He also boldly 
offered suggestions about constructing an Atlantic family alliance among the former belligerent 
powers to form a new union of mutual interests. Despite his efforts to define the role of a strong 
American entity within the evolving Atlantic community, Franklin remained removed from the 
New World and immersed in the pursuit of his rich European lifestyle. While he fulfilled his 
obligation to his country, he was also entertaining the best options for his impending retirement 
and last years of life. Franklin continued bargaining with his British contemporaries with or 
without the blessings of the French to define the outlines of a renewed Anglo-American 
rapprochement that would perpetrate an English speaking dominion across the North Atlantic 
world. It was only after he returned in 1785 to the United States he helped bring into existence 
that he realized that Americans valued their independence and freedom so much that there was 
no realistic hope that he could participate in creating a new confederation of Atlantic nations. 
Chapter One: 
An Evolving historiography 
 The historical analysis of Benjamin Franklin has undergone dramatic changes over the 
previous two centuries. In the decades following his death, scholars constructed their critiques to 
present Franklin as an infallible American hero. The earliest historians presented their 
assessments of Franklin in a one-dimensional fashion that championed facts and 
accomplishments with no in-depth interpretation of the events. Leonard Woods’ expansive 1826 
biography of Franklin successfully established and cemented this methodology among Franklin 
scholars. As the nineteenth century progressed, historians slowly began to question the validity 
of this approach, although no significant revisionism occurred. In 1867, James Parton produced 
the dramatic two-volume The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin that served as a reminder to 
historians that their craft lacked ingenuity and critical analysis. This prompted a concerted effort 
by several important scholars to offer new insights and perspectives to Franklin’s historiography. 
Despite this, actual progressed remained limited as represented by Jeremiah Chaplin’s hero 
themed 1876 The Life of Benjamin Franklin. The first significant attempt to modernize 
Franklin’s historical legacy occurred in 1899 when Sydney George Fisher actively attacked the 
failure of his fellow historians to explore Franklin’s strengths and weaknesses and produced The 
True Benjamin Franklin. As this growing thirst for truth grew within the historical community, a 
backlash against modernization was simultaneously brewing. This wave of resistance against 
revisionism triumphed when Carl Van Doren produced his 1938 Pulitzer Prize winning and 
remarkably flattering biography titled Benjamin Franklin. This definitive work paused Franklin’s 
historiography for nearly three decades until the publication of Richard Morris’ 1965 The Peace 
Makers. Morris’ work was a watershed moment for the historical review of Franklin because he 
reinterpreted Franklin’s legacy by applying a human component to his study. In the ensuing 
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decades, historians have appeared increasingly determined to dismiss all biases and humanize 
Franklin to gain a thorough understanding of his personal strengths and weaknesses. As 
Franklin’s historiography enters its third century, newly available primary sources have 
combined with contemporary perspectives such as the concept of an Atlantic world to produce 
unique insights and demonstrate that understanding this dynamic personality is a work in 
progress.  
In 1826 American Protestant theologian, Leonard Woods produced one of the earliest 
complete works on Franklin titled The Life of Benjamin Franklin. This significant publication 
helped establish the hero-worship that continues to influence Franklin’s historiography nearly 
two centuries later. Despite the work's extensive length, the author failed to present the majority 
of his source materials, instead opting to include an appendix of various writings credited to 
Franklin without specific references about their application to the text. Woods began his 
biography by tracing Franklin’s lineage back to 1555 to establish that Franklin came from a line 
of great thinkers and inventors.1 The author included an anecdote about how the Franklin family 
were among the first in England to convert to Protestantism in an effort to inflate their presence 
during definitive historical changes. Woods also recounted how Franklin’s grandfather was a 
prominent inventor who devised a contraption during the reign of Roman Catholic Mary I that 
consisted of a stool that concealed the Franklin’s English Bible and allowed them to read it 
without detection from the Catholic proctor.2 Woods clearly intended to paint the Franklin family 
as prominent innovators who stood at the forefront of the Reformation. This characterization was 
                                                           
 
1
 Leonard woods, The Life of Benjamin Franklin: Including a Sketch of the Rise and Progress of the War of 
Independence, and of the Various Negotiations at Paris for Peace; with the History of His Political and other 
Writings (London: Hunt and Clarke, 1826), 4.  
 
2
 Ibid., 5-6.  
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easily applicable to Benjamin Franklin’s later rebellious but righteous actions during the 
American Revolution.  
 Woods’ treatment of Franklin’s diplomatic activities demonstrated his calculated 
intention to avoid any disparaging references in favor of results and achievements. Of Franklin’s 
first residency in London between 1757 and 1762, Woods diminished Franklin’s role in the 
failure of this endeavor by attributing the outcome to Britain’s preoccupation with European 
events and lack of concern for Pennsylvania politics.3 Woods then quickly turned his attention to 
more flattering events of the period. He specifically highlighted that the University of St. 
Andrews, the University of Edinburgh, and Oxford University all awarded Franklin honorary 
doctorates during this period.4 Woods’ strategy of selective presentation was also evident in his 
assessment of Franklin’s brief return to America. He avoided the political miscalculations that 
cost Franklin his seat in the Pennsylvania Assembly in favor of promoting the championing of 
his efforts by the local anti-proprietary party. When analyzing Franklin’s second dispatch to 
London, Woods provided a stale chronicle of events and clearly chose to keep Franklin’s role in 
the repeal of the Stamp Act at the forefront.  
 Woods’ treatment of Franklin’s diplomatic endeavor to France mirrored his account of 
his earlier years in London. The author immediately recounted in detail how the French ministry 
received Franklin and expressed their utmost respect for him. From this vantage point, Woods 
focused on the negotiations surrounding the Franco-American alliance and eventual Treaty of 
Paris by presenting a very plain and straightforward rendition of dates and achievements. Woods 
clearly avoided any mention of the public controversies that surrounded Franklin during this 
phase of his public career, instead choosing to inflate Franklin’s stature. Woods accomplished 
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4
 Ibid., 146.  
10 
 
this through a series of anecdotes including an account of how British diplomat Richard Oswald 
advised the British ministry that “nothing was to be expected from Dr. Franklin inconsistent to 
his duty to America.”5 This pandering to Franklin’s celebrity continued throughout his 
examination of the negotiations and signing of the Treaty of Paris. Woods concluded his 
assessment of the negotiations by describing Franklin’s triumphant return to America and noted 
“he was surrounded by old men, who had petitioned heaven to live long enough to behold his 
return.”6 This flattery continued through Woods’ account of Franklin’s final years. 
 In 1867, James Parton produced the two volume Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin. 
Parton’s introduction explicitly acknowledged that the central contribution of his study to 
Franklin’s historiography was the inclusion and consideration on a larger scale of Franklin’s 
1725 philosophical pamphlet A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain. 
Despite this consideration, Parton’s study closely mirrored Woods’ biography published forty-
one years earlier. The author documented this work slightly better than Woods’ study by 
including sporadic footnotes although most source materials remained unclear. Parton began his 
examination of Franklin by tracing his lineage back hundreds of years to a family of English 
blacksmiths. Parton used this to indicate that Franklin’s ancestors supplied their villages with 
iron and therefore were important contributors to the public good.7 Parton continued by 
enhancing Franklin’s exceptional personality and described him as a “devouring reader.”8 Once 
establishing Franklin’s exceptionalism, Parton applied this perspective to all phases of his work.  
 When examining Franklin’s diplomatic exploits, Parton relied heavily on Franklin’s 
celebrity to present his account. Parton began his assessment of Franklin’s first dispatch to 
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 Ibid., 275.  
 
6
 Ibid., 289.  
 
7
 James Parton, Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin, (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1867), 1: 14.   
 
8
 Ibid., 44.  
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London by highlighting his grand reception at the house of botanist and Fellow of the Royal 
Society Peter Collinson. The author used this anecdote to construct his study around Franklin’s 
stature with the great thinkers and scientists in London. Parton‘s overall assessment of Franklin’s 
political activities in London was general, and the author generously declared Franklin’s 
endeavor a partial success.9 The remainder of Parton’s first volume followed Franklin back to 
Philadelphia and then examines his return to London. Parton’s rendition of these events mirrored 
Woods’ in both style and content. 
 In volume two of this study, Parton championed Franklin’s notoriety in Paris claiming, 
“he came to Paris, to Passy, to Versailles; conferred with ministers, dines with princes, supped 
familiarity with the most distinguished ladies, and played for some weeks, the role of first 
lion.”10 About Franklin’s election by Congress as minister plenipotentiary to France, Parton 
claimed, “every true friend to America in Paris rejoiced in this triumph of Franklin over his 
mean, insidious foes.”11 This dismissal of the other Americans and promotion of Franklin’s 
greatness carried through the remainder of Parton’s study. When addressing the problematic 
relations between Franklin and John Adams, Parton dismissed Adams by stating, “his jealousy of 
Dr. Franklin sometimes amounted to a mania.”12 Parton concluded his examination of the Paris 
negotiations by chronicling the events surrounding the signing of the Treaty of Paris in a matter-
of-fact tone. 
 In 1876, Jeremiah Chaplin produced a similarly traditional biography of Franklin titled 
The Life of Benjamin Franklin. This work clearly indicated that Franklin’s historiography had 
grown stale by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Chaplin’s biography mirrored Woods’ 
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 James Parton, Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin, (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Co., 1867), 2: 344. 
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 Ibid., 378.  
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 Ibid., 504.  
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and Parton’s work in style, presentation, and poor documentation of source material. The 
importance of this work in the study of Franklins’ historiography is that it represents fifty years 
of frozen scholarship between Woods’ contribution and Chaplin’s rehashing.  
 Chaplin began his assessment of Franklin’s diplomacy by following Parton’s lead and 
highlighting Franklin’s grand welcome by Peter Collinson in London. Chaplin asserted that 
Franklin was a frugal American who, despite his celebrity, kept his attention focused on his 
mission.13 The author presented Franklin’s first endeavor to London and offered the same 
explanation as his fellow historians. He noted that although Franklin fervently pursued his duties, 
the British were not interested in Pennsylvania politics and failed to engage the matter.14 
Chaplin’s account of Franklin’s second diplomatic assignment to London revealed his flair for 
enhancing Franklin’s stature. The author described Franklin’s responsibilities as “demanding the 
highest statesmanship, and in which all his greatest qualities were to be brought into exercise and 
put to the severest test.”15 From here, Chaplin presented Franklin’s role in the Stamp Act debate 
in a precise but stale manner that focused on events and results without much analysis. 
 Chaplin’s treatment of the Paris negotiations focused on the adversity Franklin faced and 
championed his diplomatic abilities. Chaplin noted that the struggling colonial army discouraged 
French sympathy, and that Franklin’s ability to achieve success in Paris initially appeared 
unlikely.16 Once Chaplin painted a picture of Franklin the underdog, he relied heavily on 
Franklin’s celebrity to demonstrate how the Franco-American alliance came to fruition. Chaplin 
noted how “Franklin and his fellow commissioners were formally introduced to the King but 
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 Jeremiah Chaplin, The Life of Benjamin Franklin (Boston: D. Lothrop and Co., 1876), 222. 
 
14
 Ibid., 228. 
 
15
 Ibid., 250. 
 
16
 Ibid., 341.  
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Franklin was the center of attention.”17 Chaplin’s approach to highlight Franklin’s reputation and 
focus on his reception heavily diminished his ability to analyze the roles the other American 
commissioners played. Chaplin also ignored any controversies or suspicions that surrounded 
Franklin during this period in favor of promoting his infallibility stating that Congress “showed 
their entire confidence in his ability and integrity.”18 This hero worship and lack of analysis 
continued throughout Chaplin’s account of the peace process and the signing of the Treaty of 
Paris.  
 By the end of the nineteenth century, historians were began to criticize Franklin’s 
traditional historiography, although they acted with restraint. Sydney George Fisher and his 
biography The True Benjamin Franklin challenged this caution in 1899. In this work, Fisher 
explicitly alerted the reader to how Franklin’s legacy became a creation of historians. In the 
work’s preface, Fisher compared Franklin’s legacy to that of George Washington. He noted that 
both individuals suffered from the myth making that turned them into abstract qualities and 
avoided the “eternal truths of human nature.”19 Fischer then proceeded to explain how this 
applied to each of them. He noted that historians created Washington’s myth by ignoring 
personal habits and traits, instead building him into a political and military phenomenon. The 
author then contended that the legacy of Franklin endured the same treatment. Fisher highlighted 
that historians frequently ignored components of Franklin’s personality while exaggerating other 
aspects.20 The author concluded that Franklin “has been modified into an impossible prodigy.”21 
Despite this, Fisher predicted that the human side of Franklin was bound to shine through 
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 Ibid., 361.  
 
19
 Sydney George Fischer, The True Benjamin Franklin (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1899), 5.  
 
20
 Ibid., 7. 
 
21
 Ibid., 8. 
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because “the human in him was so interlaced with the divine that the one dragged the other into 
the light.”22   
 Fisher’s analysis of Franklin’s diplomatic activities was unique for his time. The author 
devoted an entire chapter to Franklin’s first dispatch to London and titled it “Difficulties and 
Failures in England.” The author explicitly declared that Franklin’s mission to change 
Pennsylvania into a royal province failed. He noted that Franklin did not push the issue, and the 
king did not entertain the notion.23 Fisher consciously balanced this account by asserting that 
despite Franklin’s failure, he did possesses notable diplomatic skills. Fisher provided examples 
of how Franklin “gave those famous answers which enhanced his reputation more than any one 
act of his life, except, perhaps, his experiment with the kite.”24 An example used by Fisher was 
Franklin’s response to a suspicious question from a British minister about whether he was 
acquainted with Newfoundland to which Franklin answered, “I was never there.”25  
 Fisher titled chapter nine “The Embassy to France and Its Scandals.” At this point, 
Fisher’s treatment of Franklin became more personal, and the author highlighted Franklin’s 
personal insecurities and his feeling that he was, “old and good for nothing.”26 Despite this 
rhetoric, Fisher noted that Franklin readily accepted his dispatch to France and included several 
flattering anecdotes. Fisher noted that the French responded to Franklin’s arrival with enthusiasm 
and adoration that they never had afforded another American.27 He contended that it turned into 
extravagant worship, and they embellished every detail regarding Franklin and even altered his 
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age by four years to inflate his accomplishments.28 Despite this flattery, Fisher’s work remained 
remarkably balanced given the period of its publication.  
 Fisher’s most dramatic challenge to the established historiography was his analysis of the 
Franco-American alliance. The author stunningly sidelined Franklin’s role in the event. He 
noted, “this treaty, which secured the success of our revolution by giving us the assistance of a 
French army and fleet, was the result of unforeseen events, and was not obtained by the labors of 
Franklin or those of any of the commissioners.”29 The author contended that France desired to 
align with the colonists but refrained from doing so until the revolution’s tide turned against the 
British. The author credited France’s decision to join the colonists to Burgoyne’s surrender to 
American General Gates at Philadelphia.30 This assessment reflected a growing trend and 
directly contrasted with Woods, Parton, and Chaplain who all asserted that the alliance resulted 
from Franklin’s celebrity and diplomatic skills. 
 Fisher also examined the rift between John Adams and Franklin to demonstrate that 
Franklin’s history was more than dates and accomplishments. Fisher noted that after Adams 
arrived in France he immediately took issue with the climate that he encountered. The author 
quoted Adams’ description of Franklin as, “a great genius, a great wit, a great humorist, a great 
satirist, and a great politician is certain, that he was a great philosopher, a great moralist, and a 
great statesman is more questionable.”31 Fisher used this quotation that included both praise and 
condemnation to demonstrate that Franklin was a complex personality who possessed both 
strengths and weaknesses.  
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 In 1931, on the two hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of Franklin’s birth, the 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography published “The Public Career of Benjamin 
Franklin: A Life of Service” by Herman V. Ames, which directly addressed Franklin’s evolving 
historiography in his introduction and chastised other historians for their failure to present a 
balanced assessment of Franklin. The author described Franklin’s historical caricature as that of 
a demi-god and argued that historians needed to humanize Franklin to understand who he was as 
a person. Despite this convincing appeal, Ames’ article was brief and vague and contributed little 
to Franklin’s scholarship. 
 Ames’ examination of Franklin’s two diplomatic assignments to London were identical 
to the interpretations offered by Woods, Parton, and Chaplin. The author hastily mentions 
Franklin’s first endeavor to London and offered no synthesis of the events. Instead, Ames 
focused on Franklin’s second dispatch to Britain and presented him as a celebrity who “was the 
defender of not only of the rights of Pennsylvania but of America in general.”32 This premise 
remained consistent throughout the article’s brief account of Franklin’s role in the repeal of the 
Stamp Act. Ames’ discussion of Franklin’s diplomatic mission to France was equally brief and 
unanalytical. The author avoided mentioning any controversies or troubled relations during the 
negotiations in favor of championing Franklin’s greatness. Ames stated of Franklin “it was he 
who was instrumental in bringing about the alliance with France.”33 This flattery continued 
throughout Ames’ assessment of the signing of the definitive peace and the remainder of 
Franklin’s life. 
 As the early twentieth century progressed, historians increasingly acknowledged that 
Franklin’s historiography lacked depth and balance. Despite this revisionist rhetoric, the 
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 Herman V. Ames, “The Public Career of Benjamin Franklin: A Life of Service” The Pennsylvania Magazine 
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traditional historical interpretations remained prevalent. These calls for humanizing Franklin 
temporarily ceased when in 1938 literary critic Carl Van Doren produced the Pulitzer Prize 
winning Benjamin Franklin. This monumental biography presented Franklin as the 
accomplished, selfless American genius whose unwavering loyalty to the colonies embodied 
enormous virtue. Van Doren’s pivotal study guided a quarter century of Franklin scholarship and 
inadvertently inspired the next generation of historians to champion the revisionist agenda. 
 Van Doren channeled Woods and Parton among others and began his biography by 
tracing Franklin’s lineage to a line of notable individuals. The author focused on one ancestor of 
Franklin named Thomas who was a talented blacksmith and also served as clerk of the county 
court, a lawyer, a conveyance, who participated in other aspects of public business.34 Van Doren 
used this individual to establish the greatness of the Franklin family and noted that Thomas 
“seems a kind of first draft of the great Franklin.”35 Once Van Doren established Franklin’s 
exceptionalism, his biography never wavered from this perception. 
 Van Doren explained the failure of Franklin’s first diplomatic mission to Britain as the 
result of circumstances he could not control. The author consistently diminished Franklin’s role 
in favor of other miscues including an instance where the British ministers disregarded 
documents presented by Franklin from the Pennsylvania Assembly because they were difficult to 
understand.36 Van Doren concluded that despite Franklin’s tireless efforts, to the British he “was 
merely the agent of a remote colony squabbling with its proprietors.”37 Van Doren’s examination 
of Franklin’s second dispatch to London employed a straightforward approach to the events. This 
included his evaluation of Franklin’s famous miscalculation regarding the administration of the 
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Stamp Act, the negative reaction among the colonists, and Franklin’s eventual testimony before 
the House of Commons that helped effect the measure’s appeal. Van Doren concluded by 
attributing the Stamp Act’s repeal to Franklin’s persuasive abilities declaring, “no other man 
alive could have delivered the argument as Franklin did.”  
 Van Doren’s account of Franklin in France espoused the traditional interpretations 
reflected in the work of Woods, Parton, and Chaplin. Van Doren championed Franklin’s 
manipulation of France’s fears about America’s potential reconciliation with Britain to facilitate 
the Franco-American alliance. The author diminished the presence of the other American 
delegates and declared “Franklin had won a diplomatic campaign equal in results to Saratoga.”38 
When discussing the signing of the preliminary articles for peace between Britain and America, 
Van Doren significantly downplayed the fact that the agreement occurred without French 
involvement, violated the American commissioners’ Congressional instructions, and insulted 
America’s foreign ally. Van Doren instead stated that Franklin’s celebrity with the French eased 
all tensions, and French minister Vergennes believed “they had done well for their country and 
by securing their independence had overcome a difficult obstacle to the general peace.”39 The 
author’s assessment indicated that even the French believed that Franklin knew what was best for 
the Paris negotiations. Van Doren’s account of the signing of the Treaty of Paris was similarly 
flattering and straightforward. The author concluded his analysis of Paris with an assessment of 
Franklin’s selfless patriotism noting “but when it came to making terms of peace Franklin’s 
instinct was towards the completest independence of America from all of Europe.”40 Van 
Doren’s work dominated a quarter century of Franklin scholarship and remains a hallmark of 
Franklin’s historiography.  
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 In 1965, Richard B. Morris produced The Peace Makers: The Great Powers and 
American Independence. This study chronicled the personalities of those who negotiated the 
Treaty of Paris. By examining how the character of Franklin and the other diplomats shaped 
these events, Morris placed human nature at the epicenter of the negotiations. This approach 
rippled throughout the historical community and inspired other historians to approach the subject 
using similar perspectives. This revisionist movement came to define Franklin’s historiography 
during the latter twentieth century.  
 Morris separated Franklin from the other delegates and devoted an entire chapter solely 
to his exploits. The author claimed, “there was about Benjamin Franklin a certain suppleness and 
depth that set him apart from his two more unbending and less complicated colleagues in the 
peacemaking.”41 Morris examined Franklin’s diplomatic tactics and highlighted several instances 
of behavior that contrasted with the established persona of Franklin the righteous and selfless 
patriot. The author recounted how after Franklin knowingly allowed his personal notes to fall 
into the hands of the British, he created and circulated a false excerpt from the Boston 
Independent Chronicle detailing how British officials compensated American Indians for 
scalping colonists to create a diversion from his professional blunder. Morris also examined how 
Franklin’s personal interests possibly affected his faithful execution of his official duties. The 
author detailed how during the Paris negotiations Franklin secretly retained his investments in 
the business syndicate that constituted the proposed British colony of Vandalia in present day 
Kentucky and West Virginia. Morris concluded that although no concrete evidence exists that 
this influenced Franklin’s actions, there was strong evidence suggesting that Franklin would 
benefit financially if the British maintained control of the company. Citing such entanglements, 
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Morris claimed, “Franklin was the one member of the Peace delegation about whom there might 
be a suspicion of a conflict of interest.”42  
 Morris evaluated Franklin’s personality and attributed much of the friction between the 
American commissioners to his demeanor. The author cited how Franklin’s colleagues 
complained of his “saltiness, his ribald streak, his long spells of apathy and inattention to 
correspondence, his reticence, and his inscrutable ways.”43 Morris also clearly painted Franklin 
as a pessimist who felt disdain for his fellow man. The author quoted Franklin’s referring to 
humanity as “more easily provoked than reconciled, more disposed to do mischief to each other 
than to make reparation, much more easily deceived than undeceived, and having more pride and 
even pleasure in killing than begetting one another.”44 These abrasive character traits contrasted 
with the traditional Franklin persona of the diligent patriotic genius. This approach helped 
differentiate Morris’ study from the work of his predecessors and his influence on other 
historians was readily apparent. 
 In 1972, Cecil B. Currey produced the unique and remarkably daring for its time Code 
Number 72/ Benjamin Franklin: Patriot or Spy. Currey’s study argued that Franklin used his 
fickle diplomacy to effect his personal gains and guarantee his own viability regardless of the 
outcome of the American Revolution. This premise contrasted with almost two centuries of 
Franklin’s historical consideration and actually questioned Franklin’s patriotism. Through a 
careful reevaluation of the letters and papers of Franklin and his fellow diplomats and associates, 
Currey revisited many of the controversies that historians traditionally averted in hopes of 
exploring who Franklin really was.  
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 Currey’s treatment of Franklin in France was unflattering and accusatory. The author 
began by stating that although Franklin significantly aided the American cause, “there is reason 
to suspect that this was not his primary purpose on his mission to France.”45 Currey claimed that 
historians have created the myth that Franklin was a man of virtue by suppressing any claims to 
the contrary, particularly those of his closest associates. The author then extensively provided 
examples of the other American delegates in France whose opinions of Franklin were anything 
but flattering. The author cited Adams’ repeated inflammatory comments about Franklin and 
noted that Lee felt Franklin was dangerous and “capable of any wickedness.”46 Currey suggested 
that Franklin assisted the British in their aims and cited the security breaches in Paris as 
evidence. The author stated, “if Benjamin Franklin was innocent of complicity in the British 
spying operations, then the information leakage from his embassy is incomprehensible.”47 
Currey supported his notion with a detailed account of the amount of Franklin’s official reports 
and personal correspondence that are in the British Archives. By suggesting that Franklin was 
disloyal, disliked, and possibly incompetent, Currey’s caricature of him differed greatly from the 
adulation afforded to this founding father by previous historians.  
 As the twentieth century ended, historians continued to revisit Franklin and offer new 
interpretations of his legacy. In 1996, David T. Morgan produced The Devious Dr. Franklin, 
Colonial Agent: Benjamin Franklin’s Years in London. Morgan’s examination of Franklin’s 
diplomatic activities of this era presents Franklin as a multilayered personality who wavered 
between selfless ambitions and self-serving tendencies. From this premise, Morgan recounted 
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Franklin’s diplomatic experiences in London with a clear intention to demonstrate how 
Franklin’s duality showed through his activities.  
 Morgan used Franklin’s first dispatch to London seeking a Royal status for Pennsylvania 
to demonstrate how a personal vendetta could fuel his actions. The author claimed that Franklin 
personally despised Pennsylvania proprietor Thomas Penn and concealed the fact that a royal 
government in Pennsylvania could threaten the liberties of its citizens because he was dedicated 
to defeating Penn at all costs. Although Franklin’s mission faltered, Morgan used this deception 
to argue that Franklin’s animosity towards the Penn family motivated him to “say whatever he 
had to say and do whatever he had to do to achieve their ouster.”48 Despite this, Morgan 
concluded that Franklin’s ultimate loyalties rested with the United States. The author cited 
Franklin’s estrangement from and partial disinheritance of his son William because of his 
loyalist activities as proof that above all else Franklin “cast his lot with the colonies.”49 
 Also in 1996, Robert Middlekauff produced Benjamin Franklin and his Enemies. Written 
from the perspective of Franklin’s adversaries, this work explored the human component of this 
historical titan by examining how the emotions of love, hate, scorn, and anger drove Franklin and 
his colleagues. Middlekauff applied these sentiments to evaluate how they affected Franklin’s 
actions during the colonial and revolutionary politics that defined his life. Additionally, 
Middlekauff analyzed these emotions and actions in the context of a revolution during which 
politics and passion combined to produce intense animosities.  
 Middlekauff devoted his first chapter to evaluating which qualities Franklin possessed 
that contributed to his popularity. The author concluded that Franklin’s warmth and natural 
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curiosity combined with “his generosity and largeness of Spirit” to attract admirers.50 
Middlekauff then examined how these qualities earned Franklin enemies among other powerful 
personalities of his era because “these men disliked anyone larger than themselves.”51 Once 
Middlekauff established how Franklin’s dynamic personality could invoke adulation or ire 
depending on the individual, he focused on four key adversaries of Franklin. The first was 
Thomas Penn and Franklin’s first dispatch to London. The central theme of this section rested on 
the well-known animosity between Franklin and Penn and Middlekauff predictably argued that 
Franklin acted irrationally out of his personal hatred for Penn. Middlekauff attributed Franklin’s 
problematic relationship with Arthur Lee to the diplomat’s belief that Franklin was corrupt and 
not trustworthy because of Franklin’s propensity to withhold information.52 The author then 
addressed American politician Ralph Izard’s troubled relationship with Franklin and argued that 
Izard disliked Franklin because Franklin was more powerful and he wanted to acquire Franklin’s 
pivotal role in the Paris negotiations.53 Middlekauff concluded his work by examining the 
relationship between Franklin and John Adams. The author concluded that Adams’ vanity 
naturally caused him to seek quarrels, and Franklin’s opaque approach to diplomacy played 
perfectly into his combative tendencies.54  
 Over the last two centuries, historians have both romanticized and castigated Franklin’s 
legacy. As the twenty-first century dawned, historians have increasingly included new ideas and 
perspectives into their scholarship of this American icon. A prominent example of this is Jack 
Fruchtman Jr.’s 2006 study Atlantic Cousins: Benjamin Franklin and his Visionary Friends. By 
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applying the concept of an Atlantic world, Fruchtman explored Franklin’s role in the circulation 
of scientific, political, philosophical, and medicinal ideas throughout the Atlantic. Fruchtman’s 
methodology involved examining Franklin’s role as the connective tissue among the great liberal 
thinkers of America, Britain, and France. By dividing his approach into three separate 
dominions, Fruchtman effectively demonstrated that Franklin’s contributions, influences and 
presence embodied the concept of an Atlantic personality. 
 Fruchtman began by centering Franklin in the growing American abolitionist movement. 
The author detailed how Franklin published the anti-slavery writings of George Whitefield and 
served as an intermediary between Whitfield and Philadelphia schoolmaster and abolitionist 
Anthony Benezet, who founded a school in Philadelphia for free black children. Benezet wrote to 
English abolitionist Granville Sharp persuading him to introduce himself to Franklin who resided 
in London at the time. This effectively united the abolitionist efforts of the English-born 
Whitefield and Sharp with those of the French-born Benezet and America’s Franklin to create an 
Atlantic web of morality. Fruchtman attributed this connection to Franklin’s eventual role in the 
Pennsylvania abolitionist society and his efforts to persuade Congress to abolish the institution.55 
Fruchtman then expanded Franklin’s abolitionist ties and linked him to Philadelphia physician 
Benjamin Rush. Fruchtman recounted Rush’s prolific work and future leadership in the 
Pennsylvania abolitionist society. The author also detailed Franklin’s relationship with Thomas 
Paine and his role in Paine’s immigration to America. Fruchtman then recounted how Paine 
affected the American Revolution and credited Franklin by noting, “Thomas Paine was a 
spiritual cousin of Benjamin Franklin.”56  
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 Fruchtman applied this same strategy to Franklin’s other noticeable relationships, 
including his connective presence between Welsh philosopher Richard Price and English 
theologian and political theorist Joseph Priestley. This linked Franklin to the circulation of Price 
and Priestley’s ideas about religious dissent, political reformation, and their respective scientific 
exploits in mathematics and chemistry. From here, Fruchtman examined Franklin’s association 
with several other prominent personalities. Fruchtman recounted how scientist Jean-Paul Marat 
actively sought Franklin’s endorsement in his bid for acceptance into the Royal Academy of 
Sciences. Franklin was unimpressed with his work, however and Marat’s efforts failed.57 
Fruchtman noted that this caused Marat to give up on his scientific research and focus on politics 
where he gained infamy during the French Revolution. Fruchtman also analyzed Franklin’s 
troubled relationship with German Physician Franz-Anton Mesmer and Franklin’s notable 
dismissal of him as a “charlatan.”58  
 Fruchtman concluded his examination of Franklin’s Atlantic influence by examining how 
his political exploits in America survived him and influenced his associates. He detailed how the 
French revolutionaries Marquis de Condorcet and Jacques-Pierre Brissot greatly admired 
Franklin’s public and philosophical contributions, specifically the unicameral Pennsylvania 
legislature that Franklin helped create through the state’s constitution. Fruchtman used this setup 
to demonstrate Franklin’s Atlantic presence when he detailed how after the French Revolution 
Thomas Paine, Condorcet, and Brissot collaborated with others to draft the 1793 French 
constitution that mirrored Pennsylvania’s state equivalent. By detailing this, Fruchtman 
demonstrated the true presence of Franklin’s fingerprint on the Atlantic world. 
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 As Franklin’s historiography enters the twenty-first century, historians appear dedicated 
to thoroughly reevaluating this American icon through the application of new perspectives and 
use of previously obscure primary sources. This new phase of scholarship has built from the 
details documented during Franklin’s earliest historical consideration and applied the revelations 
discovered through repeated revisions to interpret his role in a broader context. These new 
methodologies and perspectives can be combined to expose more fully and accurately Franklin’s 
true fingerprint on America, Europe, and the entire Atlantic world.  
Chapter Two: 
The Falsity of Pretended Friends. 
From the beginning of the American Revolution, the Continental Congress poorly 
conceived the mission it wanted the American delegation to France to carry out when its 
members arrived in France. Congressional instructions lacked clarity and were open to a variety 
of interpretations. This necessitated the passage of multiple congressional amendments to 
elucidate their intentions during the next thirty months.  A fundamental flaw was the 
appointment of three ministers before the French court. This created a triple-headed monster with 
three personalities that drove the commissioners to work at conflicting aims. The circumstances 
the delegates encountered in Paris also exacerbated their predicament. The Americans found 
themselves immersed in an environment saturated with security breaches and uncertain loyalties. 
In the center of this almost predictable chaos stood Benjamin Franklin. After the dynamics of the 
delegation became apparent, Franklin concluded that he probably alone possessed the knowledge 
and ability to accomplish the American mission properly. This belief stemmed from Franklin’s 
advantageous prerevolutionary experiences in British politics and his unique understanding of 
the Atlantic world. Franklin surmised that these assets would best equip him to achieve a Franco-
American alliance against the British and procure the greatest amount of foreign aid for the 
American Revolution. Knowing that his associates Arthur Lee and Silas Deane lacked these vital 
strengths, Franklin developed a strategy to configure the commission so he could dictate how it 
would operate. This entailed forming an alliance with a controllable Deane against the more 
adversarial Lee who exacerbated the commission’s work through a persistent series of diplomatic 
blunders. Once he effectively silenced both Lee and Deane, Franklin enjoyed an enhanced 
presence and existing celebrity in Versailles to promote his hegemony before the royal court. 
Despite the eventual procurement of an impressive Franco-American alliance, the commission 
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remained problematic and increasingly provoked the ire of Congress. In an effort to streamline 
the delegation, Congress eventually replaced Deane by the appointment of John Adams, and at 
the suggestion of the French ministry chose Franklin as America’s sole delegate in Paris. Once 
achieving this designation, Franklin embarked on a mission of his own interpretation to extract 
America from the British Empire to the advantage of the emerging United States and cement his 
prestige within the newly configured Atlantic world.   
On September 26, 1776, Congress secretly appointed Franklin and Thomas Jefferson to 
join Silas Deane in Paris as commissioners to the French royal court. Their mission was to secure 
a Franco-American alliance against the British. Two days later Congress issued instructions that 
were flexible by design. They directed the commissioners to use every means in their power to 
secure a military alliance with the France. This granted the commissioners the power to relax 
their demands “to enlarge their Offers.”1 These directions contained a list of munitions to secure 
including “twenty or thirty thousand Muskets and bayonets, and a large supply of Ammunition, 
and Brass Field Pieces.”2 Congress further directed the commissioners to obtain public 
acknowledgement of United States sovereignty by both the French court and the British 
Parliament.3 This directive also detailed the expected conduct of the commissioners and defined 
their compensation. The commissioners were to live in a humble manner that supported the 
dignity of their public character.4 The American delegates also were to keep a record of their 
expenses and promised that “a handsome allowance be made to each of them as compensation 
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for their time, trouble, risqué, and service.”5 This initial approach contained two flaws that 
almost ensured a period of chaos. By directing the commissioners to use all powers at their 
disposal, they issued a boundless instruction. This provided a justification for a variety of 
political misdirected behaviors that were difficult to negate.  The directive also authorized the 
delegation to modify American demands to achieve their goals. This provided the commissioners 
with a vast defense for failing to adhere to their instructions or perhaps engage in activities that 
contrasted with their stated objectives.  
Five days before to Franklin’s departure from Philadelphia, Congress issued another 
directive. This guideline focused primarily on diplomatic issues. Congress instructed the 
commissioners to seek the diplomatic recognition of an independent United States by any willing 
European power.6 Congress also directed the commissioners to pursue treaties of peace and 
commerce with other European states without jeopardizing their desired paramount alliance with 
France.7 Despite the directives’ general specifications, Congress clearly stipulated that all 
agreements carried out on behalf of the United States and a foreign state must avoid any favored 
nation agreements and “be equal and reciprocal.”8   
 On September 26, Congress drafted a five-point sketch of a proposed peace between 
Britain and the United States as a guide for the commissioners. Unlike their instructions 
regarding foreign diplomacy, these stipulations were specific and demanding. The outline’s 
central goal was to demand a desired statement from the mother country: “Great Britain shall 
renounce and disclaim all pretense of right or authority to govern in any of the United States of 
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America.”9 Following this proposed declaration, the draft contained five other stipulations 
desired in any peace treaty. The first addressed the legal protections afforded to foreign 
ambassadors in event of capture.10 Congress included an expression of its desire that a declared 
peace would establish and expand commerce between Britain and the United States. The sketch 
also proposed paying £100,000 annually over one hundred years to Britain to alleviate all 
financial discrepancies resulting from America’s break from the empire.11 Another provision 
addressed Franklin personally and his connection to Britain. It stipulated that following an 
agreed peace Franklin might freely travel to Britain where he had friends “particularly among the 
best writers and ablest speakers in both houses of Parliament.”12  The remaining two points 
reiterated America’s goal of entering into a formal alliance with France and its intention to 
purchase their new country because taking the land by conquest would cost more.13 After 
solemnly considering the role he could play in America’s first diplomatic mission abroad, 
Jefferson submitted a request to Congress for dismissal from the American delegation to France. 
Congress accepted his proposal and elected Arthur Lee to replace him. 
 The secretive nature of Franco-American relations was evident before Franklin’s 
departure. On October 1, Franklin and Pennsylvania’s congressional delegate Robert Morris 
submitted a report to the Committee of Secret Correspondence detailing how Arthur Lee had 
previously secured a secret arms deal from the French court worth £200,000 sterling.14 The 
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cryptic nature of this agreement revealed an important obstacle for Franklin and the other 
commissioners. During the arms negotiation, the French expressed sympathy for the American 
cause but declared their intention to avoid conflict. In response, Franklin and Morris argued that 
this deal must remain secret for four key reasons. Most importantly, if their enemies learned of it 
they could intercept potential future shipments. Besides, disclosing the deal might jeopardize 
subsequent assistance from the already reluctant French. Another reason for concealing the 
transaction was the belief that Congress contained too many talkative members and secrecy was 
virtually impossible. Franklin and Morris concluded that because Morris belonged to all the 
committees regarding importing and receiving, there was no necessity for informing the entire 
Congress.15 This affair was indicative of the clandestine tactics that came to define the delegation 
throughout the entire mission. It established Franklin and Lee’s willingness to withhold 
information from Congress and proved that members of Congress might employ similar tactics. 
On October 27, Franklin embarked on his journey to France boarding the warship 
Reprisal. After thirty days at sea the ship arrived at Quiberon Bay off the west coast of France, 
where Franklin remained for several days awaiting safe passage to land.16 Upon leaving the ship, 
Franklin quietly familiarized himself with his surroundings. This involved traveling incognito 
and avoiding any “publick character.”17 Franklin’s primary concern at this point was his 
uncertainty if the French court was willing to receive delegates from Congress.18 He also 
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expressed concern over the commissioner’s potential to embarrass the French and “subject 
ourselves to the hazard of a disgraceful refusal.”19  
Upon reaching Paris, Franklin received discouraging news from the American Committee 
of Secret Correspondence. They warned of British agents intending “to prevent European 
Powers, but France more especially, from giving America aid in this war.”20 This dispatch also 
alerted Franklin to lapses in security. The committee revealed that the secretary of Congress 
misplaced a copy of their directions instructing them to negotiate with other courts besides 
France. The committee advised, “we think it is necessary to mention this to you, lest the paper 
should have got into the wrong hands.”21 At this early point in his venture to France, Franklin 
realized his diplomatic advantage over his colleagues. Lee and Deane clearly lacked comparable 
experiences to Franklin in the European political theater, and Congress obviously was ill 
prepared to engage in such complicated matters.  
On December 23, Franklin, Deane, and Lee announced their presence to the French 
foreign minister Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes and requested an audience to present 
their credentials and propose an alliance.22 The commissioners advised that out of respect, they 
were requesting an accord with the French first. On December 28, the Americans communicated 
to the Spanish diplomat Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, the Conde de Aranda offering their 
personal respects and announcing their intention to cultivate the friendship of the Spanish 
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court.23 This maneuver by the delegation was actually premature. On January 1, 1777, The 
Committee of Secret Correspondence wrote to Franklin informing him that the Continental 
Congress voted to instruct the delegation to negotiate a treaty with the court of Spain.24 Before 
receiving the correspondence, Franklin wrote the Congress on January 4 reporting his respectful 
audiences with the Comte de Vergennes and the Conde de Aranda and their consideration of the 
American proposal for alliance.25  
Aside from his public activities, Franklin interacted with various merchants, private 
citizens and intellectuals throughout Paris. One of these individuals was French merchant 
Jacques-Donatien Leray de Chaumont. By early January, they developed a business relationship 
centered on Chaumont’s merchant connections and ability to acquire vessels.26 As the two 
became more acquainted, it became apparent that Franklin needed suitable quarters. On January 
28, Chaumont proposed that Franklin relocate to his Hotel de Valentinois in Passy under five 
stipulations.27  The first two indicated that Franklin and any family member would pay the sum 
of six francs for each dinner served for their entire stay.28 They also agreed that Franklin would 
pay six livres for each friend who dined with him.29 The final two addressed other dining issues 
and Franklin’s obligations to provide wine and spirits to hotel visitors.30 When Franklin entered 
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this agreement, he secured both a permanent residence for himself and established the primary 
location for  American activities in France. This was one of Franklin’s first efforts to position 
himself at the center of the delegation and assert his control over the negotiations. 
Although Franklin’s experience in international diplomacy was advantageous for the 
delegation, he was not immune to miscalculations. Franklin’s first significant mistake was his 
role in inviting spies into the delegation's administrative operations. During his tenure in London, 
Franklin befriended a well-connected Massachusetts-born physician named Edward Bancroft. 
Through Bancroft, Franklin gained valuable information about those around him. As Deane 
prepared to leave for France in March 1776, Franklin instructed him via the Committee of Secret 
Correspondence to write a letter and secure a meeting with Bancroft “on the score of an old 
acquaintance.”31 This was so that Deane could obtain information about Britain. To ensure 
Bancroft’s attention, Franklin advised Deane to “remit him a small bill to defray his expenses in 
coming to you.”32 By June 1776, Deane confirmed to Franklin and the committee that he was 
traveling from Bordeaux to Paris to meet Dr. Bancroft and planned to dispatch letters 
accordingly.33  
Bancroft was loyal to Franklin in London but was also a friend of former New Hampshire 
council member turned British spy Paul Wentworth.34 Through this connection, the British 
unofficially recruited Bancroft following Franklin’s departure in 1775.35 Once Franklin arrived 
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in Paris in December 1776, Wentworth entered into a formal agreement for Bancroft to work as a 
British agent.36 Once Bancroft sold his loyalties, he compromised the American mission. The 
first significant breach came when Bancroft secretly copied a correspondence between Robert 
Morris and Silas Deane dated December 20, 1776. From this letter, the British Secret Service 
learned of American shipping, sensitive war information, and details about the depreciation of 
American currency.37 The letter also contained specific information about trade between France 
and the United States.38 Additionally, Bancroft forwarded his British contacts copies of the 
congressional appointments of the commissioners, Jefferson’s request for dismissal, and other 
instructions regarding the mission.39  
 As Franklin settled into his home at Passy, the commissioners waited on a response from 
the Comte de Vergennes. During this period of uncertainty, the Americans realized that their 
system of communications was flawed. On March 4 the commissioners wrote to the Committee 
of Secret Correspondence complaining that "the want of intelligence affects the cause of the 
United States in every department, what accounts of our affairs arrive in Europe at all comes 
thro’ the hands of our enemies.”40 The American’s were more correct than they knew. Also dated 
March 4, Bancroft wrote Franklin a lengthy letter detailing his pivotal role in their 
communications. He mentioned his possession of receipts and other books, along with monthly 
reviews for Deane, letters he was forwarding from various individuals to them, a packet of 
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government dispatches and newspaper articles in his possession.41 Although the commissioners 
were unaware of Bancroft’s deception, they acted as if they feared their surroundings. On a trip 
to Madrid, Arthur Lee wrote to Franklin that he stopped halfway “in order to negotiate with more 
secrecy, there appears to be more timidity here than with you.”42 This demonstrates that loyalties 
were always suspect, even between and among the American delegates.  
 By March 1, Franklin had fully established his headquarters in Passy.43 During this early 
period, he remained close to his residence and periodically traveled to Paris. Franklin described 
his routine as, “I am now removed to Passi [sic], but am almost every day at Hotel d’Hambourg 
with Mr. Deane.”44 As the Americans awaited word from the courts of France and Spain, they 
again addressed the problems within their mission. To the Committee of Secret Correspondence, 
the commissioners wrote, “It is now more than four months from Mr. Franklin’s departure from 
Philadelphia, and not a line from thence written since that time has hitherto reached either of 
your commissioners in Europe.”45 The letter reiterated that the only information they received 
regarding America came through British sources. The commissioners stated that such ignorance 
“makes us appear small in the eyes of the people here, and is prejudicial to our negotiations.”46  
 During this period, the commissioners became concerned with the futility of their 
mission. They acknowledged their civil treatment but complained that the French court refrained 
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from openly receiving them to avoid “giving umbrage to England.”47 The commissioners were 
further concerned following a response from the Spanish court. Lee informed Franklin and 
Deane that the Spanish diplomat the Duke de Grimaldi asked him not to come to Madrid but 
promised to aid them “as far as his own situation will permit.”48 This assistance rested on Lee’s 
ability to secure credit from the Conde d’Arnada through Dutch bankers and greatly complicated 
matters.49  
 In an effort to address the apparent confusion of diplomatic goals, Congress clarified its 
instructions by declaring its goal of securing American independence without kindling a 
European conflict. Congress asserted, “they do not presume to propose that France should enter a 
war on their account.”50 Despite this, Congress declared that if France entered into a war with 
Britain over injuries from the earlier French-Indian conflict on the North American continent it 
would agree to four protocols. The first was that America’s participation in a joint conquest of 
Canada, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and all the West Indies on France’s behalf provide mutual 
rights to the fisheries and sugar crop.51 Congress also stipulated that the U.S. would provide 
provisions amounting to two million dollars along with six frigates containing twenty-four guns. 
This directive also addressed Spain’s role in their proposed reconfiguration of the western 
Atlantic. Congress declared that if Spain joined France in the American cause, the United States 
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would declare war against Portugal.52 This stemmed from Portugal’s initial support of Britain in 
the American Revolution and earlier conflicts with Spain over border issues in South America. 
Congress’s directive outlined their stipulations for the conclusion of hostilities. The first 
component was that peace could only result from mutual consent. Congress dictated once this 
occurred the commissioners should work towards several goals. Most important, Congress 
requested that the delegates persuade the French to prevent the further dispatch of foreign troops 
to America at all costs. Congress also instructed the commissioners to seek France’s help in 
obtaining future foreign aid.53 This was a clear effort to preserve America’s independence 
indefinitely by removing any British presence from the region. 
Through March, Franklin and the commissioners awaited word from the Comte de 
Vergennes and the Spanish court over their proposed alliance. During this period, Franklin’s 
celebrity and position invited an endless stream of visitors and communications. The vast 
majority were European military officers seeking employment in the American army.54 The 
Americans had faced this problem since the beginning of hostilities, and Franklin now found 
himself in the center of this predicament. Congress advised him that many Europeans in the 
American army have “found it impossible to render themselves useful.”55 In response, they 
instructed Franklin to discourage those wishing to come to America for military employment.56 
Franklin reported, “I refuse everyday numbers of applications for letters in favour of officers 
who would go to America, as I know you must have more upon your hands already than you can 
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well employ.”57 To amend the situation, Franklin devised a document he could issue to those 
requesting a recommendation without actually involving himself. Titled Model of a Letter of 
Recommendation of a Person you are Unacquainted With, Franklin issue a blanket statement “I 
know nothing of him, not even his name.”58  
As newer problems garnered much of Franklin’s attention, old issues threatened the 
delegation. By now, Bancroft had settled in as a resident of Franklin’s household in Passy. From 
this vantage point, he concocted an elaborate scheme to relay information to British authorities. 
This entailed writing in invisible ink over other letters and sealing them in a bottle under the 
pseudonym “Dr. Edward Edwards”. Bancroft would then hide the bottle in a specific tree in the  
Tuileries gardens behind the Louvre at 9:30 p.m. every Tuesday.59 Thomas Jeans, secretary to 
British diplomat Lord Stormont, would retrieve the bottle from the secret spot and forward the 
information.60  In return, Jeans often left false and misleading information for Bancroft to 
forward to the commissioners.61 Franklin and Deane harbored no doubts of Bancroft’s loyalty to 
their cause and often asked him to travel to London to gather intelligence. On one of Bancroft’s 
trips, he and the British authorities employed a scheme to embellish his dedication to the 
American cause. In March 1777, the British arrested Bancroft on superficial charges and 
interrogated him. A perturbed Deane informed Congress of his arrest, warning of potential 
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damage to their mission.62 Despite the accusations, the British eventually released Bancroft after 
suggesting he failed to cooperate and he returned to Passy with his credibility inflated.  
 Bancroft’s espionage significantly affected the American mission. The British received 
weekly updates about the ongoing negotiations between the Spanish, French, and Americans. 
This enabled British minister Lord Stormont to accuse the Comte de Vergennes of France’s 
infringement of their present status as a neutral nation. These allegations encouraged further 
French reluctance to support the Americans. Bancroft also helped the British intercept 
information because they knew the time and location of mail shipments to America.63  
 The web of British intelligence did not end with Bancroft at Passy. Joseph Hyson was a 
Maryland native living in London during this period. A seafarer by trade, Hyson was recruited 
by Deane’s personal secretary William Carmichael to command privateer and munition ships in 
France. On February 2, 1777, British agent the Reverend John Vardill approached Hyson and 
persuaded him to become a spy. The two devised a plan whereby Hyson would go to France and 
assume command of a vessel. Once in charge of a ship containing sensitive cargo, Hyson would 
allow the British to capture his vessel.64 Carmichael detected this plan but instead of alerting the 
Americans, he offered his assistance. Hyson failed to secure command of a ship but successfully 
supplied the British with at least one packet meant for Congress detailing the commissioners’ 
actions and recent negotiations.65  
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Further security issues arose in early 1777 when New York native Jacobus van Zandt 
presented himself to Franklin under the pseudonym George Lupton. Following his reception, 
Franklin invited Lupton to stay on as an assistant.66 Unbeknownst to everyone including 
Bancroft, American loyalist the Reverend Vardill previously had recruited Lupton for the 
British.67 Lupton’s time at Passy was messy because he often clashed with Bancroft. This friction 
reached a boiling point when Lupton attempted to assume Bancroft’s position of secretary. 
Lupton’s bid was unsuccessful and within a year, he left Passy. Despite this, he successfully 
provided the British with valuable maritime reports during his tenure.68 Each of these security 
breaches aided the efforts of British diplomats in France to disrupt the American delegation’s 
success.  
Franklin found himself in the midst of spies despite previous warnings and personal 
experience. Once in France he received a letter from Juliana Ritchie, a Philadelphia native living 
abroad. Ritchie had witnessed Franklin’s disorganized offices in America and sought to advise 
him of threats.  She warned, “you are surrounded with spies, who watch your every movement 
who you visit, and by whom you are visited.”69 Ritchie further informed Franklin to beware of 
those “who pretend to be friends to the cause of your country.”70 Ritchie advised Franklin to 
question the motive of everyone’s conduct around him. Franklin also received warnings about 
suspicions against him personally. Ritchie indicated that many observers questioned his motives 
and did not trust him. She wrote “one party assures that you are seeking aid and support from 
this kingdom the other party insinuate that you have given up that cause and are making the best 
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terms you can for the private advantage of your own family connections.”71 Ritchie noted that 
these accusations against Franklin negatively affected all who associated with him. She 
explained, “I dare not be more explicit for weighty reasons to myself, but of the truth of what I 
inform you, you may strictly rely.”72  
Franklin responded to Ritchie’s warnings by indicating that efforts to prevent it would be 
futile. He wrote, “it is impossible to discover in every case the falsity of pretended friends.”73 
Franklin openly accepted he could not “prevent being watch’d by spies.”74 He explained he 
would “be concern’d in no affairs that I should blush to have made publick and to do nothing but 
what spies may see and welcome.”75 Franklin explained if he acted with transparency, there was 
no need to react. He wrote “If I was sure therefore that my Valet de Place was a spy, as probably 
he is, I think I should not discharge him for that, if in other respects I lik’d him.”76 Franklin’s 
reaction to Ritchie’s warning indicates he was mostly concerned about the ability of spies to 
embarrass him. Despite his recognition of this hazard, the inattentive actions of Lee soon would 
validate Franklin’s fears.  
In April Arthur Lee returned from his unsuccessful mission to Spain. Immediately his 
relationship with the other two commissioners soured. Bancroft reported to London that Franklin 
and Deane excluded Lee from most activities and appeared not to trust him.77 Lee responded to 
the cold relations with suspicion and resentment. Within days of his return, Lee agreed to travel 
to Berlin to petition the minister of Prussia for support and permission for American privateers to 
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use their ports.78 Before leaving Lee voluntarily diminished his presence by granting Franklin 
power of attorney during his absence to handle all of his finances, the right to sue on his behalf, 
and to conduct whatever correspondence was necessary.79  
Lee, Carmichael, and their personal associate Stephen Sayre immediately left Paris and 
travelled to Vienna, Munich, and Dresden before arriving in Berlin. Despite his efforts at all 
stops, Lee reported, “there is a cold tranquility here that bodes us no good”80 This reception 
worried Lee and he requested that Franklin and Deane pressure the Prussian court to be 
sympathetic to their cause. Lee indicated he believed the goal of his mission was unobtainable.81 
These fears were quickly realized when Lee was officially rebuffed by the ministers in Berlin on 
June 4. On June 15, he wrote Franklin and Deane advising he was unable to accomplish his goals 
and was preparing to return.82 Before Lee could depart, other events compounded this failure and 
encouraged his further ostracization by Franklin and Deane.   
On June 26, Lee discovered the theft of a collection of papers from his lodging in 
Berlin.83 Immediately, all suspicions regarding the larceny fell on a servant. Within an hour, the 
papers mysteriously reappeared on Lee’s doorstep. Accusations soon emerged that the suspect 
claimed his master offered him two thousand ducats to steal the documents.84 This information 
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traced the plot to staff members of Hugh Elliot, an English representative to Prussia.85 Elliot’s 
assistants reportedly copied the papers during their brief absence and soon the affair became a 
public controversy. In response, England recalled Elliot although he faced no real repercussions. 
This incident became a very important lesson for the Americans. No one was to be trusted, not 
even public officials. In reflection, Lee wrote to Franklin and Deane “public ministers have been 
regarded as spies; Mr. Elliot will give them the additional title of robbers.”86  
The effect of this security breach was immense. Lee communicated to Franklin that the 
copied papers were an account of all that had occurred in both France and Spain.87 Concern over 
repercussions prompted Lee to ask the Americans to notify the two courts to prepare “should the 
court of G.B. charge them with having assisted us.”88 Lee suggested that all concerned parties 
deny the allegations because the British had copies of the papers and not the originals. Lee 
suggested that the thief’s failure to keep the original papers would make suspicions of forgery 
ten times stronger.  He explained the urgency to act because information had already reached 
London.89 Lee’s disastrous endeavor in Berlin exposed his diplomatic inexperience and became a 
source of strife between the commissioners.  
 Upon Lee’s return, Franklin and Deane scolded him for his failures.90 Lee soon became 
enraged because he disapproved of the other delegate’s negative judgments. In response, Lee 
began to openly questioned Franklin’s personal loyalties and cast doubt on the entire American 
mission. Lee first objected to Franklin’s appointment of Jonathan Williams Jr. as the American 
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commercial agent at Nantes. According to Lee, Franklin was “planning to throw a considerable 
part of the mercantile business into the hands of Mr. Williams, his nephew.”91 Lee also claimed 
this appointment was illegal because Congress had previously appointed Thomas Morris as the 
American agent to Nantes.92 Lee angrily wrote to Congress stating that Franklin “attached 
himself to those he tho’t would support him and his nephew.”93 He was further irritated upon 
learning that Franklin repeatedly opened correspondences from America and only shared the 
information with Deane.94 Lee took this exclusion personally. He claimed Franklin expressed 
enmity towards him, and his friends in Passy “were daily treated with invectives against me.”95 
Lee also rebuked Deane claiming he “has artfully mixed so much personal injury and offense 
against me” and cited his “trespasses against the public.”96 The basis of this accusation was Lee’s 
discovery that financial bookkeeping by the delegation was virtually non-existent. Lee contended 
an investigation turned up no ledgers or vouchers, only massive debt and silence.97 Despite the 
severe accusations, Lee refrained from any formal complaints fearing the misconception that his 
motivations were for private vengeance not public justice.98  
Reports of Lee’s accusations readily influenced British strategy. When Paul Wentworth 
traveled to France seeking reconciliation, he ignored Lee in Favor of Franklin and Deane 
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because he believed them corruptible.99 In a meeting on January 7, Wentworth used Franklin’s 
previous expressions favoring reconciliation to ask, “how short of independence he wished.”100 
Franklin rebuked Wentworth, explaining his past opinions as “done at the time they were 
given.”101 Wentworth pressed Franklin asking what “terms and means he would suggest to 
induce reconciliation?”102 Franklin responded by expressing his full allegiance to the American 
cause. Wentworth concluded that Franklin’s view of reconciliation “would be that of the 
Congress.”103  
Despite this, Wentworth pushed the issue by suggesting Franklin’s earlier failures in 
London fueled his dismissal of reconciliation. Franklin rejected Wentworth’s insinuation and 
went on the offensive exclaiming he did not act out of personal injury but from the barbarities 
inflicted upon his country. Wentworth later wrote of Franklin, “here he lost his breath in relating 
the burning of towns.”104 Franklin continued with examples of ill-treated prisoners, the 
devastation and cruelty pursued by British generals, eventually comparing English men to 
barbarians. Franklin asserted his personal loyalties and rejected any susceptibility to 
Wentworth’s persuasion. He declared, “the spirit of America was so high nothing but 
[independency] would be at all listened to.”105 Realizing the conversation accomplished nothing, 
Wentworth asked to see Franklin again the next day. Franklin instead summoned Deane to join 
them for dinner. The three discussed issues of debt relief, international commerce and Franklin’s 
return to London but they found no common ground. Wentworth understood reconciliation was a 
                                                           
99
 Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 584. 
100
 Paul Wentworth to William Eden, January 7, 1778, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Ellen R. 
Cohn, http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 6, 2014). 
101
 Ibid.  
102
 Ibid.  
103
 Ibid.  
104
 Ibid.  
105
 Ibid.  
47 
 
failure and did not call on Franklin the next day commenting, “I do not see any good end it can 
answer.”106  
The possibility of American and British reconciliation inspired the French to act on the 
American’s proposal for alliance. On January 7, 1778 Louis XVI’s council secretly voted in 
favor of a Franco-American alliance.107 On January 8, French foreign minister Conrad-
Alexandre Gerard visited the commissioners but refrained from informing them of the decision. 
Instead, he presented three questions to the commissioners and withdrew so they could formulate 
answers. The first asked, “what is necessary to be done to give such satisfaction to the American 
commissioners, as to engage them not to listen to any propositions from England for a new 
connection with that country?”108 Franklin began to write as Deane and Lee debated the 
proposition. They decided that a formal alliance with France would enable the Americans to 
reject reconciliation. Franklin stated their goal was “the entire freedom and independence of 
America, both in matters of government and commerce.”109  
The two other questions expanded the conditions of the first. The second asked what was 
necessary for America to reject “all propositions from England for peace inconsistent with that 
independency?”110 The last inquired about the importance of the Spanish to the alliance.111 The 
commissioners did not reach a consensus, but Franklin wrote down preliminary answers to the 
second two queries. He surmised that if they did agree to the alliance, Congress was willing to 
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fight until the defeat of the British in America. Franklin enticed French and Spanish participation 
concluding that a quick end to the war would prevent their acceptance of anything short of 
absolute independence.112 Upon returning, Gerard was satisfied and informed them of the 
council’s previous vote in favor of an alliance. 
On February 6, 1778, French officials and the American commissioners signed two 
treaties constituting the Franco-American alliance. The first formed a military coalition stating 
that if a European war erupted the U.S. and France would make it “a common cause and aid each 
other mutually.”113 With this premise, both parties agreed that complete independence for the 
U.S. was a condition of peace. Additionally, the treaty permitted any other parties to join their 
cause if they were willing the “accede to the present alliance.”114 This agreement permanently 
expanded the role of the United States in Europe’s political arena. The second treaty established 
a permanent system of commerce and correspondence between France and the U.S. It declared 
the alliance perpetual among the “most Christian King his heirs his successors and the said 
United States.”115 The agreement included a clause granting most favored nation status between 
the two regarding commerce and navigation. A final stipulation addressed mutual interests, 
respective fishing rights, and parameters for addressing contraband and commerce.116  
Despite their success, cohesion among the commissioners continued to decay. Following 
the treaty, Franklin and Deane privately collected several correspondences intended for America.  
On February 13, Franklin wrote Lee about their pending dispatches regarding the alliance and 
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other public matters.117 Lee responded explaining he did not understand his exclusion from the 
process.118 Franklin initially replied aggressively that it was a proposition for Lee’s consideration 
and claimed he confused the words “propose and purpose.”119 For unknown reasons Franklin 
reconsidered and did not send this hastily crafted response. Instead, he wrote a shorter more 
pleasant note offering, “to consult with him whenever he pleases upon any circumstance.”120  
Franklin’s offer was too late as Lee responded the same day with a lengthy letter 
expressing displeasure with Franklin’s conduct. Lee stated that “according to all rules of doing 
business” it is proper to inform him when dispatches were ready for consideration.121 Lee also 
accused the commissioners of receiving important letters and not communicating them to him. 
According to Lee, this was a continuous problem noting his past accusations against Deane. Lee 
contended Franklin validated his allegations by stating, “such things had been done.”122After 
claiming Franklin’s admission, Lee inquired about the other delegate’s motives. He asked, “Is 
there, Gentlemen, any public utility to be derived from conduct, which sets me in light of an 
incapable or suspected person, and annuls the appointment of Congress?”123 This question 
sought explanation while also reminding Franklin and Dean they were circumventing their 
government. Lee compounded this by challenging the other commissioners to find cause for such 
treatment. He offered, “if there were I should submit to it without reluctance.”124  
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On March 16, Lee heard rumors that other official letters were set to sail without his 
consultation and again he demanded an explanation.125 Franklin admitted that people from 
Bordeaux sending packages to America had offered to carry their dispatches.126 He claimed he 
had dismissed the offer noting, “we could not know the captains, nor the degree of confidence 
that might be placed in them.”127 Franklin did acknowledge mentioning the offer but claimed 
whoever informed Lee “misunderstood more than I said to him, when he imagined there was a 
packet to sail soon with our dispatches.”128 Franklin then assured Lee of his inclusion in any 
business regarding their dispatches.   
As the relations between the commissioners dissolved, rumors from America further 
flamed their divisions. On March 13, Lee received word that Congress recalled an unidentified 
commissioner and corresponded with Franklin on the matter.129 Franklin responded that 
passengers from an American ship reported Congress chose John Adams to replace Deane, but 
no official word had arrived.130 The rumors sparked an effort within the delegation to prepare for 
a possible reorganization. On March 31, Lee wrote Franklin suggesting they settle the public 
accounts, a request he “long ago and repeatedly made.”131 Lee contended that resolving this was 
a fundamental part of their duty to the public. He further requested that Deane leave all papers in 
his possession relating to the commission with Franklin and Lee. This correspondence provoked 
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a fiery response by Franklin. He wrote “there is a stile in some of your letters, I observe it 
particularly in the last, whereby superior merit is assume to yourself in point of care, and 
attention to business, and blame on your colleagues is insinuated without making yourself 
accountable by a direct charge, of negligence or unfaithfulness, which has the appearance of 
being as artful as it is unkind.”132 Franklin denied Lee’s accusations that he and Deane purposely 
impeded the settlement of their accounts and called the accusation groundless. Franklin in turn 
accused Lee of failing to act on any of these purported wrongs. He contended Lee could have 
obtained the account at any time and demanded an explanation but “did neither.”133 Franklin 
informed Lee that Deane left all public papers and account related materials in his possession. To 
settle their dispute, Franklin stated that Lee only needed to name the day and place.134  
On April 2, Lee learned of Conrad-Alexandre Gerard’s choice as French minister to 
America from an outside party.135 Lee used this to accuse Franklin again of failing to inform him 
of important matters. He claimed such conduct constituted “so great an injury and injustice to 
me.”136 Lee questioned Franklin’s integrity, asking “if success to the mission, and unanimity on 
the subject in Congress was your wish, with what propriety could you make it a party business, 
and not unite all the commissioners in the advising and approving a measure, in which you 
desired their friends and constituents might be unanimous?"137 Lee contended Franklin’s actions 
were inexcusable. He noted, “I do not live ten minutes distance from you, the communication 
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therefore could not be attended with delay or difficulty.”138 Of Franklin’s deception Lee noted, 
“you could not have done it more effectively.”139 Lee then implored Franklin to explain his 
dereliction of public duties. Franklin replied to these allegations by dismissing the validity of 
Lee’s arguments. He claimed it was not his practice answer angry letters because “I am old, 
cannot have long to live, have much to do and no time for altercation.”140 He then claimed Lee 
had a sick mind “which is forever tormenting itself, with its jealousies, suspicions and fancies 
that others mean you ill.”141  
The next day Franklin wrote to Lee informing him of Deane’s pending departure. To 
deflect unwanted criticisms Franklin stated that if Deane had not contacted him “it is from him 
you should demand his reasons.”142 Franklin then proceeded to address several of Lee’s claims in 
a more civil tone. He defended the appointment of Gerard by the French court without consulting 
them as their “undoubted right.”143 Franklin then deflected Lee’s hostilities by claiming Deane 
decided to exclude him regarding Gerard for reasons, “that appeared to me satisfactory.”144 
Despite his fierce defense of Lee’s exclusion from the delegation’s activities, Franklin concluded 
by promising open communications in the future.   
Franklin then rejected Lee’s insinuations that he had prevented the settling of public 
funds by taking possession of all the financial vouchers. Franklin explained that the vouchers 
naturally came to him because Deane purchased all goods in France since Lee was in Spain, 
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Vienna and Berlin. Franklin also deflected Lee’s suggestion that he purposely blocked open 
communications with Congress via Deane’s departure to conceal his behaviors. Franklin claimed 
Congress and the delegation already corresponded on every important matter and “I therefore did 
not propose, or write any letter to the committee by him.”145 Of Lee’s insinuation that he was 
inconsistent with his public duties, Franklin denied the claim. He also questioned Lee’s authority 
to level such accusations by stating “it is to the public I am accountable and not to you.”146 
Franklin then reminded Lee of his lengthy history of public service and “there is not a single 
instance of my ever being accused before of acting contrary to their interests or my duty.”147 This 
prompted Franklin to declare that he gladly would account to Congress for any supposed crimes 
and predicted, “I have no doubt of their equity in acquitting me.”148 
On March 30, John Adams arrived at the River Bordeaux in southwestern France and 
anchored for the evening.149 On March 31, Deane quietly exited Paris under an assumed name 
possessing an endorsement from Franklin, a gold snuffbox from Louis XVI, and a testimonial 
from Bancroft. Gerard left Paris separately intending to meet Deane at Toulon on the 
Mediterranean coast and sail to America aboard Admiral d’Estaing’s seventeen-ship squadron 
that the French dispatched to aid the American cause.150 On April 10, Franklin and Lee informed 
Vergennes of Adams’ arrival. They advised Vergennes that Adams possessed several resolutions 
from Congress intended to discourage British efforts for reconciliation.151 Franklin and Lee also 
informed Vergennes that Adams expressed confidence that Congress would ratify the treaties of 
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alliance and commerce when received.152 The following day Adams traveled to Versailles with 
Franklin and Lee to wait on Vergennes. Over the next week, Adams met French Prime Minister 
Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux, the Count Maurepas, was present when King Louis XVI passed 
through his court, and toured galleries and the royal apartments. Adams described his grand 
reception in France as “friendly, as polite, and respectful as was possible.”153 Despite his positive 
introduction, Adams soon learned of the delegation’s many challenges. 
Adams described the cohesion between the commissioners and others working at Passy 
as “a rope of sand.”154 He vowed to remain untainted by the prejudices fearing the pernicious 
effects of such divisions. Adams appeared intrigued by the suspicions and accusations that 
plagued the American delegates. He insinuated that the extravagance that Deane traveled back to 
America in would provoke negative reactions in Congress. Adams surmised this would 
compound the allegations that Deane was inattentive to his duties, profited from English 
privateers and trade, and lived expensively. Adams also recorded several suspicions about Lee’s 
character. He noted the consensus was that Lee’s motivations were selfish and he retained too 
much affection for Britain.155  
Adams’ initial assessment of his colleagues was that he did not know whom to believe. 
He noted that the commissioners did not methodically conduct public business. Adams expressed 
dismay because no minute, account, or letter book existed. With no official record of actual 
events, the words of his colleagues were all he knew. This troubled Adams because he expressed 
displeasure at the idea of differing with one party or another and offending persons. This caused 
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Adams to conclude, “it is not possible to obtain a clear idea of our affairs.”156 Despite his 
indication that his colleague’s actions were unscrupulous, Adams did acknowledge their 
demonstrated merit by securing the French alliance. 
Adams’ harshest criticism came not against his colleagues but of their fundamental 
approach to diplomacy. On May 21, he reported to Congress “in my humble opinion our system 
is wrong in many particulars.”157 Adams pointed out three flaws to their mission and suggested 
how to amend them. The first was that they did not need three commissioners in France when 
one easily would suffice. His second reflected on the excess of his colleagues’ lifestyle. He noted 
that leaving their salaries uncertain guaranteed poor accounting and tempted them to live beyond 
their means. Adams’ also addressed the blending of the business of a commercial agent with that 
of a public minister. He argued that this assured no public satisfaction from their actions and 
exacerbated the existing suspicions and divisions. Adams suggested that Congress separate the 
commercial agents from the ministers and recall or reassign all the commissioners except one. 
He also argued that Congress should determine a specific allowance for the remaining delegate 
and enforce financial limits.158  
Franklin echoed Adams’ argument that multiple commissioners complicated the mission. 
He reported to the Committee of Foreign Affairs that their appointment of a fourth ambassador 
to Tuscany and fifth to Vienna increased this complexity.159 Despite any strength in numbers, 
Franklin argued, “all the advantages in negotiation that result from secrecy of sentiment, and 
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uniformity in expressing it, and in common business from dispatch, are lost.”160 Franklin 
contended that any lack of cohesion between the commissioners before a court impeded their 
success because every word is “watched and weighed.”161 From this, Franklin concluded “and in 
consideration of the whole, I wish the Congress would separate us.”162 Franklin also cited the 
financial benefit of a single commissioner in Paris and used Lord Stormont’s personal 
extravagance and downfall as an example. Claiming each American spent comparably, Franklin 
detailed how Stormont “left behind him the character of a niggard, and when the advertisement 
appear’d for the sale of his household goods, all Paris laughed at an article of it.”163  
After considering the matter, the French Court expressed its support for the nomination of 
a single American commissioner in Paris. Gerard personally lobbied Congress to select Franklin 
as the sole delegate because the French government was most receptive to him.164 On September 
15, Deane wrote Franklin informing him that Congress selected him “minister Plenipotentiary to 
the Court of France.”165 Deane expressed great pleasure in the appointment and reported that 
Congress acted with great unanimity.166 The only vote against Franklin came from his home state 
of Pennsylvania. This resulted from his conservative enemies and their objection to the presence 
of his grandson Temple at Passy whom they smeared because his father, William Franklin, was a 
loyalist.167  
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On October 21, Congress officially wrote to Louis XVI informing him of Franklin’s 
appointment as sole delegate.168 On October 26, Congress wrote to Franklin detailing eleven 
instructions defining his new position. Congress directed Franklin to assure Louis XVI that the 
U.S. expressed the highest sense of gratitude for his continual military aid.169 Franklin also was 
to assure the French monarch that Congress and the states are unwavering in their determination 
to become independent. To reassure the king, Congress dictated that Franklin should emphasize 
America’s commitment to prosecuting the war at all costs. This directive also addressed 
America’s maritime war strategy. The central premise of this objective was the confinement of 
the war to European waters to ensure the safety of the American coasts. A fundamental 
component of this strategy centered on the destruction of the British fisheries in Newfoundland 
in a bid to deprive them of supplies gained from Halifax and Quebec.170 The remaining 
instructions focused on the internal politics of Franco-American relations. Congress asserted that 
Franklin was to present the “deranged” state of American finances before the French court to 
prevent an economic collapse of the American cause.171 Congress indicated that the evolving 
state of their finances would require several future revisions to this directive. To encourage 
French assistance, Congress encouraged Franklin to take any action necessary to perpetuate 
Franco-American relations indefinitely.  
The congressional dispatch also included two documents for presentation before the 
Court of Versailles. The first detailed a plan “to attack Detroit and destroy the towns on the route 
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thither of those Indians who are inimical to the United States.”172 To justify the endeavor 
Congress offered four reasons as to why the campaign would benefit France. These included the 
possession of Newfoundland and ownership of its fisheries, the strengthening of their American 
allies by preserving their independence, and the control of the fur trade to French commerce. The 
proposal also outlined six benefits of this campaign to the United States. These included securing 
peace on the American frontier, the acquisition of two states, and the stabilization of their 
domestic finances. The remaining three addressed American interests in the north Atlantic 
fisheries. They contended that this action would protect and secure commerce, enable them to 
cultivate fisheries more efficiently, and gain such prizes at the expense of the British. The final 
two points from Congress argued that its action was justified because of British belligerence in 
both the North Atlantic and West Indies mutually harmed France and the U.S.173  
The second congressional document focused on American finances. Topics included 
America’s present inability to repay loans, lack of available resources, currency depreciation and 
counterfeiting.174 The focus of this presentation was to reiterate the importance of European aid 
to America’s success. To validate its claims, Congress examined and discredited several 
proposed alternative sources of revenue. The first was domestic taxation, a solution that 
Congress dismissed because it could not produce sufficient funds. Congress also argued that the 
U.S. did not possess a strong enough central government to enforce such tariffs. Additionally, 
Congress claimed the lack of available financiers and that made domestic borrowing 
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impossible.175 After discrediting all alternatives, Congress concluded by declaring that the 
continuance of war rested on Franklin’s successes in France.  
Despite Franklin’s appointment and the urgent situation, infighting and petty distractions 
continued to plague the American delegation. On January 2 1779, American politician Ralph 
Izard petitioned Franklin to renew his allotted credit line for services rendered.176 On January 4, 
Franklin drafted a letter denying Izard’s request citing the “distress for money in America.”177 
Franklin explained that America’s income from tobacco had not equaled its demands. He 
explained, “they are long since mortgaged to the farmers general, so that they produce us 
nothing, but leave us expenses to pay.”178 The letter further implied that Izard could not expect 
credit because the American delegation was in danger of receiving none itself. Franklin actually 
proposed that Izard repay credit he previously received “if it may be done with any possible 
convenience to your affairs.”179 
Franklin justified his refusal citing Izard’s wealth from rice plantations in South 
Carolina.180 Despite this, Adams and Lee both rejected Franklin’s stance arguing it was 
unreasonable considering Izard’s service to America. Izard, the father of five with an expectant 
wife, decided to appeal directly to Henry Grand, America’s European banker. Grand declined to 
help, and Izard then borrowed from a personal financier and presented the bill directly to the 
American commissioners. Defying Franklin’s objections, Lee and Adams accepted Izard’s bank 
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note.181 On January 15, Franklin drafted an account of the incident for Congress to defend his 
actions. He began by clarifying that in February of 1778 the commissioners advanced Arthur’s 
brother, William Lee, and Izard four thousand guineas without any order from Congress.182 
Noting their previous generosity, Franklin argued that if they issued more credit public interests 
would suffer. This argument was an attempt by Franklin to make himself appear to be acting in 
the best interests of America’s finances. He also expressed his complete surprise that Izard 
petitioned a private banker and placed all responsibility on Lee and Adams claiming the bill “to 
be accountable to them only.”183  
On February 7, Lee received word that the other commissioners had sent Bancroft to 
Britain on official American business without consulting him. Lee was further enraged after 
Franklin only provided a verbal response to Lee’s written request for an explanation.184 In turn, 
Lee unleashed a furious letter to the other commissioners discrediting Bancroft’s character and 
personally attacking the other commissioners by claiming they knew of Bancroft’s misdeeds and 
“his living in open defiance of decency and religion you are no strangers to.”185 Lee also 
insinuated that Franklin and Adams’ relationship with Bancroft proved their personal disdain for 
him because of Bancroft’s “enmity against me.”186 Despite his temporary solidarity with Adams 
against Franklin on the Izard affair, Lee found himself again ostracized from the delegation.  
Lee continued his objections claiming the actions of the other commissioners represented 
a dereliction of duty. He recounted how Bancroft was in league with Deane who libeled 
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Congress, harmed the American affairs in Europe and disgraced their national character. Lee 
continued with a concerted effort to accuse Franklin and Adams and excuse himself of any 
blame. He attacked the two claiming he could only expect Bancroft to be “the last person in the 
world you would have chosen to represent us.”187 Once Lee linked Franklin and Adams to 
Bancroft, he leveled threats suggesting impending repercussions from such actions. Lee noted, “I 
have evidence in my possession which makes me consider Dr. Bancroft as a criminal with regard 
to the United States, and that I shall have him charged as such, whenever he goes within their 
jurisdiction.”188 
Despite the serious accusations, Franklin focused on his official duties and did not 
respond. On February 18, he wrote two separate letters to Lee pertaining to his new role as sole 
delegate. In the first correspondence, Franklin shared the Congressional resolutions of September 
11 and 14 and of October 12, 1778, on the matter and declared his intentions to comply with his 
appointed duties.189 Franklin’s second dispatch requested that Lee forward to him all public 
papers in his possession.190 In response, Lee dramatically changed his tone and offered Franklin 
his personal congratulations. Lee also indicated he supported the acts of Congress because they 
appeared to restore harmony and he found their conflicts to be “detrimental to the public and 
dishonorable of ourselves.”191  
On February 17, Franklin became afflicted with gout. Within days, he withdrew from the 
public eye both delaying his official presentation as sole delegate and impeding his ability to 
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communicate with others.192 On March 14, he wrote Vergennes informing him that he currently 
was confined to his chair and unable to appear before the court on the 16th as planned.193 This 
delay was temporary, as Franklin’s recovery exceeded expectations. On March 23, Franklin 
ceremoniously triumphed over his colleagues when he appeared before Louis XVI to present his 
credentials and pay homage to the royal family as the sole delegate of the United States.194 This 
effectively put Franklin at the forefront of the American mission to France and the flourishing 
reconstruction of the imperial Atlantic world. 
 The achievement of a Franco-American alliance and Franklin’s ascension to minister 
plenipotentiary of the American delegation to France was both theatric and convoluted. Initially 
a three-member commission created by a muddled Congress, the American diplomats found 
themselves entrusted to secure munitions and alliances on behalf of their frail and budding 
government. Armed largely with ambiguous instructions, the three American ministers embarked 
on a tangled endeavor to win peace and independence through diplomacy. As Franklin wrestled 
control of the delegation from the other commissioners, he immersed himself in the culture of 
Versailles and laid the foundation for America’s diplomatic strategy in France. This monumental 
achievement was the genesis for a new phase of the American mission with the destiny of the 
United States in the palm of Franklin’s hand. 
                                                           
192
 Schiff, A Great Improvisation, 204.   
193
 Benjamin Franklin to Vergennes, March 14, 1779, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Ellen R. Cohn, 
http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 6, 2014). 
194
 Schiff, A Great Improvisation, 206.  
Chapter Three: 
Minister Plenipotentiary. 
 As Franklin attempted to settle into his role as America’s minister plenipotentiary during 
the spring of 1779, familiar problems continued to plague the commission. The arrival of Adams 
did little for the divisive politics within the American delegation, as Lee immediately leveled 
accusations that Franklin and Adams were acting in collusion against him. Other familiar 
hindrances also remained prevalent including the ever-problematic system of communications 
and the monumental threat of America’s financial collapse. As Franklin attempted to ease 
Congressional worries, his detractors took to the court of public opinion to destroy his reputation. 
A primary source of these embarrassments were a series of calculated embellishments against 
Franklin’s character circulated in pamphlets and published in loyalist presses on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Despite these problems, Franklin embraced his new leadership role and embarked on an 
endeavor to cultivate the negotiations in a manner that reflected his vision for an emerging 
American presence within the international community. This was evident when Franklin 
interjected himself into the planning of a military campaign in the European theater by acting as 
a liaison between French General Marquis de Lafayette and Scottish born American sailor John 
Paul Jones during a proposed land and sea invasion of Britain. As Franklin expanded the focus of 
his aims, a series of complications confronted the minister and threatened to unravel the 
American delegation. Despite the troubles, Franklin remained focused on his official duties in 
Paris and his standing before the French ministry. As Franklin increasingly wove himself into the 
fabric of Versailles, the other American diplomats and members of Congress grew increasingly 
fearful of his loyalties and intentions. This provoked accusations that Franklin displayed 
excessive affection for the royal court and refrained from petitioning aid because he feared 
causing offense to the French ministry. In response, Congress voted to dispatch Col. John 
64 
 
Laurens to Paris to assist Franklin in soliciting aid for America. Franklin perceived this as a 
threat, dismissed America’s demands as not practical, and requested that Congress relieve him of 
duty. Congress denied Franklin’s dismissal and cemented his role as minister plenipotentiary. 
This affirmation validated Franklin’s diplomacy and effort to create a Franco-American 
communion that could provide him with the backbone needed to engage the British in a 
diplomatic dalliance and extract a new American entity that could rival old Europe. 
Franklins triumph in Europe did little to quell the internal problems that plagued the 
Americans in Paris. On March 19, 1779, Lee responded to Franklin’s previous request for his 
official papers with a renewed resistance and insisted he could only send copies.1 This was in 
stark contrast to Adams who dutifully obliged Franklin and dispatched all documents in his 
possession. To justify his insubordination, Lee voiced suspicions that Franklin and Adams were 
in collusion against him. Lee also insinuated that Adams’ character was not under attack like his 
own and any comparisons of the two was illegitimate. Once Lee distanced himself from the 
actions of Adams, he reiterated his claim that retention of his original papers was necessary to 
defend himself properly.2  
Franklin responded to Lee conceding that copies of his papers would suffice.3 Despite his 
agreeable response, Franklin quickly dismissed Lee’s suspicious demeanor. Franklin claimed he 
and Adams had no agreement regarding the consolidation of their public papers. In response to 
Lee’s other claims, Franklin insisted they were groundless and asserted that when he requested 
the originals he in no way intended to deprive Lee of any form of defense. Franklin also refuted 
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Lee’s accusations by offering complete transparency among the commissioners. This included 
offering Lee authenticated copies of any papers held in Franklin’s possession.4  
During the spring of 1779, the dynamics of European involvement in the war 
dramatically changed. The American commissioners had successfully secured a French alliance 
but failed to induce much Spanish reaction. Spain appeared reluctant because with Louisiana 
serving as a buffer between the United States and Mexico, responding to a fight in British North 
America was not urgent. This changed when France and Spain invoked the 1761 Family 
Compact that stipulated the two would assist one another regarding mutual threats and interests. 
The premise of this engagement was that France would aid Spain in its bid to regain Gibraltar 
from Britain in exchange for Spanish support of the United States.5 
Franklin initially appeared to embrace the newfound role of the United States in 
international politics. During the transitional period, Lafayette proposed an attack on Britain with 
his land forces assisted at sea by John Paul Jones.6 Franklin quickly embraced the proposal 
responding, “I admire much the activity of your genius.”7 In an effort to inflate the plan, Franklin 
declared, “it is certain that the coasts of England and Scotland are extremely open and 
defenseless.”8 However, even the deft Franklin acknowledged that he was dabbling in a war 
policy where he lacked experience. He championed the idea but admitted, “I have not enough 
knowledge in such matters to presume upon advising it.”9  
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Yet Franklin continued to act as an intermediate between Lafayette and Jones. On April 
27, Franklin wrote to Jones offering his personal insight on the matter. He admitted that 
expeditions of land and sea forces “often miscarry” because of misunderstandings between the 
two officers involved.10 These misfortunes arise, he continued “where there are little minds 
actuated more by personal views of profit or honor to themselves, than by the warm and sincere 
desire of good to their country.”11 Franklin quickly dismissed this possibility by praising 
Lafayette and Jones’ capabilities and citing their “mutual goodwill and harmony.”12 Franklin 
speculated to Jones that the success of this expedition would be a definitive moment in their 
mutual careers. He wrote, “I look upon this expedition as an introduction only to greater trusts 
and more extensive commands.”13  
The following day Franklin issued an official six-point set of instructions to Jones. The 
first commanded him to receive and accommodate the French troops accordingly.14 Franklin 
dictated that once the troops had landed, Jones was to offer all support to their endeavors within 
his power. He further advised Jones to maintain his position at all times to protect the land troops 
throughout their expedition. Other points focused on post-invasion details including bringing all 
captured Englishmen to France to use in prisoner exchanges for Americans and Frenchmen held 
captive. Franklin also outlined a code of personal conduct for Jones and his men. Citing the 
treatment of prisoners by the English, Franklin forbade any “barbarous” behavior and advised 
against any intimidation of the prisoners “for the sake of humanity and for the honor of the 
                                                           
10
 Benjamin Franklin to John Paul Jones, April 27, 1779, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Ellen R. 
Cohn, http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 7, 2014). 
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Ibid.  
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Benjamin Franklin to John Paul Jones, instructions, April 28, 1779, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 
ed. Ellen R. Cohn, http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 7, 2014). 
67 
 
country.”15 Franklin cited the British history of burning defenseless towns in America and 
ordered Jones not to follow this example and treat the sick, elderly, women and children 
ethically. Despite the ambitious planning by Franklin and the French, the expedition never 
occurred. Lafayette’s attention turned to other matters leaving Jones to engage the British Navy 
alone. His daring exploits at sea made him a famous American hero when he returned to 
France.16 
After sending Jones to engage English warships, Franklin turned his attention to 
America’s deteriorating financial situation. On May 3, he wrote to the French minister the Comte 
de Vergennes on behalf of Maryland and Virginia petitioning for aid in the form of ammunition, 
arms, and clothing.17 This solicitation exposed a significant problem facing Franklin’s ability to 
secure necessities. As American money depreciated, he had to contend with a European 
economy where hard money with a known value was required.18 This forced Franklin to seek 
credit from Vergennes. He explained that America actually needed double the supplies but could 
not purchase “for want of money.”19 Franklin understood that this made the American 
government appear vulnerable and fragmented and offered Vergennes his personal advice to 
decrease the perceived risk. He explained that the individual states prompted him to petition 
supplies but it was in Vergennes’ best interests to grant aid to Congress who could distribute it 
and be accountable for repayment.20  
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On May 26, Franklin wrote to the Committee of Foreign Affairs detailing the state of the 
Paris diplomatic operation. He recalled presenting his credentials before Louis XVI who “in the 
most gracious manner espress’d his satisfaction.”21 Franklin continued with his assurance that he 
would fulfill the wishes of Congress with the French court.22 He also assured the committee that 
despite reports, his standing remained solid with the French. Franklin commented, “much pain is 
constantly taken by the enemy to weaken the confidence of this new court in their new allies.”23 
Despite this effort, Franklin reported, “all this has very little effect.”24  
Franklin chose this opportunity to address questions about the delegations apparent 
financial discrepancies. He informed the committee that he had hired an accountant to organize a 
detailed report for congressional inspection. When it was completed, he promised to send the 
final account at the “first safe opportunity.”25 To satisfy the committee’s immediate interests 
Franklin offered several insights into the delegation’s financial state. He specifically noted 
advancing £20,000 sterling to a “Mr. Ross,” paying congressional drafts of 93, 080 livres, and 
advancing to William Lee and Izard £5,500 sterling.26 Franklin then concluded his financial 
detail with a more ambiguous assessment. He noted that he spent a large amount of money on 
“great quantities of clothing, arms, ammunition and naval stores” and paying Americans in 
distress “a great sum.”27 
Franklin chose this moment to defend his decision to deny other financial claims by Lee 
and Izard. He acknowledged the legitimacy of their power to draw monies but challenged the 
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validity of their requests. Franklin wrote that his responsibility was to provide for expenses 
incurred before foreign courts and asserted that with the exception of Lee they had not recently 
incurred any expenses. He continued by asserting that Lee and Izard had received an ample 
provision of £5,500 and suggested, “both of them might command money from England.”28 
Franklin reiterated his earlier contention that Lee and Izard both possessed private fortunes that 
kept them properly supplied.29 Despite his adamant position that he did no wrong, Franklin 
submitted himself to the will of Congress. He wrote, “I am however in the judgment of 
Congress, and if I have done amiss must submit dutifully to their censure.”30   
Franklin also took this opportunity to inform the committee of three threats to their 
mission. The first was his inability to negotiate the shipping and receiving of cargo with ship 
captains. He attributed this to his lack of experience in the business and claimed that his distance 
from any port “renders my having anything to do with it extremely inconvenient.”31 The second 
issue was the problem of a fragmentation between the states. Franklin indicated that individual 
petitions for European loans separate from Congress interfered with his work. He noted 
applications from three different states requesting “great quantities of arms, ammunition & 
clothing or money upon credit to buy them.”32 Franklin claimed this compromised the integrity 
of the United States before foreign courts. He commented “I find the ministers do not like these 
separate applications, and seem to think that they should properly come only thro’ Congress.”33  
Franklin’s public image continued to deteriorate through 1779. A great source of 
embarrassment came in the form of a falsified pamphlet called Green Box of M. de Sartine. This 
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short book appeared to be a collection of official correspondence belittling Franklin and the 
Americans unintentionally misplaced by the French naval minister.34 One particularly 
unflattering exchange came in the form of a letter to de Sartine from the Superintendent of the 
Queen’s household, Princess de Lamballe. The princess wrote of the American minister’s 
audience before the court describing it as “perfectly awful” and declared that if it had lasted any 
longer, it would have given her a “headache.”35 Lamballe also recounted how the queen 
responded to the Americans. She described her majesty as having “all the trouble in the world to 
refrain from laughing” upon their entrance.36 Of their apparent simplicity the queen reportedly 
had commented, “I must say that they are nothing but rabble.”37 Lamballe personally dismissed 
Franklin’s aptitude commenting, “look at Dr. Franklin’s white hat; it is the emblem of 
innocence.”38 The Countess also commented on his spectacles stating, “they are what I call real 
economy” because one was supposedly broken.39 The pamphlet concluded with a quote from the 
Queen describing Franklin as “really very singular in everything.”40 
These dismissive caricatures of Franklin were not unique in the European press. On June 
1, 1779, London’s Morning Post and Daily Advertiser published a scathing portrayal of Franklin. 
Written as an anonymous letter to the editor, it detailed Franklin’s illegitimate son he had with a 
“wench in Philadelphia, whom he left to die in the streets of disease and hunger.”41 The letter 
also questioned Franklin’s loyalty to the American people he represented. It declared, “modern 
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history scarcely furnishes an example of such consummate hypocrisy.”42 The portrayal claimed 
this made Franklin the worst traitor because he was only loyal to himself. It declared “if the axe 
or the halter are to be employed on this occasion, it were much to be wished the first example 
could be made of the hoary traitor.”43 
Suspicions and accusations against Franklin also flourished in America. On September 
20, John Adams wrote to Congressman Thomas McKean calling for the appointment of a 
secretary to assist the delegation with commercial and maritime matters. He attributed their 
difficulties to Franklin claiming “he is not a sufficient statesman, he knows too little of American 
affairs or the politics of Europe.”44 Adams also described Franklin as “too old, too infirm too 
indolent and dissipated to be sufficient for the discharge of all the important duties of 
Ambassador.”45 Questions about Franklin’s abilities and loyalties also echoed throughout the 
American press. On October 20, the loyalist New York Gazette published an article that accused 
Franklin of lacking character and working against American independence. The piece insinuated 
that Franklin was in concert with the Catholic church and was causing America to “go to the 
devil” because he relinquished Canada to the French and Florida to the Spanish.46 This scathing 
portrayal suggested Franklin contrasted with North America’s British and Protestant identity and 
therefore could not be trusted.   
As 1780 approached, both the war in America and the mission to France faltered. On 
December 24, Silas Deane wrote Franklin from Virginia informing him of his impending 
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dispatch to France aboard a twenty-four-gun ship commanded by marquis de Vaudreuil.47 Deane 
provided Franklin with a poignant assessment of the state of the war. He anxiously wrote of an 
impending invasion of Virginia and other southern states by the British. Deane noted that 
America was not prepared to oppose the forces “as I wish we were.”48 He continued by 
surmising that the British would attempt to control the Chesapeake to gain a significant 
advantage by preventing the use of the waterway. Deane indicated how desperate the situation 
was by acknowledging they were relying on severe weather to prevent the British attempt on the 
bay.49 
On December 27, John Jay wrote Franklin informing him of his approaching departure 
for France and forwarding a congressional resolution passed on October 15 regarding salaries 
and funding for American commissioners.50 Jay used this resolution to request salary owed and 
to inform Franklin of an acquired debt of 3.379 livres and “eight Sols Tournois”51 The resolution 
provided explicit instructions for Franklin to establish a fund of “two thousand Louis d’ ors” for 
distribution according to their respective salaries.52 Congress assured Franklin it would replace 
the funds and establish a permanent resource for future salary payments.53 By instructing him to 
fund the other ministers, Congress appeared to rebuke Franklin’s argument the previous May for 
denying funds to Lee and Izard.  
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The American mission to Europe continued to struggle through early 1780. On January 
26, Jay wrote to Franklin describing his turbulent accident-prone travel across the Atlantic 
claiming Franklin doubtlessly would have “been amused.”54 Jay informed Franklin of financial 
charity offered to him upon his arrival in Cadis noting he was “a little embarrassed on the article 
of money.”55 He also took the opportunity to remind Franklin of the consequences of his 
financial actions. Jay noted, “American credit suffers exceedingly in this place from reports that 
our loan office bills payable in France have not been duly honored.”56 After charging Franklin 
with negligence, Jay also offered a personal criticism. He commented, “how far you may be in 
capacity to answer the demands made upon you I cannot determine.”57 This clearly indicated that 
Jay was on the offensive against Franklin, and that their two egos were destined to clash.  
Franklin waited until February 22 to respond to Jay. He wrote that the news of Jay’s safe 
arrival gave him “infinite pleasure.”58 Franklin responded to the contents of Jay’s letter by 
assuring him that he had complied with all instructions regarding debts and salaries and avoided 
any mention of the hostile rhetoric. Franklin also informed Jay that he had established a fund of 
24,000 livres at Madrid for him and instructed him to fulfill Carmichael’s request of 4,800.59 
This cordial response temporarily eased the tension between Franklin and Jay but reoccurring 
communication problems within the commission eventually would further divide them.  
On March 5, Juliana Ritchie wrote Franklin seeking any information about the fate of her 
husband. This letter symbolized the continued problem of broken communications among 
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Americans in Europe. Ritchie informed Franklin that all correspondences between her and her 
husband were routinely intercepted thus leaving her in a state of “suspense and intire [sic] 
ignorance.”60 She also detailed her several unsuccessful attempts of gaining information from 
contacts in London. This was troubling for Ritchie who expressed profound fears for her 
husband. She explicitly asked Franklin if he knew of any information regarding rumors about 
American officers killed by the British including one named Richards or possible Ritchie.61 
Ritchie’s letters assumed that Franklin possessed intimate knowledge of such matters. 
She wrote that Franklin must have this information regularly sent to him and brought by recent 
American arrivals in France who she assumed were “well informed of those events.”62 
Expressing no perceived possibility that Franklin remained ignorant of these matters, Ritchie 
requested he dispatch any relevant information to her. Ritchie further suggested that she and 
Franklin establish a consistent line of communications for their mutual benefit. She wrote that in 
the coming months she planned to leave France for England. Once established in London she 
offered to “render you any service.”63 After three weeks without a response from Franklin 
Ritchie wrote again on March 29. She expressed concern about Franklin’s silence and referenced 
his lack of response to another letter three years earlier.64 Ritchie expressed that the continued 
lack of information increased her apprehension. After explaining her situation, Ritchie pleaded 
with Franklin to respond with information as an act of “charity.”65  
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Franklin responded to Ritchie informing her that he had learned nothing of her husband 
since leaving America in 1776.66 He also addressed her inquiries into American officers 
including those who migrated to Paris. Franklin claimed that in Paris they were “scarce” and that 
he did not know where they were at present.67 Despite his lack of knowledge, Franklin assured 
Ritchie that he would keep the lines of communication open in case he learned anything. 
Franklin also addressed the problem with correspondence between America and Europe. He 
described the communication between the two as “interrupted.”68 Franklin cited two important 
causes for this including letters intercepted by the enemy at sea and poor organization between 
the Americans and their allies. He also noted that a large number of letters were sunk at sea to 
avoid capture, and he commented, “I do not wonder at your not hearing from Mr. Ritchie.”69  
This lack of communications continued to be problematic for the American 
commissioners. On April 7, Franklin wrote to Jay that he had been in “suspense” sometime about 
contacting him because he did not know if Jay was in Cadiz or Madrid.70 The problem with 
correspondence between the two delegates appeared to be a result of poor effort by Franklin. He 
used this letter to “now acknowledge the receipt” of letters from Jay dating September 26 from 
Philadelphia, December 27 from Martinique, and January 26, 28 and March 3 from Cadiz.71 
After this, Franklin addressed problems with false information that hurt their effectiveness and 
credibility. Franklin informed Jay that his reports of rumors in Cadiz that he had failed to honor 
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Loan Office Bills payable in France were “wicked falsehoods.”72 He assured Jay that he refused 
no bill from the original proprietor and actually paid those guaranteed by the presenter or an 
alternative form of credit. After denying all suggestions that he refused payment of bills, 
Franklin contemplated the source of such information. He surmised the source to be “enemies of 
our country” or “persons who proposed an advantage to themselves by purchasing them at an 
under rate.”73 
On April 14, Jay responded to Franklin’s recent letter. Jay dismissed Franklin’s excuse 
for not writing noting that Gerard successfully delivered all his correspondences to Paris.74 Jay 
surmised, “I find it therefore difficult to account for my not having been favored with a single 
line from you since my arrival.”75 Despite this, Jay did admit there were security problems 
within their lines of communications. He claimed he drafted several letters but did not send them 
by post because of espionage. Jay also stated he did not send them special express because as a 
stranger “I knew not whom to trust.”76 He did offer a solution to their broken line of 
communication. Jay wrote that because he received no advice or orders from Franklin over the 
past three months he would send Franklin’s letters in a packet addressed to an American tobacco 
merchant in Nantes named M. Joshua Johnson.77 Jay concluded his letter reminding Franklin of 
the importance of open communications and affirmed his dedication to transparency. 
Despite the problems with Jay, Franklin and Adams’ relationship appeared less 
complicated at this point. On April 19, Adams informed Franklin that he had received 
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instructions from Maryland for Franklin to choose an agent in Britain to draw money from their 
“English funds” at a compensation rate of two percent.78 Adams offered Franklin his personal 
suggestions regarding five potential nominees chosen by Maryland. Despite this, Adams 
admitted he had no right to interfere and asked Franklin’s pardon for his “presuming to advise.”79 
Franklin responded quickly on April 21 suggesting his mistrust of the information delivered to 
Adams. Despite this, Franklin declared Adams recommendations came with great weight to him 
and he would consider them. Franklin concluded that he would nominate a Mr. Williams, 
someone Adams considered a proper person.80  
As tensions eased between Franklin and Adams, an old issue escalated into an outright 
crisis and highlighted how confused the lines of authority in the American government were 
during the Paris negotiations. A year before Franklin had ordered commander of the USS 
Alliance French Captain Pierre Landais to join John Paul Jones in his campaign against England. 
Franklin explicitly instructed Landais to “put yourself and ship under his command as your 
senior officer.”81 On September 23, 1779, Landais’ Alliance fired on Jones’ ship the Bonhomme 
Richard killing several men and ultimately sinking the vessel.82 This followed a series of schisms 
between the two captains and resulted in accusations of insubordination from Jones against 
Landais. Franklin reluctantly led an inquiry of the allegations but rendered no judgment because 
he felt it was not within his authority and was better suited for an American court.83  
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In early March, Franklin relieved Landais of the Alliance for acting “captious and 
critical.”84 Franklin specifically cited Landais’s tendency to misconstrue any part of the English 
language he did not understand as an intended insult.85 Despite Franklin’s intentions to limit or 
entirely sever their communications, Landais continued to correspond. Landais wrote to Franklin 
denying the charges and announced his intentions to seek a court martial in America for 
vindication.86 He also insulted Jones personally claiming he “behaved so well in all respects for 
to not take or destroy the whole fleet of the enemy, that I must say loudly, that the King of 
England ought to reward him for it.”87  
Landais later wrote to Franklin asking for passage to America, his personal effects, prize 
money, and monthly pay “since I am in Europe.”88 Franklin responded to these requests claiming 
it was not in his power to give Landais passage to America and that concerning his wages and 
prize money “payment of them does not belong to me.”89  Landais altered his approach in 
response asking Franklin to use his influence to persuade the officers of the Alliance to return his 
possessions as a favor.90 He also provided Franklin with an account of his unfortunate financial 
situation and asked to whom he must apply to for his monies. Landais further implored Franklin 
to advise him of his best options to obtain passage given his circumstances.91 This attempt at 
civility by Landais was short-lived. The next day he wrote claiming Franklin relieved him of 
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command of the Alliance over accusations “that none but a court martial can judge.”92 Landais 
further accused Franklin of keeping him in France four months longer than his instructions from 
America dictated.93 From this Landais asked as a “right” that Franklin either restore command of 
the Alliance to him or provide him with a written refusal for him to present to Congress.94  
Franklin responded the next day with a letter that offered multiple reasons for his actions. 
He informed Landais that the continued quarreling between captain and crew as well as 
Landais’s repeated written criticisms of his men prompted Franklin to take action.95 Franklin 
supported the validity of this decision by citing the lack of complaints of the crew regarding their 
new commander.96 He also stated that Landais’s only ambition in returning to the Alliance 
during his four months in Paris was to retrieve his possessions. Franklin clearly intended to 
portray Landais as an ineffective commander who abandoned his post.  
Franklin also insinuated that Landais pleaded for reinstatement just prior to the ship’s 
sailing for the sole reason of obtaining a written denial to aid his cause in America. Despite this, 
Franklin assured him he would provide him with a denial “as positive and clear as you require 
it.”97 Franklin continued by declaring that he had not informed anyone in America of his opinion 
of Landais’s actions to prevent a promotion of bias against him. This was a clear attempt by 
Franklin to embellish his neutrality and fairness regarding final judgment of Landais in America. 
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Despite this, Franklin declared that if “I had 20 ships of war in my disposition I should not give 
one of them to Captain Landais.”98  
Following these exchanges, Franklin assumed that Landais had sailed to America. 
Landais actually traveled to L’ Orient in northwest France where the Alliance prepared to sail to 
America.99 On May 29, Landais surprised Franklin with a letter stating “I have been waiting ever 
since I came to L’ Orient for your order to me to retake the command of the frigate Alliance.”100 
Landais wrote that he figured Franklin had had enough time to reflect on the issue and reminded 
him that Congress appointed him captain. Landais then informed Franklin “I consider it my duty 
to return to my station on board her.”101 He justified this using a letter dated April 1 from the 
Secretary of the Board of Admiralty John Brown addressed to Captain Peter [sic] Landais or the 
Commanding Officer of the Continental frigate Alliance instructing whoever to return to the 
United States.102 Landais included a copy of this letter and reminded Franklin that he was 
answerable for any “disagreeable consequences.”103 Franklin responded on June 7 claiming no 
knowledge of Landais’ presence at L ‘Orient and reminded him that both of their actions would 
be laid before their superiors for judgment.104 Franklin concluded by warning Landais about the 
consequences of his actions and declared, “I wave therefore any further dispute with you.”105 
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After rejecting Landais’s claims, Franklin wrote to Jones informing him of Landais’s actions and 
instructed him to act “with all possible expedition.”106  
The actual situation in L’ Orient differed from Franklin’s understanding when he rebuked 
Landais’s request for reinstatement. When Landais moved to take the ship, Jones ridiculed the 
lack of loyalty from the crew and left the vessel for the taking.107 Landais informed Franklin on 
June 14 that he had “taken the command yesterday as my right.”108 The reinstated captain asked 
Franklin again to explain under what authority he relieved his command. Landais also 
discredited Franklin’s previous claims over crew complaints against him and their admiration for 
Jones. He wrote that his officers and crew informed him that they wrote Franklin “begging” that 
their lawful commander be restored and they received no response.109 Landais then resumed his 
standard captaincy dialogue asking Franklin to pay owed prize money to the crew and send him 
his dispatches so “I may fulfill the orders of Congress.”110 Franklin responded with surprise at 
Landais’ disobedience and ordered him “to quit the ship immediately.”111  
Landais ignored Franklin’s demands and responded with a detailed inventory of the arms 
and ammunition on board.112 He also repeated his demand that Franklin pay his crew their prize 
money, stating “I am sure it would be for the interest of the United States that no more time be 
lost by that delay.”113 Franklin ignored Landais and wrote to Jones the following day revoking 
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his order that he receive Lee as a passenger.114 This was done because Franklin believed Lee 
“advised or promoted” the mutiny on the Alliance.115 Franklin left the decision to Jones 
suggesting that he might judge Lee for himself and decide to allow or prevent his passage.  
Jones did not confront Landais following the mutiny.116 He instead traveled to Versailles 
in an attempt to win the favor of the court.117 Jones claimed that Congress believed Landais was 
well respected by the court and therefore appointed him captain to please the king.118 Jones asked 
the king’s ministers to relay their opinion of Landais’ recent conduct to America because 
Congress should know if the account he gave of himself was true.119 The Court of Versailles, 
convinced of Landais’ improper conduct, ordered a blockade to prevent his departure, and 
instructed the port citadel to fire on the ship if he attempted to escape.120  
Knowing Landais’s pending fate, Jones wrote to naval officer Mathew Parke on board the 
Alliance. Appearing sympathetic, he informed him of the king’s arrest order and referenced 
Landais’ inevitable ruin asking, “why should he draw you in to share his fate?”121 Jones also 
rejected Landais’ justification for the mutiny warning, “men are not to fly in the face of order 
and authority, and Mr. Franklin is too wise to exceed the limits of his power.”122 Later Jones 
acquired a flotilla of warships and advanced on the Alliance. Instead of engaging, Jones stood 
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down and permitted Landais to pass avoiding the potential of sinking an American ship.123 The 
following day Jones justified his actions to Franklin stating “your humanity will I know justify 
the part I acted in preventing a scene that would have rendered me miserable for the rest of my 
life.”124 Jones also informed Franklin of his true opinion of Lee’s loyalties. He wrote Lee “is not 
a little disappointed that his operations have not produced bloodshed between the subjects of 
France and America.”125  
The Alliance was granted permission to pass from L’ Orient but was ultimately towed 
and anchored outside of Port Louis in western Brittany.126 This was because Landais refused to 
depart without first receiving the prize money from his earlier privateering exploits.127 Franklin 
responded by discrediting Landais and calling his prizes illegitimate. He noted that the two ships 
Landais captured reported his illegal seizures and demanded damage payments of £500 sterling 
and 60,000 livres respectively.128 Franklin also cited Landais’ capture of an Irish ship with an 
English passport and predicted that, “damages will also be demanded.”129  
Despite Franklin’s insistence that Landais was completely negligent and not owed 
money, he contacted Adams and inquired his opinion. Franklin asked Adams three sets of 
questions. The first was if he felt that Landais was guilty of capital crimes.130 He further inquired 
Adams’ opinion about whether relieving Landais from duty and denying him funds to travel was 
proper. Franklin also asked if Adams felt Landais was to blame for delaying the ship’s departure 
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and sought advice about the future. He inquired if Adams believed they should allow Landais to 
retain control of the Alliance and sail to America where he would face trial.131 By asking for 
Adams’ opinion of his actions, Franklin was expressing some level of uncertainty regarding how 
he handled the situation. 
Adams responded to the queries by stating that his opinion was unimportant because in a 
court martial he could neither witness nor judge.132 Adams instead explained his legal 
understanding of instructions given by the Navy Board and Congress. He claimed he was 
unaware of Landais’s receiving any instructions to obey the minister plenipotentiary. Adams also 
stated that only Congress could remove Landais from command “because the Navy Board 
themselves had not as I apprehend such authority.”133Adams explained that he believed that such 
an event required the presentation of formal charges before Congress. This prompted Adams to 
conclude that no American in Europe possessed such authority because he knew of no formal 
complaints against Landais before Congress. Adams also informed Franklin that the American 
admiralty laws were inadequate and legally there was no evidence that supported the charge that 
Landais abandoned his duty.134 
On June 27, Franklin wrote to Jones acknowledging that he would not likely regain 
command of the Alliance and commented, “so that affair is over.”135 Following Franklin’s 
acceptance of Landais’s command, he commented, “the business is now to get the goods out as 
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well as we can.”136 Franklin also wrote to Landais on the 27th focusing strictly on business. He 
instructed him to receive a shipment of gunpowder, arms, and cannon from Prince de Montbarey 
for transport to Philadelphia.137 Landais responded on July 2 arguing his case to Franklin one last 
time. Landais claimed he was right to demand prize money, rejected Franklin’s reasons for 
denying him payment, and dismissed the claims of damages and illegal capture.138 Franklin 
chose not to reply to Landais’ final effort. On July 7, Landais notified Franklin of his departure 
referencing his last response on June 24 stating, “you charged me in the letter with the 
prejudicial delay of the sailing of the Alliance, and given no hopes of having my people righted, I 
have prevailed upon them to go to our own country to seek justice.”139 
As this crisis subsided, Franklin found himself entangled in another. Throughout the 
spring, Adams questioned the dedication of the French to the alliance. He became convinced that 
they pursued the war halfheartedly because they feared the emergence of a powerful nation in the 
Americas.140 When Adams voiced this opinion, his relationship with the Comte de Vergennes 
suffered dramatically. On June 22, Adams wrote Franklin about the matter and stated his belief 
that French sources were planting false information in their dispatches to Congress intending to 
cause distress in America.141 On June 24, Franklin wrote the Comte de Vergennes about Adams’ 
claims and requested to delay and examine all correspondences to America for 
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misrepresentations.142 This briefly aligned Franklin with Adams against the Comte de 
Vergennes. On June 29, Adams wrote Franklin admitting that his argument with the Comte de 
Vergennes was out of his typical pursuit “and therefore I may be inaccurate in some things.”143 
He continued by asking Franklin that if he believed him to be wrong on anything to please 
inform him “for I am open to conviction.”144 When Adams questioned his own actions, Franklin 
immediately retreated from his earlier support.  
On June 30, the Comte de Vergennes wrote Franklin dismissing Adams’ argument as 
“abstract reasoning.”145 The Comte de Vergennes also addressed Adams’ claims that the French 
were not in full support of American independence. He noted that the King was confident that 
Franklin’s opinion differed from Adams’ and assured him of no repercussions. The Comte de 
Vergennes provided Franklin with copies of all his correspondences with Adams on the matter. 
He also informed Franklin that the king expected him to put everything in front of Congress.146 
On July 10, Franklin wrote the Comte de Vergennes attempting to distance himself from the rift 
between him and Adams. Franklin wrote that he was trying to comprehend the issue but 
explained, “I cannot say that I yet perfectly understand it.”147 Franklin also dismissed Adams’ 
insinuation that the French did not fully support the American cause. He assured the Comte de 
Vergennes that the sentiments of the United States differed dramatically. Franklin asked the 
Comte de Vergennes to assure the king that Americans were fully aware of their obligations to 
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France for their support.148  Franklin clearly saw Adams as a threat to his effort to remain in the 
favorable graces of the court and therefore declined to stand in unity with his fellow American 
commissioner. 
On July 31, the Comte de Vergennes wrote Franklin expressing his trust and admiration 
for his wisdom and principles.149 He further requested that Franklin inform Congress of Adams’ 
ill will and actions against the French for their judgment.150 Franklin responded by reiterating 
that Adams did not represent the opinion of America and spoke “from his particular indiscretion 
alone.”151 He further explained that his communications with Adams were limited declaring, “I 
live upon terms of civility with him, not of intimacy.”152 Franklin concluded by assuring he 
would honor the Comte de Vergennes’ request to inform Congress of the situation as asked.  
On August 9, Franklin wrote to the President of Congress Samuel Huntington detailing 
both the Alliance affair and the rift between Adams and the Comte de Vergennes. Of the Alliance 
Franklin warned that the disorder and mutiny that infected her crew might cause them to “carry 
her into England.”153 To support this Franklin cited the existence of a conspiracy for this purpose 
during the ship’s initial voyage to Europe. Franklin stated that the quarrels between, Landais, 
Jones and the crew resulted in her delay and eventual sailing at under capacity. Franklin used this 
opportunity to deflect any potential criticisms of his handling of the affair. He claimed the 
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distance between him, the ports, and the lack of a code of laws involving ships abroad “give me 
infinite trouble.”154  
When informing Huntington of the conflict between Adams and the Comte de 
Vergennes, Franklin allowed the Comte de Vergennes’ words to explain the affair.  Franklin 
simply forwarded to Congress all correspondences from the Comte Vergennes on the matter and 
noted that Adams provided him with no documents. This approach enabled Franklin to fulfill his 
promise to the Comte de Vergennes and use the French minister’s words against Adams while 
diminishing his direct involvement. Franklin limited his personal insight on the matters to a 
couple of explicit observations. He stated that Adams’ belief that Franklin expressed too much 
gratitude towards France was “mistaken.”155 Franklin then offered his understanding of how this 
affair affected the negotiations. He noted that Adams no longer was effective because the Comte 
Vergennes declared he would not hold any discussions with him.156 Franklin’s critique of Adams 
by Franklin clearly outlines their different perspectives on America’s diplomatic relations with 
France and its war effort. Adams doubted that a strong allegiance with France could be a 
mechanism to create a strong American entity because he believed America would trade British 
domination for French subjugation. In contrast, Franklin expressed little concern about France’s 
imperial intentions and believed French assistance was essential for America to gain 
independence. 
On August 10, Franklin wrote a second letter to Huntington describing settled debts, 
actions of key French and American diplomats, and details about the pending departure of the 
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ship Ariel.157 He also provided information about the gains of privateers whom he commissioned 
in France to harass British “coasting trade.”158 Franklin concluded by addressing the growing 
denunciation of his character among those connected to the negotiations in Europe. He 
acknowledged that Lee, Izard, and Landais would lay accusations against him before Congress 
and declared he would fight the charges “knowing the uprightness and clearness of my own 
conduct.”159   
On August 17, Adams wrote Franklin detailing Dutch perceptions of the United States. 
He declared, “everyone has his prophecy, and every prophecy is a paradox.”160 Adams claimed 
some believed America would align with the British and break with the French.161 He 
immediately dismissed this possibility citing the stability of the Franco-American alliance. 
Adams also addressed other popular predictions including the belief that France and Spain would 
abandon America, Spain would forsake France, or all of Europe would abandon America. These 
varying perceptions demonstrate the common idea that although no one was certain how, the 
revolution was doomed. Adams explained the most popular reason the populace questioned 
Europe’s commitment to the American cause. He cited Europe’s fear that America would 
become the leading manufacturing base and ruin its economy and that America would become a 
“great and an ambitious” military power and turn against Europe.162   
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Adams clearly did not trust Europeans and reiterated his belief that the Americans could 
not rely on their support. He theorized that European rhetoric indicated they desired the 
assimilation of Americans back into Europe as “paupers.”163 Adams sternly rejected the idea of 
any reconciliation between Europe and America. Instead, Adams declared that Americans should 
stop believing in “delusive dreams of peace,” utilize their own strength, and “depend upon 
themselves.”164 When Franklin responded over a month later, he dismissed Adams’ claims about 
American delusions as untrue. He declared, “all the accounts I have seen, agree, that the spirit of 
our people was never higher than at present, nor their exertions more vigorous.”165  
Despite a growing schism between the American delegates over diplomatic strategy, 
financial issues again consumed their attention. On September 20, Franklin wrote to Vergennes 
about securing another loan. Franklin expressed his reluctance claiming he asked Congress not to 
request this because the cost to the French already was immense.166 Franklin also admitted that 
he could not reasonably expect to make repeated requests for money with any success. Despite 
this, Franklin explained that the state of America’s currency could not sustain its troops and 
current operations without new loans. Franklin feared if he protested America’s bills it would 
destroy Congressional credit and America would be “bound hand and foot” unable to fight.167 He 
also informed the Comte de Vergennes that he fully believed France was America’s only hope. 
He claimed that the effort to gain credit from the Netherlands failed, and “we have had hopes of 
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aid from Spain; but they are vanished.”168 Franklin concluded by reiterating America’s 
commitment to settling all its debts following the war. 
On October 14, Adams wrote to Franklin regarding European loans and America’s 
diplomatic strategy. He commented that he had felt the same “mortification” as Franklin about 
soliciting money but attributed this to their failed efforts.169 Adams justified the continued 
American effort to borrow funds. He claimed there was no shame in borrowing because 
“England has been all the time borrowing of all the nations of Europe, even of individuals among 
our allies.”170 Adams noted that England annually borrowed a sum equal to its exports while 
America one twelfth of its export. He also expressed support for the dispatch of American 
diplomats to all courts in Europe. Adams argued this was necessary because Britain had 
emissaries in every corner of Europe, “by which they keep up their own credit and ruin ours.”171   
On October 22, Jay wrote Franklin supporting his actions and offered an alternative if 
they failed. He suggested that if France declined their request they must borrow from individuals 
despite higher interest rates.172 Jay continued claiming they should secure funds on any terms 
because “almost anything will be better than a protest.”173 He offered an assessment of the 
potential fallout from such an event consistent with Franklin’s view. Jay believed a protest was 
an intolerable disgrace and the consequences could cost Congress more than just its credit.174 On 
October 24, Adams wrote Franklin in support of Jay. He advised that the contents of Jay’s letter 
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“will certainly be of great weight and use.”175 Adams expressed his belief that private funding of 
the American effort was plausible. He wrote, “I am assured of the good will of a number of very 
worthy and considerable people and that they will endeavor to assist a loan.”176 Adams also 
advised Franklin that their financial problems were not unique. He noted that in the Netherlands 
“English credit certainly staggers.”177  
On November 28, Samuel Huntington wrote Franklin detailing the recent activity of the 
American government. Huntington indicated that Congress had passed a resolution petitioning 
Louis XVI for loan of 25,000,000 livres.178 From this, Huntington provided four specific 
directives for Franklin. The first stipulated that Franklin forward the resolution to the king and 
“on all occasions and in the strongest terms” represent congressional resolutions. The resolution 
also directed Franklin to procure the longest respite possible after the war for repayment. This 
included various suggestions regarding interest, repayment methods, and issues of financial 
security. A final directive urged Franklin to expand his diplomatic presence by cultivating a 
friendship with Consul to Morocco Stephen D’Audibert Caille in hopes of securing a treaty of 
commerce.179   
Huntington used this opportunity to inform Franklin of an effort to undermine him in 
Congress. He reported a pending vote on December 2 for the appointment of an American 
secretary to the Court at Versailles.180 Huntington explained that the initial effort was only to 
provide Franklin with a personal assistant but a movement emerged to expand the appointee’s 
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powers. He detailed several reasons this effort had gained strength. Huntington pointed out that 
Congress was irritated because they only received two letters from Franklin in 1780. Of these 
two correspondences, both addressed negative events. In his March 4 letter, Franklin reported his 
failure to obtain most of the military supplies Congress instructed him to secure. Huntington then 
noted that although Franklin’s second letter on May 31 reported his successful procurement of 
arms, few actually reached America. This indicated that even when Franklin found success he 
was underachieving. Huntington concluded by stating that Congress canceled the vote and 
elected an envoy to Versailles “for the special purpose of soliciting in conjunction with our 
minister plenipotentiary.”181 
Huntington amended his initial instructions to Franklin in a letter dated December 27. He 
reported that Congress dispatched Col. John Laurens to France with authority to negotiate “the 
important affairs to which they more immediately relate.”182 Huntington praised Laurens and 
expressed admiration for him. He stated that Laurens had “opportunities of information” about 
America’s troubles that particularly qualified him to explain their circumstances to Louis XVI.183 
Huntington also explained that Laurens’ dispatch eased concerns over Franklin’s ability to 
perform his duties during these critical negotiations. He commented this would “guard against 
the accident of your want of health.”184 Huntington concluded by stating “Congress doubt not 
that the success of the measure will be much promoted by the assistance he will derive from 
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you.”185 On January 1, 1781, Huntington wrote Franklin again forwarding a congressional 
resolution respecting the empress of Russia and a copy of Laurens’ instructions.186  
Lafayette wrote Franklin following these events providing his own insights. He informed 
Franklin that Congress had struggled to select a secretary because of politics and the “spirit of 
party.”187 Despite this, Lafayette expressed support for the Col. Laurens. He informed Franklin 
that he would have chosen no other person for the role citing his “uprightness, candor and 
patriotism.”188 Lafayette concluded his letter with a candid description of Franklin’s position 
within the politics of Philadelphia. Lafayette commented that Franklin had enemies but this was 
the nature of politics. Despite this, he assured Franklin of his allies noting, “You have in 
Congress as well as everywhere many faithful friends.”189  
 On March 9, Laurens wrote Franklin announcing his arrival at L’ Orient and his 
possession of several dispatches from Congress.190 Laurens then bypassed Franklin and directly 
addressed Vergennes presenting the congressional orders outlining his directives. These 
Congressional extracts declared that America’s victory rested on the achievement of naval 
superiority and the acquisition of loans in excess of those previously sought.191 He argued that 
France should increase its loans because the belief that the previous amount was adequate 
betrayed “the common cause of France and America.”192 Laurens’ heavy-handed approach 
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before the French court continued. He claimed that Congress believed France’s regard for “the 
rights of man” should dictate its actions and therefore “demand every effort” to prevent British 
domination in America.193 He also noted that Congress demanded “the abasement of this rival” 
and the securing of an ally based on mutual interests.194 Laurens concluded his argument 
regarding French obligations by declaring “the decisive measures insisted upon in the forgoing 
extracts are necessary” because the war appears to be in peril.195   
 On March 12, Franklin carefully constructed a letter to Samuel Huntington detailing the 
state of the American delegation. He first declared that he had attempted to the best of his 
abilities to comply with the instructions he received on November 28 and December 27 
respectively.196 Franklin admitted his initial attempts proved futile because the French ministry 
was preoccupied with other matters. He then explained that subsequent efforts to procure the 
25,000,000 livres requested by Congress ultimately failed. Franklin attributed this to the great 
expense France had already endured in the war effort, to Versailles and other domestic burdens, 
and the poor state of American credit. Franklin reported that although securing the requested 
loan was impractical, Louis XVI did offer a grant of 6,000,000 livres to show his solidarity with 
America. This assistance compounded an earlier gift of 3,000,000 livres for congressional drafts 
and interests owed. Franklin concluded his financial detail by noting that this grant was for 
military use and warned Congress against using it for “general purposes.”197  
 Once Franklin outlined the state of America’s finances, he addressed a personal matter. 
Franklin admitted his role in the current state of affairs and offered several reasons for his 
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conduct. He noted that he had passed seventy-five years of age and stated his recent case of gout 
had “shaken me exceedingly.”198 Franklin noted that his health woes and overwhelming public 
duties combined to prevent him from any personal satisfaction or activities. He expressed 
bewilderment over this personal development commenting, “I do not know that my mental 
faculties are impaired, perhaps I shall be the last to discover that.”199 Despite any uncertainty of 
the cause for Franklin’s shortcomings, he was positive about a “diminution in my activity.”200 
Citing his previous decades of public service, Franklin suggested his career was over and that 
Congress should replace him as its delegate in Paris. He noted that his decision was not based on 
doubts of their success or ill experiences during his service but “purely and simply on the reasons 
above mentioned.”201  
 Franklin included a copy of this letter with a separate one to Jay on April 12, in which he 
elaborated on his decision to retire. Franklin purposely left his letter to Huntington unsealed for 
Jay’s inspection.202 The reasons and specifics he included in Jay’s letter mirrored the ones in his 
letter to Huntington with one major exception. Franklin expressed his wish for Jay to succeed 
him in Paris.203 Having omitted this in his letter to Huntington, Franklin advised Jay to write to 
his associates accordingly if he desired this appointment. Franklin concluded this letter by 
advising Jay that he had not informed anyone in France of his intentions.204  
 On May 14, Franklin again wrote to Huntington expanding upon the situation in Paris 
and offered advice regarding his dismissal. Franklin noted that since the arrival of Col. Laurens 
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the French had appeared more receptive to their requests for aid. Despite this, Franklin warned 
Congress not to burden his successor with future applications that were unobtainable.205 Franklin 
also directly addressed his issue with William Palfrey, the U.S. Consul in France. He claimed 
that Palfrey had failed to communicate with Franklin for over four months and recommended he 
be relieved of all his business affairs. Franklin concluded his letter by addressing his pending 
retirement and declaring his intent to remain in France indefinitely.”206  
 As Franklin awaited word from Congress about his retirement, the earliest hints of a 
peace process emerged. On June 15, British minister David Hartley wrote Franklin offering to 
travel to France and meet to “think of some means of putting a stop to the horrors of universal 
wars.”207 To accomplish this Hartley requested Franklin’s assistance. He expressed no desire to 
visit without the knowledge of the French ministers and asked Franklin to gain their consent.208 
Hartley also informed Franklin that their potential meeting would occur at an important time. He 
noted that his brother moved a conciliatory bill through Parliament in hopes of achieving a 
“honorable and universal accommodation of peace.”209  
 Franklin wrote to the Comte de Vergennes on June 27 providing him with a copy of 
Hartley’s letter. He expressed a desire to see Hartley as a friend but Franklin predicted that 
without official consent from the British court no good could come politically.210 Franklin also 
predicted that a diplomatic meeting of the two would cause more harm than good. He noted the 
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likelihood of it generating false reports and “conjectures.”211 The Comte de Vergennes 
responded in agreement noting Franklin’s intelligence on such matters.212 Despite this, the 
Comte de Vergennes did not completely reject the notion of such a conference. He suggested that 
Franklin and Hartley both should seek official approval to meet, stating his intention to assist 
with all legalities.213 Instead, Franklin responded to Hartley on June 30 denying his request and 
attributing the decision to the Comte de Vergennes.214   
 On June 15, Congress drafted three letters to the American commissioners redefining 
their mission. The first informed them that the emperor of Germany and the empress of Russia 
had offered their mediation between Britain and America.215  In light of this, Congress enclosed 
several instructions regarding the matter. Congress expressed a desire to terminate the war with 
an honorable peace by gaining justification for their cause from their “imperial majesties.”216 The 
instructions continued by directing the commissioners to accept Germany and Russia’s 
mediation on their behalf using the letter as proof.217 
 The second letter from Congress altered the dynamics of the negotiations and clarified its 
directives. Congress granted Adams full “general and special” powers to negotiate with the 
Courts of France and Britain along with all other European states to achieve peace.218 Congress 
took the opportunity to guarantee there were no misunderstandings regarding American 
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authority. Congress named Franklin, Jay, Laurens and Jefferson along with Adams to possess the 
power to negotiate and “make a treaty or treatise.”219 Congress concluded by expressing its faith 
in the commissioners. They stated they would “accept, ratify, fulfil and execute whatever shall 
be agreed and concluded and signed by our said ministers.”220 
 The third letter recommended that the commissioners adhere to instructions provided on 
August 14, 1779, and October 18, 1780, regarding boundary disputes.221 Despite this, Congress 
advised the commissioners to use their own judgments on such matters. Congress felt it was 
unsafe to “tie you up by absolute and peremptory directions” as long as the negotiations secured 
the interests of the United States.222 Congress also instructed the commissioners to provide the 
“most candid and confidential” communications about the negotiations to the French court.223 
The correspondence concluded by providing a guideline if the negotiations faltered. Congress 
granted the commissioners the authority to enter into a truce if peace was unobtainable given that 
Britain retain no possessions in the United States.224 
 Congress convened again on August 16 and further amended its strategy for achieving 
peace. Their first resolution granted full powers for Adams to enter into a treaty of amity and 
commerce with the Netherlands.225 Congress also addressed the issue of Europe’s balance of 
power. To bend this in America’s favor, Congress agreed that Adams should propose a treaty of 
alliance between Louis XVI, the Netherlands and the United States. Congress specifically 
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outlined its desired parameters of an agreement. Congress stipulated that the duration be limited 
to the present American war with Britain and conform to the existing treaties between France 
and the United States. Congress resolved that the Netherlands recognize U.S. sovereignty and 
only to accept a unanimous peace. The directive further stipulated that once the compact 
materialized, the commissioners were to invite the court of Spain to join the alliance.226  
 On August 20, Jay wrote Franklin offering his opinion on Congress’ proposal for the use 
of mediating parties and an expansive European alliance. Jay expressed suspicions about 
Germany and Russia’s potential involvement because he believed “every nation in Europe except 
Prussia wish better to England than France.”227 This motivated Jay to offer a suggestion about 
the negotiators course of action. He advised they should delay the mediation and focus on the 
alliance between France, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Jay offered several 
reasons for his conclusion. He surmised that both Spain and the Netherlands would eagerly join, 
and this would rapidly facilitate an acceptable peace. To support this he offered an assessment of 
the Spanish Court. Jay reported that the Spanish were not tired of the war and had ambitions to 
gain territory including Gibraltar, Jamaica and Port Mahon on the Mediterranean island of 
Menorca. He also detailed the importance of a Spanish alliance for the American cause. Jay 
noted that if the Spanish acknowledged and supported American independence it would give 
“Britain a mortal wound.”228  
 On August 25, Adams wrote to Franklin outlining his perspective on their new orders. 
Adams disliked the plan stating, “I am very apprehensive that our new commission will be as 
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useless as my old one.”229 He continued by offering his personal insight into ending the war. 
Adams claimed that Britain would only consider peace following the death or capture of every 
British soldier in the United States.230 Following this assertion, he issued a warning to Franklin. 
Adams contended that if Congress soon expected word of peace it would only find 
disappointment. He concluded by asserting his role in his vision for the American cause. Adams 
claimed, “my talent, if I have one lies in making war.”231 
 On August 15, Franklin received a dispatch from Congress denying his dismissal and 
expanding his role in the peace negotiations in an apparent validation of Franklin’s advantageous 
diplomatic skills, understanding of European politics, and celebrity in Paris.232 Franklin openly 
accepted his continued appointment but remained relatively silent on the new congressional 
directives. On September 4, he wrote to Jay regarding accounts and mentioned receiving a letter 
from Adams about the commission but provided no details.233 On September 13, Franklin wrote 
to Huntington expressing gratitude for his continued appointment. Franklin advised Congress 
about the complexities involved in achieving its stated goals and cautioned it against relaxing its 
war efforts in anticipation of a quick peace.234 Franklin responded to Adams on October 5 
claiming he knew nothing new about the mediation efforts and described them as in a state of 
stagnation.235 The stalled progress continued until news of Lt. General Cornwallis’ surrender at 
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Yorktown reached Versailles on November 19.236 This did not end the war but caused 
disenchantment in British Parliament, poor morale among British troops and renewed the push 
for peace negotiations.237  
 During the first thirty-two months of his role as minister plenipotentiary to Paris, Franklin 
laid the foundation of what would become the cornerstone of his diplomacy during the coming 
peace process. With a clear intention of leaving his personal fingerprint on both sides of the 
Atlantic, Franklin expanded his presence and influence in such matters including military 
campaigns within the European arena. As Franklin championed the efforts of the French on the 
Americans’ behalf, Adams and certain members of Congress expressed anxiety about the course 
of the American diplomacy in Paris. The central premise of Franklin detractors was that 
American delegate was too affectionate towards the French. Franklin vehemently disagreed with 
this insinuation and recognized the amalgamation of French and American interests would create 
a balance of power and increase the likelihood that Britain would concede to their most 
advantageous demands. Worried over America’s increasingly fragile state, Congress dispatched 
Col. Laurens to assist Franklin in Paris and solicit an ever-increasing amount of aid out of 
concern that Franklin’s acquisition of aid failed to match America’s need. Recognizing the 
impracticality of the Congressional aims, Franklin offered to relinquish his duties. Congress 
instead reaffirmed his role as sole delegate to France and Franklin emerged with a renewed 
purpose and a sense of vindication. This development coincided with a British initiative to 
commence negotiations to end hostilities and formulate a peace. With the consent of America 
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and the strength of the French, Franklin was now free to engage the peace process from a 
diplomatic vantage point of his own design.  
Chapter Four: 
The Peace Process. 
  
 Although Franklin’s diplomacy invited criticism from multiple sources, it became 
immediately apparent the he accurately anticipated British actions once the peace process 
commenced. British minister Hartley immediately informed Franklin that the only avenue for 
effective negotiations rested on the elimination of French involvement. Foreseeing his 
adversary’s strategy, Franklin remained imbedded within the French ministry and rejected 
Britain’s repeated proposals for separate arbitration. With the support and protection of Britain’s 
greatest antagonist, Franklin could effectively delay the mediation until the optimum 
circumstances emerged to negotiate. This enabled Franklin to strike an advantageous accord and 
create the greatest possible American empire. As Franklin continually affirmed his position, the 
British employed a series of tactics to sever the Franco-American alliance. These attempts 
including Hartley’s use of London-based American agent Thomas Digges in an attempt to 
compromise Adams; the dispatch of British diplomat Thomas Grenville to engage Versailles; 
and the dispatch of British merchant Richard Oswald to discuss potential solutions directly with 
Franklin. As this cat and mouse game continued, Franklin employed a scheme where he offered 
a series of preliminary stipulations for peace that he expected to fail. Despite Franklin’s 
nonsensical proposals, British desperation eventually crested, and in a shocking development, the 
terms were accepted. This initial agreement propelled the negotiations forward, and on January 
20, 1783, the American, French, British and Spanish ministers signed the preliminaries, ending 
hostilities. This sent a wave of delight and relief across both Europe and America. After 
finalizing the details, Franklin, Adams, Jay, and Hartley signed the Treaty of Paris on September 
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3, 1783. This was Franklin’s greatest public achievement and cemented his fingerprint on the 
new Atlantic world order where the extraction of an independent United States from a fractured 
British Empire created a social, political and economic shockwave that rippled throughout the 
entire globe. 
On January 2, 1782, Hartley wrote a lengthy letter to Franklin proposing peace 
negotiations between Britain and America without French involvement.1 Hartley argued this was 
the only logical solution. He claimed Britain would rather “fight to a straw to the last man and 
the last shilling rather than be dictated to by the French.”2 This mirrored Hartley’s previous 
suggestions that Franklin had resisted. Hartley again reiterated his claim that the Franco-
American alliance impeded the wish of the British people for peace and was the single largest 
hurdle to negotiations.3 Hartley suggested the negotiations use the Conciliatory Bill passed 
through Parliament on June 27, 1780, as a foundation. This bill contained five clauses. The first 
dictated the negotiations would address the removal of British troops from the “thirteen 
provinces”, security of British interests, and an agreement not to aid their respective enemies.4 
The bill also defined the non-military aspects of the negotiations and proposed the establishment 
of a “free and mutual intercourse, civil and commercial” between Britain and the “thirteen 
provinces.”5 The bill’s other provisions addressed a variety of issues including the proposed 
suspension of certain British decrees detrimental to the peace process and parameters for 
relations between Britain and the United States following the conclusion of hostilities.   
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 Franklin responded swiftly to Hartley’s proposal with a stern rejection. Regarding French 
involvement Franklin claimed, “I believe there is not a man in America, a few English Tories 
excepted, that would not spurn at the thought of deserting a noble and generous friend for the 
sake of a truce.”6 Franklin also reminded Hartley that he had previously rejected Britain’s offers 
of separate negotiations. Franklin commented those proposals “always gave me more disgust 
than my friendship for you permitted me to express.”7 He also addressed Hartley’s assertion that 
the inclusion of the French impeded the will of the British to desire peace. Franklin commented 
that if one party proposes terms of peace and the others view it as “dictating” then “no treaty of 
peace is possible.”8 He concluded this commentary with an assessment of what Congress might 
instruct and what he personally would do. Congress would never instruct its commissioners to 
gain peace on these terms, he explained, and if it did, “I certainly should refuse to act.”9 Here 
Franklin was using his communications with Hartley to create the framework he desired for the 
burgeoning negotiations. 
 The burden of paying for the American commissioners’ expenses continued to grow dire 
as peace negotiations stalled. On January 9, Franklin wrote to Robert Morris explaining that 
neither the Netherlands nor Spain had offered assistance in subsidizing their living costs.10 
Franklin explained this put him in a difficult position. He claimed that the duty of paying bills 
drawn by Jay, Laurens, and Adams fell on him, and his current resources would only permit this 
to continue another six weeks until the end of February.11 On January 11, Franklin relayed a 
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similar message to Adams, adding “I have not only no promise of more money, but an absolute 
promise that I shall have no more.”12 The other commissioners reported to Franklin similar 
situations. Jay reported his inability to settle his debts and stated that Franklin’s intervention 
would be necessary to prevent America’s default of its existing bills.13 He also offered a bleak 
view of his future economic prospects. Jay reported his difficulty in obtaining loans from 
individuals. Despite Spain’s promise of assistance he claimed, “I have no reason to rely on 
receiving it soon.”14  
 Franklin responded to Jay with heavy criticism of the Spanish court. He claimed he did 
not know the amount of aid Jay received but if it was not significant, he “wished you had never 
been sent there.”15 Franklin expressed this opinion because he felt that Spanish actions hurt their 
cause. He surmised that their slight of America’s proposed friendship was “disreputable to us” 
and hurt their relations with other courts.16 Franklin also addressed Jay’s solicitation of aid and 
offered his assessment of the situation. He claimed that he had no power to assist him and he 
perceived Spanish reluctance as a refusal of their offer of alliance.17  
 On January 25, Adams dispatched a detailed assessment of the financial situation in the 
Netherlands. He mirrored Jay’s request for assistance claiming his inability to obtain funds.18 
Adams continued by explaining the reason he was not successful. He claimed four people 
controlled all loans and acted in concert together. Adams asserted this monopoly consciously 
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worked against the American cause because they received their salaries on the condition that 
they resist his requests for loans.19 Adams’ failure along with Jay’s difficulties in Spain 
threatened to give the appearance that the United States was more of a poorly conceived and 
politically unstable experiment than an emerging nation. 
 On January 24, Hartley wrote Franklin again attempting to arrange negations claiming his 
efforts were misunderstood. Hartley contended that the offer of separate negotiations stood “with 
the consent of the allies of America.”20 Hartley argued that this was feasible given the present 
situation. He claimed he understood the French to be disposed to consent, and Franklin had not 
told him different. Hartley concluded by assuring Franklin that peace was obtainable. He claimed 
that multiple treaties would conclude the war offering, “let us have one treaty begun, and I think 
the rest will follow.”21 This demonstrated that Hartley understood Franklin’s refusal and 
attempted to entice him to negotiate by assuring a British acceptance of the Franco-American 
alliance. 
 On January 28, Franklin wrote Louis XVI assuring him of America’s firm commitment to 
independence and its determination to achieve an honorable peace.22 On February 16, Franklin 
responded to Hartley claiming that if the British truly desired peace they must “make 
propositions for that purpose.”23 Franklin purposely placed all the initiative on Hartley. With 
tongue in cheek, he claimed that one of the war parties must take the first step, and “America 
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being a novice in such affairs has no pretense to that character.”24 Despite his commitment to 
non-action, Franklin reiterated his position, stating the United States stood with its allies and 
would negotiate “but do not dream of dividing us, you will certainly never be able to affect it.”25 
Despite feigning inexperience, Franklin clearly understood the diplomatic game and was simply 
waiting for the right opportunity to bring the negotiations forth.  
 The  dynamics of the negotiations changed again in early 1782. On March 21, Hartley 
wrote Franklin informing him that George III intended to change his ministers in hopes of 
facilitating negotiations.26 Hartley insinuated to Franklin that this offered an opportunity for the 
Americans to reevaluate their demands for peace. He asked if Franklin desired him to inform the 
new ministry that the Americans firmly rejected a peace separate from France.27 Hartley 
continued by reiterating his desire for negotiations and the end of hostilities. Franklin responded 
on March 31 affirming his aversion to a separate peace but hinted he alone could not decide the 
matter. He wrote “but I am but one of five in the commission, and have no knowledge of the 
sentiments of the others.”28 By clouding the process, Franklin used Britain’s invigorated push for 
peace to bait Hartley into a less advantageous position.  
 Despite their revitalized efforts to produce effective negotiations, Britain remained 
committed to a peace without France.  On March 26, Adams wrote Franklin detailing an attempt 
by American agent in London Thomas Digges to engage him on business with authority from 
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Hartley.29 Adams assured Franklin he rejected the offer explaining he would not meet without 
witnesses and advised Digges to engage the commissioners at Paris. Despite this rejection by 
Adams, Digges again visited Adams inquiring about his authority to enter into a truce with 
Britain. Adams assured Franklin that he asserted that he could not offer any opinion without 
consulting the other commissioners. He also commented on Digges’ representation of British 
politics and public opinion. According to Adams, Digges claimed Britain was “gloomy” citing 
“the distresses of the people and the distractions in administration and parliament.”30 Adams then 
informed Franklin of a growth in popular support for America in the Netherlands, claiming “ten 
or eleven cities of Holland” favored the Americans.31 This news strengthened Franklin’s resolve 
to deflect negotiations until an opportune time when the British would agree to the most 
desirable terms.   
 To compound their efforts in the Netherlands, the British devised a scheme to divide 
America and France. Franklin wrote Adams on April 13 informing him that he had learned of 
British diplomats addressing the French ministry in hopes of convincing the royal court to 
negotiate a treaty without the Americans.32 He noted the British offered to give the rest of 
Canada to the French as a sacrifice.33 Franklin assured Adams that Americans had already stated 
their position on such matters. Also on the 13th, Franklin wrote Hartley expressing his 
displeasure at British attempts to sever the Franco-American alliance. He wrote, “you may judge 
from hence, my dear friend, what opinion I must have formed of the intentions of your 
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ministers.”34 Franklin continued recounting the French response to the British proposition. He 
insisted Louis XVI asserted that the British must be prepared to negotiate with France’s allies. 
Franklin also used this opportunity to reiterate the French and American commitment to their 
alliance. He cited the principles of the French court and described their attempts to circumvent 
the Franco-American alliance as “vain.”35 Franklin concluded by suggesting that France’s 
reception of its ministers offered all sides possibilities. On April 45, Franklin added an additional 
note to the correspondence advising Hartley that if the British desired negotiations, Laurens 
possessed the authority to hear all proposals regarding “time, place or any other particulars.”36 
Clearly such extensive efforts by the British to produce negotiations with America and France 
separate from one another indicated the importance of preventing such an occurrence to cement 
an American advantage.  
 Despite continuous rejection of the idea, Britain relentlessly tried to facilitate negotiations 
without a Franco-American alliance. On April 16, Adams wrote Franklin detailing a visit the day 
prior by American merchant and politician Henry Laurens. Adams wrote that Laurens informed 
him that the British ministers again proposed a separate peace “upon any terms short of 
independence.”37 Adams noted that Laurens advised the British that he believed a treaty without 
France was impossible. Adams wrote that he agreed stating, “I told him I was fully of that 
opinion.”38 Adams also forwarded information presented to him by Laurens. He noted that the 
British ministers no longer trusted Digges’ character and had dispatched a British commissioner 
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named Oswald to engage Franklin. Adams concluded his correspondence by stating a desire to 
meet only with “a plenipotentiary” in the future if Franklin permitted.39 
 Unbeknownst to Adams, Oswald petitioned Franklin on April 16 requesting to meet with 
him the following day.40 Oswald presented himself as a peace emissary despite not possessing an 
official title or diplomatic status.41 Franklin engaged Oswald discussing a durable peace and 
removing “what may give occasion for future wars.”42 A key component of their conversation 
was the role of reparations during negotiations. Franklin noted his belief that peace could only be 
secure with reparations because American resentment from injuries guaranteed future conflict. 
Despite this belief, Franklin admitted that he was unsure if Americans would demand reparations 
but still suggested it would be to their advantage if the British offered it. Their conversation also 
addressed British possessions in Canada. Citing the cost of governing the territory, Franklin 
suggested the British cede control in favor of profitable trade agreements.43 Franklin clearly was 
candid during this discussion because he understood any agreements were not binding. Such an 
environment afforded Franklin the opportunity to gauge his British adversary while reiterating 
his stipulations for peace.   
The following day Franklin wrote Adams stating that Oswald liked the idea of using 
Canada for reparations because of Britain’s present financial constraints.44 Despite Franklin’s 
account of his meeting with Oswald, Franklin failed to inform Adams about a significant blunder 
                                                           
39
 Ibid.  
40
 Richard Oswald to Benjamin Franklin, April 16, 1782, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Ellen R. 
Cohn, http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 9, 2014).  
41
 Schiff, A Great Improvisation, 297.  
42
 Benjamin Franklin, notes for a Conversation with Oswald April 19, 1782, in The Papers of Benjamin 
Franklin, ed. Ellen R. Cohn, http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 9, 2014). 
43
 Ibid.  
44
 Benjamin Franklin to John Adams, April 20, 1782, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Ellen R. Cohn, 
http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 9, 2014).  
113 
 
he had committed. During his meeting with Oswald, Franklin scribbled notes on the subjects 
discussed. At the conclusion, Oswald requested if he could present the notes to his British 
beneficiaries and Franklin agreed.45 Franklin soon realized his mistake because he failed to 
confer with Vergennes as instructed and had no authority to discuss reparations.46 Franklin 
immediately went into damage control and resorted to libel to distract attention from the 
negotiations. 
Franklin printed and circulated a fictitious excerpt from the Boston Independent 
Chronicle detailing atrocities committed by Indians with British encouragement. These included 
an account attributed to a Capt. Gerrish describing the discovery of eight boxes containing 
American scalps intended as a present for Canadian Governor Col. Haldimand.47 Franklin also 
fabricated correspondences between Indian tribes and the Canadian governor. These included a 
letter from the Seneca asking Haldimand to send the scalps to “the great King” to assure him 
“our faithfulness in destroying his enemies.”48 The excerpt also detailed multiple examples of 
how this discovery affected the American populace. The examples included an account from 
Boston dated March 20 claiming that after the scalps arrived thousands of people flocked to see 
them “and all mouths are full of execrations.”49 To make the excerpt appear legitimate, Franklin 
included ads for claims against estates and the sale of houses and land.  
Franklin used this interruption to strengthen his support structure and requested that Jay 
return to France. On April 22, Franklin explained he could not negotiate without his colleagues 
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and because Spain was unlikely to aid them, Jay’s talents were more useful at Passy.50 On April 
23, Franklin wrote Jay again informing him that Vergennes agreed to the move and suggested 
they leave Carmichael in Madrid.51 On April 24, Franklin wrote Jay a third time explaining his 
perception of where the negotiations were heading. Franklin noted that Britain agreed to a 
prisoner exchange with the Americans. He stated this resulted from Parliament’s passing an act 
that designated them as prisoners of war instead of being charged with high treason.52 Franklin 
perceived this as a vague acknowledgement of American independence. He stated that in 
response to America’s rejection of a treaty without France, Britain appeared to entertain the 
possibility of a general peace.53 On May 8, Jay wrote Franklin informing him of his intentions to 
travel to Paris and commenting that the French ambassador in Madrid agreed with the move.54 
Franklin also expressed a desire for both Laurens and Adams to travel to France given the 
possibilities of negotiations.55 Despite this, Franklin understood the importance of Adams’ 
presence in the Netherlands during this crucial period. He informed Laurens that if Adams could 
not attend then he wished him to arrive with expressed knowledge of Adams’ opinion.56 On 
April 30, Laurens wrote Franklin informing him of his pending departure for Paris.57 Laurens 
also brought Franklin up to date on recent conversations about American and British relations. 
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He reported that Lord Shelburne was receptive to the proposed prisoner exchanges that various 
American and British parties had discussed.58  
 On May 2, Adams wrote Franklin informing him that his ability to attend was 
uncertain.59 Adams chose this correspondence to clarify his position on peace and offer an 
assessment of their loan prospects. He claimed that he had previously hinted that 
acknowledgement of their independence was paramount, but reiterated that he did not mean they 
insist on such an article in the treaty. Regarding finances, Adams reported less than desirable 
news. He explained that Dutch profits from trade had fallen sharply and they were exhausted 
from loans for “France, Spain, England, Russia, Sweden, Denmark and several other powers.”60 
Adams also informed Franklin that domestic debts impeded their assistance commenting, “there 
is scarcely a Ducat to be lent.”61 Despite this, Adams expressed optimism for their future. He 
wrote that although enthusiasm for their cause had faltered, “another year, if the war shall 
continue, perhaps we may do better.”62 
On May 3, Hartley wrote Franklin informing him that the British government issued a 
general order releasing all American prisoners.63 This event revitalized the peace process 
because it demonstrated Britain’s apparent acquiescence for negotiations under the present 
conditions.  Hartley commented that this was the first step towards “sweet reconciliation.”64 
Franklin responded on May 13 commenting, “I rejoice with you in this step” and “I think it will 
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tend greatly towards a reconciliation.”65 He concluded his letter by expressing his hopes for a 
durable peace built upon this development. 
On May 13, Deane wrote Franklin a lengthy epistle from his adopted lodgings in Ghent 
offering his differences of opinion with Franklin. Deane immediately addressed their lack of 
communication, commenting on Franklin’s lack of or short responses to his correspondences.66 
He continued by warning Franklin of how their relationship could negatively affect their 
important task. Deane wrote that they must not let their “resentments and passions get the better 
of our reason and judgment.”67 He continued by reminding Franklin of their goal. Deane wrote, 
“the great object before us is to secure peace, liberty and safety for our country.”68 Despite their 
shared objective, Deane detailed their differing opinions about what was best for the United 
States. Deane wrote, “you believe that the peace, liberty and happiness of our country will be 
best secured and supported by a close alliance with France.”69 Deane explicitly disagreed with 
Franklin’s opinion. He explained he believed America “was formerly the most happy and free 
country in the world whilst under the British constitution.”70 Despite their differences, Deane 
concluded his letter with an expression of his personal interests. He claimed, “I have neither 
correspondence or interest or the prospect of any in G. Britain- the small remains of my fortune, 
the most of my friends and family and all my future hopes and prospects are in America.”71 
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On May 17, Laurens wrote Franklin informing him that for health reasons he intended to 
decline his Congressional appointment to negotiate.72 Laurens justified his decision by 
disagreeing with Franklin’s earlier assertion that he could not enter into mediation without his 
colleagues. He stated that he believed that Congress and its constituents never intended or 
expected everyone named in the commission to act. Despite his refusal to negotiate, Laurens did 
express interest in continuing his assistance to the American cause. He explained his intention to 
contact Adams and assume his financial role in the commission.73 This put Franklin in a peculiar 
position. Within two weeks of Britain releasing American prisoners, one of Franklin’s colleagues 
expressed his aversion to independence and another elected not to participate. This proved to be 
the beginning of a series of events that immediately negated any progress made in the recent 
weeks.  
With the stability of the commission in peril, Adams composed a letter on May 24 but 
failed to send it. In the letter, he made several prophetic assertions about the integrity of those 
with whom they would negotiate. He questioned whether Lord Shelburne and “his royal master” 
actually had lowered their ideas of “British omnipotence?”74 Adams continued his assessment of 
Britain’s intentions. He predicted that Britain’s desire to maintain possessions gained in the 
Peace of 1763 would prolong the war indefinitely. Adams also believed that new British 
ministers would refuse to make concessions, attempt to turn the tide of the war, and prevent 
successful negotiations.75 
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On June 2, Franklin wrote Adams detailing the events surrounding British diplomat 
Thomas Grenville’s appearance at Passy. Franklin described his rhetoric as a repetition of 
Oswald’s assertions that the British would negotiate with all powers.76 Despite this, Franklin 
reported a deception at the hand’s of the British. He noted that the French court had requested an 
agreement that France could share with Spain and Holland assuring Grenville’s authority. 
Franklin reported the arrival of a British document twelve days later supposedly declaring 
Grenville’s authorization to negotiate with the French and their allies. When Franklin arrived at 
Versailles and read the document he noticed there was no mention of France’s allies and noted 
that the Comte de Vergennes had dismissed the event as a ruse to gain time. Franklin claimed 
that because Grenville declared his dedication to including America’s allies in the negotiations, it 
indicated Britain’s intention to continue the war.77  
On June 13, Adams responded to Franklin’s correspondence about the events. He 
immediately declared that Grenville’s intent to negotiate only with France did not surprise him.78 
Adams continued with an assessment of the situation that mirrored the sentiment from his unsent 
letter to Franklin in May. He noted that because of divisions among the British ministers and 
their unwillingness to make concessions, they would likely never make peace. Adams continued 
with his personal desires for the conclusion of the war. He stated, “I wish their enemies could by 
any means be persuaded to carry on the war against them in places where they might be sure of 
triumphs.”79 Adams also declared his personal commitment to negotiations with their allies. He 
stated he had not taken any engagements to make peace without the Dutch and only would with 
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their blessing. Adams declared, “it would be with infinite reluctance that I should see a peace 
made between England and any of her enemies, unless it is made with all.”80  
Franklin responded with cautious optimism. He wrote to Oswald expressing the belief 
that his dedication to the good will of both countries indicated his willingness to negotiate with 
the American commissioners.81 Franklin indicated he believed that recent events resulted from 
the politics of negotiations. He surmised that despite Grenville’s initial commission to negotiate 
only with France, Britain’s plan was to enable Oswald to mediate with the Americans later. 
Franklin attributed this to the pending “Enabling Bill” before Parliament that authorized 
negotiations with the United States.82 He concluded with an expression of hope for an honorable 
and swift conclusion to the war.  
Franklin’s optimism was not evident when he wrote to Laurens on July 2. He theorized 
that the British delayed negotiations hoping that they could manipulate the situation for their 
advantage.83 Franklin also suggested that the British intended to make the American 
commissioners irrelevant. He claimed that British General Guy Carleton was preparing to offer a 
proposition before Congress that would make a treaty in Paris unnecessary. Franklin also offered 
an unfavorable commentary on the European climate. He noted Oswald had not received a 
commission, and Grenville “does not very clearly comprehend us according to British ideas.”84  
Franklin actively addressed the potential negotiations between General Carlton and 
Congress. On July 6, he provided the Comte de Vergennes with a resolution from Maryland’s 
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general assembly indicating their rejection of any proposition.85 Franklin specifically highlighted 
the importance of such a strong rebuke from the state. He noted that Maryland was last to accede 
to their “confederation” and therefore “esteemed by some the least hearty in the cause.”86 
Franklin also wrote Hartley expressing his displeasure at the slow pace of the British peace 
effort. He informed Hartley of Maryland’s unanimous resolution exclaiming their dedication to 
“continuing the war at all hazards than violate their faith with France.”87 Franklin concluded by 
predicting the present state of affairs would produce negative results. 
As Franklin voiced his displeasure, Hartley responded with his own complaints. He wrote 
that Franklin’s strategy of gaining independence before a treaty impaired progress. Hartley 
explained that Britain likely wished to gain something for American independence.88 Hartley 
suggested that Franklin abandon his position and seek independence as the first article of the 
treaty. He concluded by expressing his belief that dependence could only arise “from the failure 
of the treaty.”89 As the diplomatic dance between the two began, Franklin again resorted to 
deflection as a means to stall the process in hopes of finding the best opportunity for the 
Americans. This came in the form of limited communications with Hartley designed to string 
him along but accomplish little.  
On August 16, Hartley wrote Franklin communicating much warmer relations. He 
commented that Franklin’s “honest, anxious and unremitted” efforts for peace must endear him 
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to America “and to all mankind.”90 From this premise, Hartley detailed the noble role he and 
Franklin played in the peace process. He noted, “I can give the strongest testimonies of the 
constant honor and good faith of your conduct and correspondences, and my letters to you will 
bear me equal testimony.”91 Hartley continued by dismissing any future criticism of their actions 
during the negotiations. He claimed neither should fear censure because under scrutiny they 
would claim “the poet’s character of the sincere statesmen.”92 Hartley continued with an 
assessment of their affairs arguing that he and Franklin agreed in sentiment. 
Despite Franklin and Hartley’s apparent truce, criticism began to surround the minster 
plenipotentiary. On September 5, American statesman Robert Livingston wrote Franklin 
explicitly addressing the consequences of Franklin’s lack of communication. Reminding 
Franklin his last correspondence occurred in March, Livingston reported that the Americans had 
resorted to private letters as their primary source of information.93 Livingston noted that of 
Adams’ position in Holland, Lauren’s liberation, and Jay’s travel to France, “Doctor Franklin has 
told us nothing.”94 His criticism addressed the entire American system, not just Franklin. 
Livingston stated the Americans had adopted a system based on ignorance that impeded their 
ability to function. He continued by venting his personal frustration over their state of affairs. 
Livingston noted that he blushed when he met “a member of Congress who inquires into what is 
passing in Europe.”95 He continued by highlighting a point that plagued the Americans from the 
beginning of the revolution. Of intelligence Livingston asked, “how does it happen that all our 
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information of what is transacting in Europe should come through indirect channels or from the 
enemy?”96  
Franklin quickly responded to Livingston and attributed his poor correspondence to their 
bad postal service and the interrupted peace process. He claimed that he had written “sundry 
letters” and expressed hopes that they had not all “miscarried.”97 Franklin continued with an 
update of the negotiations. He claimed they “amounted to little more than mutual professions of 
sincere desires.”98 Franklin continued by pleading with Livingston for patience. He noted the 
number of interests under consideration in a peace between five nations, and “it will be well not 
to flatter ourselves with a very speedy conclusion.”99 Franklin concluded his short letter with an 
assurance of future communications containing important information and various relevant 
documents. 
On September 27, Robert Morris wrote Franklin detailing two acts of Congress 
identifying three points of consideration. The first act dated September 14 consisted of a three-
part directive defining Franklin’s agenda before the French court. The first instructed Franklin to 
solicit a four-million-dollar loan from Versailles while reassuring the French of America’s 
admiration. The second and third points directed Franklin to highlight America’s reliance on 
France and convince them of the present loan’s necessity. For reference, Morris included cost 
estimations for the year 1783 to support their petition for assistance.100 Such a directive from 
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Congress placed much pressure on Franklin because Congress appeared to ignore his earlier 
assertion that its financial demands were impractical.  
On September 23, Congress approved a second directive reinforcing its expectations of 
Franklin. They expressed doubts about Britain’s suspicious change from “vengeance and war to 
kindness and conciliation” and instructed Franklin not to consider British compliments when 
negotiating.101 Congress also reiterated the importance of America’s continued friendship and 
alliance with Versailles. The final point implored Franklin to accept the necessity of these 
congressional loan applications because America lacked the ability to raise sufficient funds 
through taxation. Despite the official decree of Congress, Morris disclosed his personal doubts to 
Franklin regarding America’s strategy. He stated his belief that foreign assistance was a 
necessity but expressed fears that “we shall be considered as relying too much on France, or in 
other words doing too little for ourselves.”102  
On September 28, Morris wrote a second letter addressing Franklin’s critics in America. 
He noted that many believed Franklin’s perceived allegiance to France “seals your lips when you 
should ask their aid.”103 Morris wrote that this viewpoint caused “Mr. Lee and company” to 
continuously assert that Franklin’s connections and influence before the French court were 
“extremely feeble.”104 He also informed Franklin that these detractors were gaining influence in 
America at his expense. Morris noted that Congress believed “your grateful sensibility might 
render you unwilling to apply with all that warmth which the sense of their necessity convinces 
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them is necessary.”105 Despite the apparent singling out of Franklin, Morris offered a personal 
assessment of the source of these resentments. He claimed that those “who censure you are well 
disposed to place like censure on France.”106 
Despite negative information from America, Franklin remained focused on the 
diplomatic wrangling at hand. On October 14, Franklin wrote Livingston detailing his latest 
attempt to influence the course of the negotiations. He stated that the Americans had sent 
preliminary propositions to Oswald, although he doubted the British court would approve 
them.107 The first article insisted the British king renounce for himself and all his successors any 
claims within the dominion of the thirteen colonies. The second addressed fishery rights dictating 
that America claimed the rights to the seas they possessed when they were under British 
dominion. Franklin’s provisions also discussed postwar financial and commercial relations 
between Britain and America. It proposed that citizens of each nation should enjoy the same 
protections in each other’s ports as afforded to their native subjects. Franklin concluded with an 
expression of hope that the British agree to the proposals. He claimed that if they were 
successful, “I apprehend little difficulty in the rest.”108  
On November 4, Oswald wrote the American commissioners outlining several obstacles 
to successful negotiations. The first was America’s refusal to accept Britain’s insistence that all 
seized property be restored to loyalists and those who fought on behalf of the crown.109 Oswald 
continued by asserting that if restoration was impractical, the American’s must agree to provide 
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adequate compensation. He continued by indicating that this stipulation united the British 
commissioners. Oswald claimed that Paris-based British diplomat Henry Strachey “has most 
strenuously joined me” in insisting on the restoration of property.110 Britain also issued demands 
regarding British citizens under American control. Oswald insisted that America must grant 
general amnesty to those held in confinement with full restoration of property and rights.111 
Oswald concluded with an assertion that America must accept these stipulations before 
negotiations could progress further.  
Henry Strachey reinforced Oswald’s demands the following day in a letter to the 
American commissioners. He claimed America’s refusal would be the great obstacle “to a 
conclusion and ratification of that peace which is meant as a solid, perfect, permanent 
reconciliation and reunion between Great Britain and America.”112 Despite this warning, 
Strachey expressed his personal desire to achieve such an agreement between the two. He 
claimed he would not leave Paris without submitting the matter for consideration one last 
time.113  Strachey concluded by indicating that American independence and territory would 
suffer if the American commissioners continued to reject the propositions.  
The American commissioners unanimously responded to Oswald on November 5. They 
rebuked his proposals and claimed they could not enter into an agreement regarding restoration 
because confiscation occurred under the laws of individual states, and Congress had no 
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constitutional authority to interfere.114 The commissioners also dismissed the validity of Britain’s 
proposal regarding amnesty. They claimed to agree “to an amnesty more extensive than justice 
required” but could not extend it further.115 The commissioners concluded by stating that if their 
inability to comply would induce Britain to continue the war “we hope that the utmost latitude 
will not be given to its rigors.”116 The following day the commissioners forwarded a copy of the 
correspondence to Strachey.117 
 On November 21, Livingston wrote Franklin informing him that Congress appointed 
Jefferson to the commission but expressed doubts whether he would undertake the task.118 
Livingston’s letter included a personal assessment of the negotiations. He argued the British did 
not truly desire peace and compared them to church ministers unwilling to quit the pulpit even 
“when they have tired out their hearers.”119 He also reported that the war effort in America was 
stagnant. Livingston explained the French army at Providence stalled without orders despite their 
preparedness to proceed.120 He concluded his correspondence by expressing concerns over the 
commercial repercussions of British naval advances in the Caribbean.  
 On November 26, Franklin wrote to Oswald informing him of resolutions passed by 
Congress and the state of Pennsylvania. Franklin reported that Congress directed him to obtain 
the “authentic returns of the slaves and other property” destroyed or confiscated during the 
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war.121 He also informed Oswald that Congress determined any lack of compensation from 
Britain would invalidate claims against Americans for similar offenses. Franklin reported failure 
to pay would prevent America from making restitution to any former property owners that was 
“forfeited to, or confiscated by any of the states.”122  
 Franklin also presented a second resolution from the Pennsylvania assembly titled “An 
act for procuring an estimate of the damages sustained by the inhabitants of Pennsylvania, from 
the troops and adherents of the King of Great Britain during the present war.”123  The bill 
referred to the damages as “unwarranted by the practice of civilized nations” and called for an 
estimate of damages for use as advantage during the negotiations.124 The resolution delegated the 
task to the Pennsylvania county assessors and designated lost slaves as property damage.125 The 
resolution concluded with a directive of how to execute the project including costs and court 
appearances. Despite the apparent stalemate, Franklin continued to offer proposals to Oswald 
attempting to further the peace process. 
 On November 29, Franklin drafted a preliminary proposal for peace and sent it to 
Oswald. It immediately called for the British king to convince Parliament to approve swift 
compensation for American merchants and citizens who lost “tobacco, rice, indigo, and negroes 
etc.”126 Franklin also insisted that the British king petition Parliament to offer additional 
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compensation for “all the towns, villages and farms burnt and destroyed by his troops.”127 The 
proposal also contested several debts claimed by Britain. Franklin noted that before the war free 
commerce based on “mutual faith” existed where Britain credited American merchants who sold 
goods and would make “accustomed remittances.”128 Franklin contended that inflicted damages 
during hostilities nullified both this system and all debts claimed on existing merchandise. He 
compared the British to a draper who gave cloth to his neighbors on credit, followed him, seized 
the cloth and then sent a bailiff to arrest him for the debt.129 Oswald was receptive to Franklin’s 
proposal in hopes that an agreeable response would resolve their ongoing stalemate. Franklin 
informed the Comte de Vergennes of their progress and stated he would forward a copy of the 
details the following day.130  
The Comte de Vergennes expressed surprise over the agreement and was astounded when 
Oswald and the Americans signed the preliminary compact on November 30.131 The document 
contained several articles that addressed certain post-war issues. In terms of territory, it defined 
the northern borders from Nova Scotia through Lakes Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior.132 A 
subsequent article dictated that the United States retained fishing rights off Newfoundland, the 
Grand Banks, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. The remaining articles expanded on the stipulations 
put forth in earlier peace proposals. They addressed the recovery of debts, compensation for 
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damages by both Britain and the U.S., a ban on future confiscation of property, granting freedom 
to prisoners, and open navigation of the Mississippi River.133  
Despite the progress, Franklin expressed doubt over the terms and their overall prospects 
for success. On December 4, Franklin wrote Livingston detailing why he expected the agreement 
to fail. He noted that the French had not signed with Britain, and that both Spain and the 
Netherlands had failed to act impeding a “definite treaty.”134 Franklin continued by questioning 
the terms of the compact. He noted that, “to secure our main points we may have yielded too 
much in favor of the royalists.”135 Franklin also expressed concern that the quantity of 
compensation awarded remained undecided, commenting, “I suppose something depends on the 
event of the treaty.”136  
As 1782 ended, Franklin expressed cautious optimism over the state of negotiations. He 
addressed Louis XVI directly to assure him of the Americans’ resolve in their fight for 
independence and commitment to the Franco-American alliance.137 Franklin also wrote to Morris 
warning him that America should not consider itself at peace because the other powers had yet to 
sign an agreement.138 He warned that the war might continue longer than expected, predicting 
that Parliament would meet the signed preliminary agreement with “great clamors.”139 Franklin 
used this opportunity to express his agreement with Morris’ statement the previous September 
regarding America’s foreign dependence. He contended “our people certainly ought to do more 
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for themselves, it is absurd the pretending to be lovers of liberty while they grudge paying for the 
defense of it.”140  
On January 3, 1783, Jefferson wrote Franklin informing him of his pending departure 
from Philadelphia for France. Jefferson clearly stated that he understood “I can do no good to the 
commission; it shall be my endeavor to do it no injury.”141 He continued by inferring that despite 
his place in the negotiations, his arrival would affect the commissioners. Jefferson explained that 
he was the bearer of “something new to you” but assured them it was “not of a nature to 
embarrass your operations.”142 He concluded by informing Franklin to expect his arrival shortly 
after the letter arrived. 
On January 6, Livingston wrote Franklin detailing the current state of affairs in America. 
He claimed he understood Franklin’s reluctance to solicit loans but reported that America’s 
treasury was empty and that “no adequate means of fulfilling it presents itself.”143 Livingston 
also indicated that he agreed with the growing notion that the United States needed to be more 
self-reliant. He stated, “I do not pretend to justify the negligence of the States not providing 
greater supplies.”144 Despite this, Livingston expressed his belief that there was no other way to 
continue the fight without solicitation of foreign loans. He stated he felt it was his duty to inform 
Franklin that if the war continued, it would be at the expense of the French.  
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On January 18, Franklin received a dispatch from the Comte de Vergennes requesting to 
meet with him, Adams, and any other commissioners in Paris.145 The Comte de Vergennes did 
not explain the urgent meeting but requested the presence of Franklin’s grandson and secretary 
Temple Franklin because there would be a need to translate French to English.146 Franklin 
responded to the Comte de Vergennes that he and Adams could attend, but Laurens and Jay 
could not because they had traveled to Britain and Normandy respectively.147 Franklin informed 
Adams of the meeting and suggested they travel together so they could discuss business and 
ensure they arrived when expected.148  
On January 20, Franklin and Adams arrived at Versailles to find that the Conde de 
Aranda, British plenipotentiary Alleyne Fitz-Herbert, and the Comte de Vergennes had 
successfully negotiated a treaty.149 Immediately, the Americans signed a cessation of hostilities 
between Britain and the United States with Spain and France.150 The declaration officially 
recognized the preliminary articles signed on November 30 and based continued peace on the 
agreed reciprocity among the three European monarchs and the United States.151 This event was 
an achievement for Franklin and officially set in motion an evolution throughout the Atlantic 
bearing his fingerprint.  
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The following day Franklin wrote Livingston informing him of the news. He stated that 
he enclosed a copy of the declaration and wished for him to inform Congress.152 Franklin 
explained to Livingston that he was not in possession of the preliminary agreement signed 
between the three crowns, commenting he believed they generally were advantageous to Spain 
and France. He also offered an assessment of the strength of the declaration. Franklin noted that 
although the Dutch had not participated, the agreement settled their stipulations, and he did not 
envision this to be an obstacle in forming the definitive treaty.153  
On February 5, Franklin and diplomat Comte de Creutz negotiated a treaty between the 
United States and Sweden. This was the first treaty between the U.S. and a foreign power not 
active in the war.154 The preliminary stipulations declared that neither side would arm a vessel 
that acted belligerently towards the other.155 Other stipulations included commercial agreements 
over vessels and ports, maritime conduct between the two nations, and an official recognition of 
each other’s “Consuls, Vice-Consuls, agents and commissioners.”156 These negotiations also 
produced an additional five stipulations separate from the initial agreement. The first declared 
that Sweden would use all resources to protect and defend the interests and citizens of the United 
States.157 The remaining four articles addressed U.S. reciprocity in defense of mutual interests, 
issues of neutrality in international maritime conflicts, jurisdiction and contraband issues.158 
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Franklin and the Comte de Creutz signed an official treaty of amenity and commerce in early 
April.159  
On February 25, Franklin and the Comte de Vergennes negotiated a financial agreement 
between the United States and France. The contract allocated a loan of six million livres to the 
United States followed by six articles addressing repayment of all previous aid and matters of 
interest.160 The agreement outlined various payment schedules and varying interest rates until the 
projected final payment in 1802.161 Despite the stringent repayment plan, Franklin managed to 
negotiate a minor concession from the French, who agreed to allow the United States to 
accelerate its payments to take advantage of the evolving interest rates previously agreed to.162 
Franklin expressed surprise at the success of the negotiations. He wrote Morris informing him of 
the deal explaining that because of the state of French finances, “I wonder I have obtained so 
much.”163 Despite securing the latest loan, Franklin warned Morris to act as if it was the last of 
their resources. He stated, “I am absolutely assured that no further aid for this year is to be 
expected.”164 
On March 12, Hartley wrote Franklin a congratulatory letter for the peace agreement and 
forwarded him a document of conciliatory proposals and a “sketch” for a treaty of commerce 
between the two nations.165 The central premise of the conciliatory document was that there was 
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no need for further delay in the conclusion of the treaty based on the previously agreed terms.166 
To facilitate this, Britain offered to evacuate its army before the conclusion of the treaty in 
exchange for the United States’ not  harassing any loyalists who remained in America for a 
period of one year.167 The proposal concluded with a reassurance of Britain’s commitment to 
releasing all prisoners of war. The commerce proposal intended to return Britain and the United 
States to the terms and conditions of trade before the war with “the new duties imposed during 
the war excepted.”168  
Livingston wrote the American commissioners on March 25 reporting that Congress 
received the preliminary articles of peace and reacted positively.169 Congress also expressed 
approval of the commissioners’ refusal to negotiate peace without British acknowledgement of 
their independence. Livingston recounted how Congress specifically reacted to certain points in 
the agreement. He noted the boundary decisions were expected, and they had no complaints 
regarding the fisheries. Livingston implored the commissioners to clarify one aspect. He asked 
for an explanation of the term “real British subjects” in the agreement.170 Despite the lack of 
clarity, Livingston surmised that there was no deception between the Americans and British on 
the matter and dismissed any probability of consequences. 
Despite their differences, the American commissioners continued to work cohesively 
towards creating and reshaping postwar relations between America and Britain. On April 28, 
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Adams and Jay invited Franklin to meet with them and Laurens the following day.171 At the 
meeting, they produced a proposition for Hartley reiterating their dedication to free commerce 
between the two nations. They asserted that following the evacuation of the British army, all 
waterways controlled by the United States would be open to British vessels if the British 
reciprocated with U.S vessels in their respective waterways.172 On May 5, the commissioners 
constructed a revised proposition to clarify the classification of certain islands within the 
province of Nova Scotia as stated in the agreement.173 Also on May 5, the commissioners 
declared they had fully executed their authority regarding water boundaries in America and left 
all future negotiations in the hands of the individual states.174 
As the peace process continued, Franklin again received poor financial news from 
America. On May 9, Livingston wrote that despite America’s successes, “our finances are still 
greatly embarrassed.”175 Livingston also implied that America’s financial problems would 
continue to deteriorate. He expressed hope that Franklin could procure more aid stating, “be 
assured that it is extremely necessary to set us down in peace.”176 Livingston continued by 
predicting that serious disorganization likely would impede America’s ability to recover. He 
stated that Congress did not expect to procure any compensation for losses because only 
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Connecticut and Rhode Island had provided estimates of damages, and those were “extremely 
imperfect.”177  
On May 12, Morris wrote Franklin detailing severe disorganization at the office of 
finance. He stated that the confusion rendered him unable to determine paid bills from unpaid 
ones and fear that several may have received “double payment.”178 Morris informed Franklin that 
he had written Jay, Adams and American financial commissioner Thomas Barclay on the matter 
in hopes of bringing organization to his office.179 On May 26, Morris wrote Franklin again 
informing him that he intended stay superintendent of finances as directed by Congress.180 
Despite this, Morris wrote candidly, about the financial problems within his department. Morris 
declared, “the distresses we experience arise from our own misconduct.”181 Morris reiterated 
earlier sentiments communicated by the commissioners. He stated, “if the resources of this 
country were drawn forth they would be amply sufficient.”182 Morris continued by asserting he 
never was intentionally dishonest and implored Franklin to solicit more aid for the cause.  
The stagnant peace process continued into the middle of summer. Franklin wrote to 
Laurens on July 6 commenting, “our negotiations go on slowly, every proposition being sent to 
England, and answers not returning very speedily.”183 The commissioners collectively expressed 
frustration over the slow process in a correspondence to Livingston on July 27. They stated that 
nothing of the treaties was completed and they consistently waited in expectation of answers that 
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did not arrive.184 The commissioners also reported that the Dutch had yet to ratify their 
preliminaries and suggested they might not participate in the negotiations.185  
The uncertainty continued until August 29 when the commissioners received a brief 
notice from Hartley stating he was prepared to sign the definite treaty “whenever it shall be 
convenient to you.”186 Hartley informed the commissioners that his instructions specifically 
confined him to Paris and when they decided upon a date, he hoped to receive them at the Hotel 
de York.187 The American commissioners responded on August 30 that despite a previously 
appointed place for the signing of the treaty, they would attend to the matter on Wednesday 
September 3 at eight o’clock in the morning.188 Hartley agreed to their proposal hoping to 
achieve peace without any inconvenience for all participants.189  
When Franklin, Adams, and Jay arrived that Wednesday morning, the commissioners 
certainly were aware of the historical significance of attaching their signatures to the Treaty of 
Paris. This document was the culmination of an almost seven-year effort and validated 
America’s right to exist. After the American commissioners and Hartley completed the 
document, the British minister and the Comte de Vergennes signed the Treaty of Versailles as 
agreed to in their negotiations. After these monumental acts were completed, all parties 
expressed relief and commitment to never allowing the global calamity they just endured to 
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repeat itself. With their official duties completed, the Comte de Vergennes and the Americans 
celebrated their achievements throughout the night, while Hartley retreated from the festive 
atmosphere.190    
 In the almost five years that Franklin served as America’s minister plenipotentiary in 
France, he carefully constructed a diplomatic scheme in anticipation of concluding the American 
Revolution through a peace treaty. Franklin’s strategy correctly predicted that the British would 
employ a divide and conquer game plan because France constituted America’s source of strength 
and security. To avert this, Franklin carefully weaved American and French interests together 
and exploited all available means to reinforce their mutual dedication to preserving the Franco-
American alliance. Franklin’s pandering to the Versailles elite provoked strong conjecture from 
his America colleagues who feared such an entanglement. As the negotiations progressed, 
familiar problems including security threats and internal conflicts among the American 
delegates, disrupted their progress. 
  Once the peace process commenced, Franklin’s genius shown through as Britain 
proposed negotiations without French inclusion and attacked the Franco-American alliance on all 
fronts. This maneuver included employing American agent Digges in an attempt to compromise 
the American ministers present at other European courts, the dispatch of British diplomat 
Grenville to Paris in an attempt to break the alliance from the French angle, and Oswald’s 
endeavor to persuade Franklin directly. Despite this grand assault on the alliance, the American 
ministers and French crown remained committed to their alliance and eventually British 
desperation spawned favorable concessions. This evolved into an American and British 
consensus over preliminary stipulations that eventually served as the framework of the historic 
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Treaty of Paris signed on September 3, 1783. This monumental event was more than a validation 
of an independent United States; it was the completion of a dramatic social, economic and 
political transformation within the Atlantic world. The individuals who founded the colonies 
nearly two centuries earlier initially viewed themselves as English subjects, and this revolution 
effectively rejected this character in favor of an American identity. The treaty also legitimized an 
American government that extracted control over their commerce from an imposed mercantile 
economy and instituted a political system that repudiated European royalty in favor of 
republicanism and natural rights. When the dust settled from this shattering event, an American 
entity stood bearing the undeniable fingerprint of Benjamin Franklin.  
Chapter Five: 
Franklin’s Triumphant Return. 
 With a stroke of his pen on September 3, 1783, Franklin validated American 
independence, dismantled the seemingly unbreakable British Empire, and reconfigured the 
Atlantic world. Following the signing of the definitive peace, celebrations erupted across 
America and Europe. Franklin and the other delegates relished in their victory and soon found 
themselves in a state of limbo as the treaty effectively dissolved their commission. Despite these 
celebrations, Franklin continued holding unofficial discussions with David Hartley about the 
future of British and American relations. Hartley championed a peaceful reconciliation and 
believed that an Anglo-American partnership best suited their mutual interests. Franklin agreed 
and expressed a strong desire to heal the wounds inflicted upon both countries from the war. 
After considering various solutions, Franklin developed an ambitious plan to unite the 
inhabitants of the Atlantic world. This plan consisted of a familial union between America, 
Britain, and France to prevent hostilities and strengthen their respective infrastructures. Despite 
his efforts, Franklin lacked authority to negotiate beyond a peace treaty. He thus increasingly 
directed his attention to other activities as the commissioners awaited further guidance from 
America. On January 14, 1784, Congress ratified the Treaty of Paris and dispatched the news and 
their compliments to the delegates in Europe. This brought closure to the lengthy peace process. 
Although Franklin declared his intention to return to America, he did not take his leave for a year 
and a half. On July 27, 1785, Franklin embarked on his final trip across the Atlantic Ocean. 
When he arrived in Philadelphia, his compatriots greeted him with adulation. Franklin was 
shocked over the dramatic growth of Philadelphia during his absence and immediately noticed 
that the general populace fully supported their new government and championed their 
independence. Realizing it would be difficult to convince the American citizenry to entangle 
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their newly independent country with European interests, he finally closed the door on his lofty 
goals for an Atlantic union. 
The completion of the treaty dramatically redefined the position of Franklin and the other 
commissioners. On September 5, Franklin, Jay, and Adams informed Hartley that their 
commission was “terminated” and they no longer possessed authority from Congress to 
negotiate.1 Despite this end to their official status, the commissioners continued to contemplate 
the future relations between Britain and the United States. They advised that they would propose 
that Congress send a new commission to Europe to handle future negotiations. The 
commissioners also used this opportunity to express their wish to promote “a liberal and 
satisfactory intercourse between the two countries.”2 This was the beginning of an effort by 
Franklin and the other commissioners to heal the wounds inflicted during the decades long 
schism. 
On September 6, Franklin wrote Hartley detailing his perception of the state of affairs in 
America. He advised Hartley against delaying a British evacuation of New York in “the vain 
hopes of a new revolution in your favor.”3 Franklin surmised that such an event would 
exacerbate the fragile state of affairs. He noted that if the British expected the people of New 
York to pay their debts to British merchants as agreed they needed to consider the injustice of 
their continued presence. Franklin asserted that any hopes of a return to British rule resulting 
from America’s collapse was naïve. He noted, “the great body of intelligence among our people 
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surround and overpowers our petty dissensions.”4 Following his praise for America and 
dismissal of any possible American subjugation, Franklin expressed a desire to advance 
complimentary relations. He wrote, “there is no truth more clear to one than this, that the great 
interest of our two countries is a thorough reconciliation.”5 Franklin continued by assuring 
Hartley of his commitment to healing the shattered relations between Britain and America. He 
concluded, “let you and I, my dear friend, do our best towards securing and advancing that 
reconciliation.”6 
Despite the achievement of peace, suspicions about Franklin remained prevalent among 
the other American delegates. On September 10, he wrote Laurens acknowledging his receipt of 
reports about his conduct during the negotiations. The most damning accusation was that the 
French opposed America’s acquisition of the Atlantic fisheries, and that Franklin either favored 
their position or failed to “oppose this design.”7 This was an apparent remnant of the suspicions 
championed by Adams and others that Franklin’s pandering to the French establishment came at 
the expense of the American cause. Franklin explicitly dismissed the credibility of these 
accusations. He cited his fifty years in public office and declared his ambition to carry his well-
established “character of fidelity” to the grave.8 Of the accusations, Franklin wrote, “I cannot 
allow that I was behind any of them” and referred to such actions as treason.9 Following his 
denial, Franklin referenced Laurens’ knowledge of the events and their personal relationship. 
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Franklin stated that Laurens had witnessed his conduct in the affair and implored him to 
“destroy” the accusations and “do a brother commissioner justice.”10  
Jay offered his support to Franklin on September 11 by decidedly stating, “I have no 
reason whatever to believe that you was averse to our obtaining the full extent of boundary and 
fishery secured to us by the treaty.”11 Jay backed his position with specific examples of 
Franklin’s behavior throughout their diplomatic mission. He cited a conversation from the 
“summer of 1782” in which Franklin effectively argued with Vergennes supporting America’s 
“full right to the fishery.”12 Adams also expressed support for Franklin but did so in a more 
reserved fashion. On September 13, Adams wrote in support of Franklin, declaring that during 
the negotiations Franklin was “useful both by his sagacity and reputation.”13   
As his colleagues came to the support of Franklin’s reputation, America’s most famous 
minister continued to focus on his continued banter with Hartley over reconciliation. On 
September 24, Hartley wrote Franklin, expressing a wish that the peace between their two 
countries improve their ongoing relations.14 Hartley wrote again on October 4 expressing his 
thoughts about “restoring our ancient co-partnership generally.”15 He described his goal as 
“endeavoring to arrange that system upon which the China Vase, lately shattered, may be 
cemented together.”16 Hartley argued that rapprochement was the most desirable solution to 
America’s ills and declared his determination to achieve it peacefully.  To validate his point, 
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Hartley cited a letter by General Washington that referenced the uncertainty of America’s 
government from a weakened congressional authority.17 On October 8, Franklin agreeably 
responded to Hartley’s ideas, stating, “I join you most cordially.”18  
Franklin wrote Hartley again on October 16 expanding upon his conception of future 
relations between Europe and America. He also offered a proposal designed to create a multi-
state federation of interconnected Atlantic nations. He asked, “what would you think of a 
proposition, if I should make it of a family compact between England, France and America?”19 
Franklin equated this arrangement as a means for America to unite in peace with “her father and 
her husband.”20 His argument for such an accord rested on his hopes of preventing future 
conflicts between the great colonial powers. Franklin commented, “what repeated follies are 
these repeated wars?”21 To validate his point, Franklin wrote of the damages suffered from these 
altercations. He commented, “how many excellent things might have been done to promote 
internal welfare of each country; what bridges, roads, canals and other useful public works and 
institutions tending to the common felicity might have been made and established with the 
money and men foolishly spent during the last seven centuries by our mad wars in doing one 
another mischief?”22 Franklin concluded his correspondence by appealing to a character aside 
from national identity. He wrote they should learn to respect each other’s rights because they 
were “all Christians.”23  
                                                           
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Benjamin Franklin to David Hartley, October 8, 1783, Benjamin Franklin Papers, Yale University Library, 
New Haven, CT, http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 9, 2014).   
19
 Benjamin Franklin to David Hartley, October 16, 1783, Benjamin Franklin Papers, Yale University Library, 
New Haven, CT, http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp (accessed April 9, 2014). 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 Ibid.  
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Ibid.  
145 
 
On December 5, Adams wrote Franklin from London saying that he had received a 
dispatch from Philadelphia containing newspapers, proclamations, a set of instructions for the 
commissioners and a separate packet addressed solely to Franklin.24 Adams indicated that he 
would forward all the materials to Paris and take no actions himself until Franklin replied, 
because “there is no commission under cover to you in which I am named.”25 On December 10, 
Franklin responded by informing Adams that the packet contained no mention of a further 
commission to the delegation and observed, “it seems to have been forgotten or dropped.”26 For 
the time being, both Adams and Jay were ministers without portfolio. In a December 26 letter to 
Franklin, Jay affirmed the situation, declaring, “I decline to say anything about politics, for 
obvious reasons.”27 In an apparent state of suspended animation, the American commissioners 
spent the New Year awaiting further directions from Congress. 
Congress ratified the Treaty of Paris on January 14, 1784, proclaiming they “approve, 
ratify and confirm the same and every part and clause thereof.”28 The nine states present at the 
time of the ratification vote also unanimously resolved to recommend to their legislatures “to 
provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties which have been confiscated 
belonging to real British subjects.”29 Congress’ resolution also called for the restoration of rights 
and property to residents of those districts controlled by the British at the time of ratification who 
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“have not borne arms against the said United States.”30 The current president of Congress 
Thomas Mifflin, reported the unanimous vote and detailed his appointment of Col. Josiah 
Harmar to deliver copies of the proclamation and resolution to the commissioners.31 
The achievement of peace was a solemn event for Franklin. His physical decline was 
increasingly noticeable, and word spread among his fellow commissioners about his health, 
causing them great concern. Franklin dismissed these concerns and predicted he could survive 
comfortably for the remainder of his life.32 In one of his letters, he returned to the topic of his 
reputation and entered into a new defense of his course of action in France. He believed history 
would judge him favorably. While acknowledging his enemies, he also dismissed them stating, 
“there does not exist a human being who can justly say, Benjamin Franklin has wrong’d me.”33 
Despite this, Franklin asserted the value of such adversaries. Franklin surmised, “If you make a 
right use of them they will do you more good than harm.”34  
During the last months of 1784, Franklin occupied himself in the arts and sciences of 
Paris while the commissioners awaited further official news from America. During this period, 
their main source of information was the European press, which continually reported that 
America was on the verge of a political and economic collapse.35 This apparently failed to rattle 
the American delegates because false and misleading statements in a hostile press had saturated 
their entire mission. Without a clear further objective and amid growing health issues, Franklin 
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began expressing his desire to return to America. Despite his decreasing stamina, Franklin 
maintained a strong face in the Paris community and often entertained dinner guests at his Passy 
lodgings. He was clearly basking in the attention that his personal celebrity afforded him. 
Franklin finally got his wish when he finally received word on May 2, 1785, that Congress had 
approved his recall. He responded with elation and exclaimed that he again felt like a free man.36 
Franklin spent his remaining time in France composing letters and arranging his 
departure. He declared his determination to see America again but expressed great sorrow over 
leaving France. As his departure neared, the goodbyes turned tearful and caused Franklin great 
despair. Despite this, his desire to return to America never wavered. On the night of July 27, 
Franklin and his Paris entourage boarded the newly built London-based ship the Packet and 
enjoyed one final dinner reception. Early the following morning as Franklin slept, the ship set 
sail for America.37 
News of Franklin’s impending arrival in Philadelphia preceded him, and he arrived to a 
hero’s welcome on September 15. It appeared that the entire city turned out to greet him with 
celebratory cannon fire and admiration. Four nearby British ships obliged the festivities and 
displayed their colors in recognition of his arrival. Franklin immediately announced his return 
and dispatched his gratitude for such a reception to the Pennsylvania General Assembly.38 The 
University of Pennsylvania congratulated Franklin for “having accomplished the duties of your 
                                                           
36
 Ibid, 390.  
37
 Ibid, 396.  
38
 Benjamin Franklin too the Pennsylvania General Assembly, September 15, 1785, Benjamin Franklin 
Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT, http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedVolumes.jsp 
(accessed April 12, 2014).   
148 
 
exalted character with dignity and success.”39 As the congratulations continued, Franklin 
expressed bewilderment at what Philadelphia had become. It had grown and flourished 
dramatically in his absence with new neighborhoods, markets, and public buildings.40 Franklin 
continued to embrace his welcome and designation as an American titan.  
Once Franklin settled into Philadelphia, he attempted to bring a happy closure to his 
previous talks with Hartley by offering his former adversary a glowing description about 
American affairs. Franklin wrote Hartley on October 27 describing the state of America in detail 
and dismissed accounts in the British press that America was in disarray. He reported that 
property values had risen, crops were plentiful, unemployment was low, wages were high, and 
commerce was strong.41 He also reported that the populace strongly approved of the government 
that he and his colleagues had created and noted their dedication to preserving their 
independence. To prove his observations, Franklin declared his intention to include several local 
newspapers with his correspondence. This marked the end of any serious discussions about 
reconciliation or an Atlantic union because Franklin immediately realized that it would be 
impossible to sell his compatriots on anything resembling a European entanglement. Franklin 
concluded by acknowledging his role in America’s transformation and declared, “you know the 
part I had in that change.”42  
 Franklin’s return to America was the end of a dramatic adventure abroad that became a 
defining moment in the history of humanity. This was not the end of Franklin’s public life, as he 
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soon found himself immersed in the Pennsylvania Abolition Society and was elected president of 
Pennsylvania in late 1785. Franklin also attended the Constitutional Convention in 1787. 
Although his advancing age diminished his contributions, Franklin’s presence at the creation of 
the U.S. Constitution afforded him an opportunity no other founder father could claim. When he 
affixed his signature to the Constitution he became the only person to have signed the 
Declaration of Independence, the Franco-American alliance, the Treaty of Paris, and the U.S. 
Constitution. Even this monumental achievement was not the end of Franklin’s public 
contributions, as he continued his official service to Pennsylvania until late 1788 at the age of 82. 
With accolades still coming until his final days in 1790, he could observe in peace and 
satisfaction that he had taken a leading role, probably the crucial role that no other person in 
Europe or America could have played in reshaping a new Atlantic world that for the next century 
would contain four great empires, not three: Britain, France, Spain and the United States.  
 
Conclusion. 
 The events surrounding the achievement of the Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783, 
dramatically redefined Benjamin Franklin’s historical stature and the entire Atlantic world. 
Before to his dispatch to France, Franklin had already lived a prolific life as a successful 
capitalist, author, inventor, scientist, political theorist and public official. It was Franklin’s 
activities as America’s first foreign minister that provided him with the opportunity to apply his 
personal interpretation of international diplomacy to deconstruct the imperial Atlantic paradigm 
for the world and to emancipate America from European domination. This crowning 
achievement was not an overnight action for Franklin; it actually was the culmination of a 
decades-long process beginning with the loosest of creations. In 1754, Franklin proposed and 
unsuccessfully campaigned in favor of his Albany Plan of Union to unite the fragmented British 
colonies of North America in mutual defense against the hostilities engulfing America during the 
French and Indian War. This precursor to a United States as later detailed in the Declaration of 
Independence was an early demonstration of Franklin’s understanding about the value of 
American unanimity and the complexity of Europe’s ancient rivalries.  
 In the twenty-two years between Franklin’s failed Albany Plan and the Declaration of 
Independence, American society rapidly evolved from a divided collection of individual interests 
into a citizenry of sufficiently common interests to sue for independence. Franklin himself 
expanded politically and intellectually as he spent a number of these years as a diplomat in 
Britain on two separate missions. These trips abroad exposed Franklin to the nature of Atlantic 
imperialism and Europe’s political framework. When the newly created United States sent 
Franklin as its first minister abroad to France in 1776, his knowledge of international diplomacy 
became an asset as he embarked on a mission to achieve peace and gain recognition of an 
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independent United States from Britain. This endeavor would translate into Franklin’s crowning 
achievement when the new Atlantic landscape that emerged from the 1783 treaty bore his 
fingerprint. 
 Franklin’s activities in France have served as a benchmark and model for over two 
centuries of American foreign diplomacy. His success in securing the Franco-American alliance, 
gaining sufficient munitions to support a massive rebellion and negotiating the definitive peace 
are virtually unparalleled in American history. Franklin’s persona of the wise, well-traveled, 
talented, and inventive dignitary has emerged as a desirable trait among all future ambassadors. 
The position held by Franklin in France eventually evolved into the U.S. Secretary of State 
through his successor to France, Thomas Jefferson. This resulted from the creation of the U. S. 
Department of State that can trace its roots back to legislation creating the Department of 
Foreign Affairs signed into law by President Washington on July 27, 1789. This department has 
rapidly expanded in size and responsibilities over the course of American history. The 
department’s foundation lies with Franklin and his coonskin cap and is duly recognized in the 
creation of the Franklin diplomatic rooms at the Department of State.  
 The 1783 peace redrew the North American continent by rapidly expanding the land 
claims of the newly created United States through the Great Lakes to the North, west to the 
Mississippi and defined the southern border with Spanish Florida. Most  of the territory gained 
by the U.S. at the end of the war came at the expense of those Indian nations along the colonial 
perimeter who had supported the British during the Revolution. The Treaty also granted both the 
United States and Britain unlimited access to the Mississippi River. This expanded admittance to 
the Mississippi River basin and the northern Great Lakes rapidly enhanced the commercial 
opportunities for the fledgling United States. Additionally, the treaty helped strengthen 
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America’s self-sufficiency by securing fishing rights to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Grand 
Banks off the Newfoundland. This evolution of the geography, economy, and autonomy of North 
America was only one component of Franklin’s impact on the Atlantic World. 
 The conclusion of the Treaty of Paris and the subsequent three separate accords between 
Britain and the other European belligerents officially marked the end of the first British Empire, 
which had incorporated the eastern half of North America (1583-1783). This loss of Britain’s 
valuable North American possessions caused a redirection of the crown’s imperial pursuits 
towards other territories in Africa, India, the Far East and the greater Pacific Rim of nations. In 
Britain’s remaining Canadian possessions, the impact of the American Revolution was 
undeniable. The immediate result was a significant northern wave of immigration by tens of 
thousands of American loyalists who fled the United States following Britain’s defeat. This 
noticeable population shift somewhat eased tensions in America but caused agitation in Canadian 
society. Although Britain retained its important Canadian provinces, its imperial ambitions in 
America never fully recovered from the loss of the thirteen colonies. 
 The success of the American Revolution and the fruits of Franklin’s labors at Versailles 
created a domino effect of change throughout the entire Atlantic theatre. The French had 
incurred a significant debt from the funding of the American war and gained minimal spoils from 
the endeavor outside of humiliating their perennial British adversaries. This exacerbated France’s 
existing financial difficulties dating back to the Seven-Year’s War and inflated the growing 
indignation toward its aristocracy among the French populace. To compound this development, 
the success of the American Revolution and the establishment of a government modeled on 
republicanism and other principles of the enlightenment inspired the French masses. This is 
apparent by the nearly simultaneous creation of France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
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the Citizen (August 1789) and the introduction of the U.S. Bill of Rights on September 26, 1789. 
Soon the French monarchy that financed the American insurrection and provided Franklin with 
the backbone needed to extract an American empire from Britain would fall victim to a revolt of 
its own citizenry. 
 As France descended into chaos, its ability to administer an Atlantic empire crumbled as 
well, and the revolutionary tide that began in America, traveled to Europe, and then returned to 
the Americas when a slave revolt in the French colony of St. Domingue erupted on August 21, 
1791. Fighting against a heavily stratified society and championing enlightened ideas that 
flourished in the American and French revolutions, African born slaves successfully rebelled 
against the white planter class. This brought forth the establishment of the independent country 
of Haiti and the abolition of slavery within the state. This definitive event in the Caribbean was 
not the end of the revolutionary tide throughout the Atlantic. As the Napoleonic Wars (1803 – 
1815) destabilized the European continent, a wave of struggles for independence began within 
Spanish America that raged well into the third decade of the nineteenth century. This demolition 
of Atlantic imperialism eventually rippled throughout the entire globe in a series of smaller and 
more localized insurrections. 
  Within five short decades, the Atlantic world underwent a dramatic social, political, 
intellectual, and economic evolution. The varied causes of this monumental transformation were 
convoluted and interconnected. Despite this, certain events of this period that created the 
mechanisms for this change stood as milestones above the others. The 1783 Treaty of Paris as 
achieved through the diplomatic talents of Benjamin Franklin that established the first 
independent nation to arise in a colonize America was certainly one of these.   
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